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CONFIDENTIAL.

F.O.
424

PAPERS

RELATING TO

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL REFORMS

IN

TURKEY.

1859—61.

19

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Papers relating to Administrative and Financial Reforms in Turkey.

No. 1.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 26, 1859.

YOUR Lordship in your despatch No. 1 of June 25 mentions a conversation which took place between your Lordship and Baron Brunnow, with reference to the conduct pursued, and to be pursued, by the Consuls of foreign Powers in the East.

In this conversation your Lordship alludes to a remark of Aali Pasha's, to the effect that the arbitrary demands and conflicting influence of such Consuls completely annihilated the power which should be exercised by the Turkish authorities, to which Baron Brunnow replied by saying: "What would be the case without the Consuls?" adding finally, a suggestion that it would perhaps be possible to get the foreign Consuls to act together upon some common plan founded on identical instructions.

I have thought that your Lordship might probably wish to know my opinions with reference to this subject. I will first state, then, that I agree with Aali Pasha to this extent: that the manner in which many of the foreign Consuls, including our own, have been in the habit of assuming the functions of government; of dictating to the Pashas arbitrarily the line of conduct to be pursued in internal matters; of fostering partizans, and of contending with each other for paramount influence,—has gone a great way towards annihilating the power of the provincial Governors, of introducing a restless spirit of dissatisfaction amongst the native population, and of involving the European Governments in quarrels on trifling matters which have essentially their origin in the mere personal pretensions of their several Agents.

On the other hand, I am equally convinced that the power of foreign Consuls, if restricted within salutary and legitimate limits, would be of immense service to the civilization of Turkey, and even to the Turkish administration.

It was with this view that I framed circular instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls, dated the 1st of January last, in which I endeavoured to define, and lay down as clearly as I could, the line of conduct they should pursue, and my endeavour has since been to restrict them within the limits thus imposed, allowing perhaps a little more latitude to those Consuls on whose good sense and ability I could especially rely, and being more particularly stringent with those who I thought ought to be more carefully watched. It would be exceedingly desirable if instructions of this kind, with any alterations or modifications which your Lordship might deem advisable, were given to the Consuls of other Powers, and, indeed, if precisely similar instructions were given to the Consuls of all the Powers it would be desirable; but it would be necessary in this case that their Representatives at Constantinople should have a power of exercising a control over the said Consuls, and of determining with more or less authority any differences or questions that may arise between them. A limited power of this kind was given to M. Thouvenel and myself by our respective Governments, and I think we were disposed to use it fairly, and did use it in a manner which

put a stop to that hostility which had previously existed between various of our Agents. It is exceedingly desirable, however, that any policy thus entered upon should be strictly and impartially enforced, and, if I am to believe the reports I receive, I do not believe that this at the present time is the case in Syria, where Mr. Moore has the most positive orders from me not to interfere in affairs of the internal administration of the country without reference to Constantinople, and special instructions to that effect; whereas the Count of Bentivoglio takes up the person who was lately Christian Kaimakam of Mount Lebanon, but whose authority has been lately suspended, and insists on his reinstallation in office as a matter in which the dignity and honour of his country are concerned. If any general rule is to be established between the two Governments, a question of this kind should not be taken up by the Consul of either in this manner. It should either be left calmly to the independent decision of the Porte itself, or a common opinion should be arrived at by the respective Consuls-General at Beyrout, or the respective Ambassadors here. I mention this case especially, because it explains the whole system which I think has hitherto been so fatally pursued. A particular Consul takes up a particular local authority; he identifies his Government with this individual, whose cause he invariably advocates with more zeal than it deserves. Either other Governments must submit to this, in which case they establish an influence paramount over the Porte, as well as over themselves; or they must resist it, in which case there arises an infinitude of never-ending disputes on matters which, in nine cases out of ten, might be traced to causes wholly insignificant.

What I find at present is this: if a Pasha is a weak man, he either crosses his arms on his breast and does nothing, or he surrenders himself to the patronage of some Consul with a strong will and authoritative manners. In the first case his own Government naturally complains of him; in the second, one Government usually cries him up as a phœnix, and the others run him down as a monster. On the other hand, if a Pasha of strong mind and independent character is sent anywhere—a man who goes his own way without attending to this Consul or that—all the Consuls usually combine against him, and hold his assumption of independence as an act against their Consular authority.

I find also that each Consul is too apt to wish and expect that the Pasha should obey him and him alone; and, moreover, that each not only wishes to govern, but to appear to govern, and to have it said that everything is done by his influence, which, if he is an Englishman, he calls English influence, if a Frenchman, French; but which, whether French or English, is an influence that excites the jealousy of his colleagues, and damages the position of the Pasha who is charged with the government of the district in which he resides.

I do not know whether your Lordship will approve of this, but I tell our Consuls whenever they can exercise a beneficial influence, to do so, but not to be ostentatious of it, and rather to give the credit of whatever good they are able to perform to the Turkish authorities than boast of it themselves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 2.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 67.)

Constantinople, July 26, 1859.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship requests me to express an opinion as to the weight which may be attached to the statements contained in a paper respecting the late reforms in Turkey which I forwarded to the Earl of Malmesbury in my private letter of June 1st.

Of the paper in question I have not, unfortunately, a copy, and I cannot therefore review its contents in detail, but I read it attentively, and perfectly remember its general tenour and substance. It is to be considered as the Turkish Government's statement of its own case; but it is drawn up by a Christian subject of the Porte, a man of some character, station, and ability. The outline may be held to be correct; the colouring must be considered as too favourably exaggerated.

Whether the Turks have done a great deal, or very little, depends on the point of view from which we look at the subject. If we compare Turkey as she is with what she was twenty-five or thirty years ago, the change is marvellous. Men who lived at the former period tell me, every day, they can hardly credit the state of things they see now, when they remember what existed in the days of their youth.

On the other hand, when you compare Turkey as she is, to what she ought to be, in order to stand side by side on equal terms with the first and most civilized States in Europe, the progress she has to make is so immense that that which she has already made appears almost insignificant.

In no countries are great reforms made, especially when they involve social changes, except as the generations which grow up in one set of ideas have been replaced by generations which grow up in another; but in this country especially, a country composed of various races with various religions, each sect being exclusive and fanatical, and one race especially being the dominant one; in a country, moreover, which has always hitherto been ruled by a loose and undisciplined system of government, any change that would suit our notions of justice, government, and law, can only be a work of great difficulty and considerable time.

I may mention, however, that a regular army has been formed on something like the system that prevails in Prussia; and, though this army is irregularly paid and kept, and the majority of its officers are ill-educated, it is nevertheless, upon the whole, an army that not only on prepared occasions appears creditably on parade, but has manifested in the field, and is capable, I am convinced, under suitable guidance, of again exhibiting there, sufficient discipline and courage to enable it to contend without dishonour against any of the great military Powers in Europe.

The military navy of Turkey is also fairly organized, and is perhaps as efficient as the Empire requires, or, at all events, can expect to have, as long as the Turks, to whom the sea is odious, are alone employed in the naval service.

Life and property, which were formerly at the mercy not only of the Sultan, but of every Minister and Pasha, are now, on the whole, secure against any act of vengeance, illegality, and oppression, that is not sanctioned by a tribunal and the forms of law.

The Turkish tribunals, however, of all kinds, whether new or of more ancient date, are in most respects to be condemned, and of many the corruption is notorious, though not more so, perhaps, than that of other tribunals in other countries of Europe which I have visited. Indeed, the judicial reforms which have very recently been made, though evidently calculated to lead eventually to better things, improve them but slightly, if at all, at the moment.

As to the Administration, it is not constituted without an idea of order and justice; it has rules and regulations, and safeguards against the abuse of power; but it is complicated and inefficient; and, in avoiding the extreme which formerly confided absolute authority to the caprice and will of an individual, there has arisen another in a series of checks and delays enervating all authority. This may be seen in the fact which recently took place at Jeddah; namely, that whereas of old a Pasha could put an innocent man to death at will, he cannot now execute the greatest criminal without referring, however distant his post, or however pressing the emergency, to the Porte.

With respect to finance, I treated that question in a letter I had the honour to forward to your Lordship on the 20th instant.

I now pass to a subject interesting on account of its intrinsic importance, and interesting also on account of the various statements that are made concerning it—I mean the treatment of the Rayahs, or Christian subjects of the Empire.

In Constantinople and its immediate vicinity these have undoubtedly attained a greater degree of equality with the Mussulmans than could have been expected, considering the short space of time that has elapsed since the Edict of Gulhané was promulgated.

There is still certainly a difference between the two classes, but this is rather a difference as between the upper and the middle class in other countries, than as between the infidel and the true believer. At a distance from the capital, however, such distinction is no doubt far greater, and depends, in a certain degree, upon the character of the population of the particular district, as

well as on that of the Governor appointed over it; both of these serving to temper the general orders of the Porte.* But it is also to be borne in mind that the Christian classes are not, even here, inferior only on account of their religion: they are nearly all belonging to that portion of society which in all countries not perfectly civilized and well-governed, whether Christian or Mussulman, are unfortunately oppressed. The Mussulmans in the provinces, indeed, when of the inferior classes, suffer perhaps even still more than the Christians from the effects of the bad government that maintains there; for the latter are usually in some degree protected by the foreign authorities, whereas the latter have no protector. The persecutions of the different sects of Christians, moreover, are not unfrequently caused by their several animosities, and the manner in which the one excites the local authorities against the other. Protestants, Catholics, Greeks, are usually involved in rival quarrels; and the Turk, who receives their several complaints, is urged to espouse the cause of the one or the other, by the momentary influence of the Consul or Consul-General who is most in vogue.

A little mischief also has, perhaps, been done by the indiscreet zeal and imprudent counsels of those foreigners whom motives of humanity and religion incline to become champions of the Christian races. By many of these, copies of the celebrated Hatti-Humayoun have been published and circulated throughout the country, whilst comments are made upon it calculated to make the people believe that the Mussulmans are to concede more, and the Christians to obtain more, suddenly and at once, than is practically possible under the most favourable circumstances. Hence, the one have become discontented under the influence of exaggerated hope; the other irritated, suspicious, and severe under the opposite influence of exaggerated fear.

It is likewise to be considered that the reformers in Turkey are, after all, as yet but a very small body of men in Constantinople; some of these are exceedingly able and well informed; they are, moreover, sincere in their desire of maintaining the system of which they are the patrons, for it gives them a monopoly of power: but, partly from a jealousy of younger aspirants, partly from an actual want of any number of persons fit for public employment, there are few to whom they can confide the execution of their designs, and thus they are either themselves overpowered by the multitude of details which crowd upon them, or they see their wishes frustrated by the incompetence of the agents they employ.

If I am asked what course we, amidst such circumstances, should pursue, I should say that I think we must, first, define to ourselves very clearly what it is possible to do, and what it is not; secondly, I think that we must endeavour to carry out what is possible, by a few simple measures that will not cause great expense, or be received with great repugnance; measures which the two Embassies of France and England should agree to and urge perseveringly and seriously on the Sultan's Government.

The first measure necessary, I confess (in my opinion) is to go, in one point of view, somewhat backward, and by removing to a certain extent the multiplication of controls and counter-controls that now weigh down authority, throw a greater degree of responsibility on individuals, and give greater life and action to the Government itself.

A certain number of honourable positions should then be created for the Rayahs, which would elevate their character and increase the consideration in which they are held.

Thirdly, I would in the Christian provinces have some Christian Authority—call him a Vice-Governor, or any other name—who should represent the sentiments and wishes of the Christians in a suitable manner to the Local Governor and to the Central Government; and I think, also, that a certain number of Christians should be admitted into a Council where the questions relative to the administration of their provinces could be considered. I confess I think it would be vain to attempt to amalgamate entirely into one common system the different sects and races. Each now in a great measure governs itself and is accustomed to its own habits and mode of administration; and wherever it is possible for this still to be the case, it should be so. The task indeed of encountering all prejudices and all opponents at once would be more than any Government could cope with; but, on the other hand, in those cases of a mixed or general nature, where more than one sect is concerned, and where the interests of the general community are at stake, there mixed tribunals must have jurisdiction and the general authority prevail. It will be impossible, moreover, to attempt to carry any plan into effect with the assent of the ruling race, which should have for its evident object the placing of any other race over it. It is not a policy of religion alone which will prevent this. The Turk thinks he is superior to the Arab, as he thinks he is superior to the Armenian or Greek; and the habit of command has made him in many respects superior to both.

* It is in parts of Albania and Syria that the greatest abuses prevail, and that the Government is in the most unsatisfactory state.

Between the Greek and himself, moreover, he feels that when the question is one of power, the struggle is one of life and death. The Hellene, in fact, would no more accept equality than the Turk. He has the same pride of lineage and the same ambition for supreme place. The best Government will not content him, if he is not the master in it; the Ionians reject the British rule, and it is therefore easy to understand that the same people will not be satisfied with the Turkish rule, even after it has undergone a vast amelioration.

I say all this, not to check our efforts for improving and advancing the Christian populations in this Empire, far from it, but in order to steady and methodize our views as to the degree in which, with the assent of the Turks, reforms having for their object the amelioration of the position of the Rayahs may be promptly carried out.

Independently, however, of this peculiar subject, the whole conduct of the Government here, and of its administration, has, as I have said, to be improved; and although in many instances it seems to me in the way of being so, its progress, I fear, will be slower than the times in which we live, and the dangers which surround it will allow, unless some extraordinary exertions are made, some extraordinary measures are adopted.

Turkey has, in fact, to be Europeanized to cope with its enemies or rivals in Europe; and I own I do not see any way in which it can be so with sufficient rapidity to be in time to meet coming events, unless by the agency of Europeans. If the Turks would freely employ Europeans in the different departments where their knowledge, energy, and habits of business are required, they might within a few years make a great advance, and educate a race that would hereafter dispense with European assistance. There seems, however, to this plan an insuperable repugnance, which is no doubt fostered by the peculiar position which foreigners hold in this country. The Turkish Government cannot appropriate such foreigners to itself, because they cannot be under its laws and jurisdiction. Here, indeed, is one of the great difficulties which, in considering the prospects and maintenance of the Turkish Empire, one has to deal with.

Clear evidence on the part of Turkey of a firm desire to establish a Government that Europe would approve of, and a firm determination on the part of Europe to maintain this empire on such conditions, might suggest a reconsideration of our Capitulations, with a view to their gradual modification; but I fear, in the present state of things, it is useless to do more than glance at this idea; and I thus conclude the sketch with which I have troubled your Lordship, without however, I fear, giving any very clear picture of what is in itself so confused, and without arriving at any very definite result.

What I have said, however, may be thus summed up:—

Great changes for the better have of late years taken place in this country.

These changes are as rapid and general as could, under the circumstances, and within the time which has elapsed since their commencement, have taken place. But they leave an immense space of reform yet to be traversed.

The position of the Christian population is considerably improved, and may be yet, by a few simple and not very difficult measures, much advanced. But I fear any extensive change must be gradual in its progress, and as it has always to be remembered that the Mussulman class is, generally speaking, the upper and proprietor class, so we are not to consider all the oppression which takes place in the provinces as oppression against the Christians, but often as oppression against the lower class of the population, both Mussulman and Christian. Good Local Governors, even with the existing laws, would go far to remove this; but the requisites for such Governors are not easily found amongst the individuals from whom a Grand Vizier has to make his selection. The way, however, to

form such Governors is, to give those employed sufficient power for the purpose of executing the charge confided to them, and to inflict severe punishment on such as abuse this power.

On the other hand, as to many branches of administration, namely, those which concern Finance, the Army, Navy, Telegraphs, Public Works, &c., these can only, in my opinion, be placed on an European basis with sufficient rapidity to meet the crisis with which Turkey is threatened, by the employment of competent Europeans; and the great thing is to persuade the Turks of this necessity, and to facilitate, as far as we can, the removal of obstacles that exist, or any prejudices they entertain against it.

I have, &c
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 3.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Constantinople, July 26, 1859.

My Lord,

MR. HORNBY has shown me the sketch of an able Report which he has drawn up for the information of Her Majesty's Government, on the late judicial reforms in Turkey.

I agree with all Mr. Hornby's views as to the principles on which such reforms should be carried out; but he rather underrates, in my opinion, the difficulties which this Government has to contend with, and does not take sufficiently into consideration the causes, not of a judicial character, which stand in the way of immediate and adequate judicial improvements.

The objections found by Mr. Hornby against the new reforms are:—

1. That they were got up hastily to meet the urgent pressure Her Majesty's Government made on the Ottoman Government, and do not represent, and are not adapted to, these countries, but are simply taken from the institutions of a country foreign to and dissimilar from this.

2. That a new Court of Second Instance, lately erected, is merely a Court of Inquiry without the power of decision.

3. That all Courts which do not consist of one, but of many Judges, are relieved from all responsibility; and that, notwithstanding the principle of many Judges, and not of one, is that which the Porte now constantly adopts in the formation of her Courts, and especially in that of the Court just alluded to.

With respect to the first objection, the Turkish Government says in its defence, that the reforms in question were not got up hastily to meet present difficulties, but were duly and caretully weighed before being adopted, and that the new scheme is imitated from the French Code; because had the Turkish Government set about framing a new Code of its own, it must have employed in its construction its own men of law, bound to consult the precepts of the Koran; and that thus things would have been left in much the same state as they were. By adopting a new and foreign system, it hints that it separated the divine from the human law, and rendered useless the authority and knowledge of the exponents of the former.

Next and secondly, as to the limited powers of the new Court of Second Instance or Inquiry. The Turks say they were afraid to give at once to a Mixed Court with Christian Judges the power of actually pronouncing sentence on the lives and property of Mussulmans, and that they, consequently, deemed it prudent to habituate the Turkish people to see Christians in the first instance on the judicial seat, investigating such cases and passing an opinion on them. This opinion, however, the Supreme Court, which, though Mussulman, is generally composed of men of great ability, is bound to respect.

With regard to Mr. Hornby's observations, that where there are many Judges instead of one, the aforesaid Judges are relieved of all responsibility, the statement is assuredly correct; but the object the Government has here in view is rather a political than a judicial one.

In fact, the introduction of the Christian element into the exercise of judicial powers can hardly be executed except by some method of the sort; for

if you were in this country to have only one Judge, that Judge could not, in the present state of opinion, be a Christian. But by introducing Christian Judges into the Tribunals, you accustom the public mind to the idea of Christians sitting in judgment on Mussulmans. It is true that this may be all you gain, but the gain, though small at first, is calculated to become eventually great.

In fact, the whole of the proposed changes are worth little in themselves, and to the eye of a mere judicial reformer; but looked at by the statesman they may be regarded as a means for taking the popular mind, as it were, off its old hinges, and preparing the way for a better state of things.

I am, however, of opinion that the formation of a new Tribunal attached to the Municipality of Pera might, if properly organized on the principles laid down by Mr. Hornby, be productive of great advantage.

My endeavours, therefore, are for the moment concentrated in the attempt to create some good Tribunal of this kind, which, if it could bring the argument of practicable and visible advantage before the public eye, would do more, I think, to advance the question of judicial reform than can ever be done by any arguments merely on paper, however conclusive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 4.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 68.)

Constantinople, July 26, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE troubled your Lordship upon this occasion with much that relates to reforms in Turkey.

There is one reform, however, to which I wish to give a separate place, which has long dwelt in my mind, and which, if practicable, will be of immense benefit not only to the native population of Turkey, but to the foreigners who inhabit it: in fact I think it difficult to calculate its effects or to ascertain its benefits; neither do I conceive it altogether impracticable.

The reform to which I allude, is the establishment of one general code and mode of procedure for the subjects of all the foreign States who reside in this Empire. This will naturally lead to common tribunals, which might then be placed on a suitable footing adapted to the circumstances of the case.

The Mixed Tribunals which now exist of necessity furnish some ground for bringing the subjects of different Sstates together in a court of justice, and though, according to the rule now adopted, the law varies in each particular case as the party may be prosecutor or defendant, it would surely be better for all parties to get rid of so absurd a rule, and to have a common law by which a man, whether as prosecutor or defendant, should have justice dealt out to him. Moreover, I have not the slightest doubt that if one code should be adopted for foreign States it would soon be a model to Turkey from which her new code would be formed; and that thus the way would be prepared better than it could be in any other for allowing to the Turkish Government those rights which every other Government exercises within its own dominions, the alienation of which renders its perfect independence impossible. There are difficulties, doubtless, in the way of this plan, and it may perhaps appear theoretical that I should propose it; but its scope is so wide that I think it may not unwisely be considered before dismissing it as unattainable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 90.)

Foreign Office, August 9, 1859.

Sir,

I HAVE read with great interest your various despatches, especially Nos. 66, 67, and 68, respecting reforms in Turkey.

I willingly leave to your judgment the choice of the time, and the order of introducing these reforms to the notice of the Sultan's Ministers.

There is one point, however, which I am anxious to press on your attention.

Each Consul, as you rightly observe, is eager to press his own view on the Pasha of his jurisdiction; if he succeeds, he raises his country's reputation, and, perhaps, his own. But he weakens the authority of the Porte, and excites jealousy among the other Consuls of Christian Powers.

It is very desirable to introduce regularity and concert in making these laudable efforts. If each Consul were, unless in very urgent cases, to report to his own Ambassador or Minister at Constantinople, and if the Ambassadors were to communicate in a friendly manner to each other respecting an ill-governed district and frequent outrages on justice, they would have a better claim to be attended to than the separate Consuls can hope to establish by their desultory efforts.

A good understanding with your colleagues of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, is very desirable.

If any one of these should evince a reluctance to co-operate with you, you should endeavour to unite the others who are willing to join with you.

If you are thwarted in these attempts at conciliation inform me, that I may apply a remedy by friendly remonstrance with those Courts which are so ill represented.

I wish to make it clear to the Sublime Porte that these reforms are not urged with a view to increase British influence, or any other foreign influence; but with a sincere desire to render Turkey a fit member of that European system to which she is acknowledged to belong, to increase her prosperity, and to provide for the better security and contentment of the Sultan's subjects of all creeds.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 81.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, August* 3, 1859.

THE Turkish Government has adopted a measure for payment of the Sultan's debts which the exigence of the case required (but which is simply of a palliatory nature), by the creation of new "consolidés" bearing 6 per cent. interest.

It is calculated that the interest of these can be paid out of the revenue of the Customs of Constantinople, after paying the interest on the English loan for which these Customs are security.

But all this is pure hypothesis.

I had yesterday an interview with Fuad Pasha, in the presence of M. Falconnet, representing the Ottoman Bank here, and one of the members of the Mixed Financial Court recently organised; and I plainly told the Ottoman Minister that if the Turkish Government did not at once adopt some decided step towards the establishment of regularity and order in the Turkish finances, the ruin of Turkey was inevitable.

The first step I urged was the calling together the Mixed Financial Commission above alluded to, and instantly assigning to it all the proceeds of Customs at Constantinople, with an order to the said Commission to pay regularly in the first instance the interest on the English loan.

He promised this should be done on Saturday next. If it is, I shall think it possible that the new measures I have advised will follow; and if they are, a perfectly new state of things may rapidly be brought about; but I fear to encourage hopes, having been myself so frequently disappointed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 7.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 97.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 16, 1859.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 81 of the 3rd, reporting the conversation which took place between Fuad Pasha, M. Falconnet, and your Excellency on the subject of the Turkish finances, I have to state to you that the promises made by Fuad Pasha on that occasion appear to be very satisfactory, but that unless the Sultan can be induced to limit his own expenses to a fixed sum, and to put a stop to the plan of incurring debts for his own personal disbursements, the progress of Turkey towards ruin is certain.

I have further to instruct your Excellency to endeavour to induce your colleagues to join with you in making a joint representation to the Grand Vizier on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 8.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 106.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August* 16, 1859.

I HAVE had some conversation with M. Thouvenel since his return as to the policy of France, and I think I have also ascertained pretty accurately the policy of Russia as to this country.

The French, for various reasons, amongst which may be named a dislike to seem to adopt too suddenly an entire change of conduct in the East, are for giving the Turks a further trial, and awaiting the effects of such counsels with respect to reform and good government as we may be disposed to urge in conjunction with them.

I think their mind, however, is pretty well made up as to the unavailing effect of these counsels, and, having no faith in the government of any other portion of the population, they look forward in this case to the partition of the Empire amongst foreign Powers.

The Russians, with the same views, are disposed to follow those views out somewhat differently. They will be more abstinent in advice, more cautious and forbearing in manner, and re-assume, if possible, their old position of protectors to a falling Power, until such time as may seem most convenient to them for putting their foot on the neck of the people to whom they have been giving their hand.

With respect to Austria, my opinion is that it will probably relapse into its former alliance with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and follow out with it such changes in this part of the world as circumstances may produce.

Prussia will likewise be found in the end by the side of Russia.

The only real chance of upholding the Ottoman power for any length of time, therefore, depends on us and on the Turks themselves. As to reforms, if there is a question of great, general, and rapid reforms, such as would convert the whole of Turkey in a very few years into a perfectly well-governed Empire on European principles, it is idle expecting this. I see, for instance, it is asserted in some journals, that murders and robberies are still committed in Turkey, notwithstanding its new laws and its reforms. Such criticism is absurd and unreasonable. There are not only robberies and murders, which, unfortunately, are to be heard of in the most civilized communities, but disorder, corruption, weakness; what was certain to exist, in short, when the old discipline and despotism were relaxed, until such period (and these changes will be the effect of years) as a new system of discipline and government has been instituted and entered into the habits of the people. To attempt to make this new discipline and government too complicated and too perfect will be an error; to expect it to produce more in a given time than it can do is a wilful delusion.

The most we can hope from Turkey is that within the next few years she

will establish a regular system of finance, a tolerable army, and tribunals more adequate for the ends of justice—an operation, however, considering there are according to this new system, judges to form, lawyers to educate, perfectly new ideas as to equality before the law to create,which is not, and cannot be, either a very quick or a very easy process.

Of one thing I am quite convinced; the more simple the reforms that are attempted, whether in law or in administration, the more chance there is of their success. For years to come, in fact, the Government will depend more on the men employed than on the laws they administer. Responsibility must be concentrated, punishment inflicted, and rewards given, peculation discountenanced, adequate salaries afforded, a class of honest and capable officials formed; and this, which seems easy on paper, is difficult in practice, especially in a country where a Minister knows that a concubine, a woman, a favourite, may at any moment disorganize his plans and effect his disgrace.

I cannot, then, with all the difficulties and contingencies which present themselves to my mind, and with the formidable and hostile combination likely at any moment to be formed, speak with such confidence as to the future prospects of this Government as would relieve that of Her Majesty from anxiety on its account. I think, indeed, we must hold ourselves prepared for any catastrophe that may occur, any course that events may suggest.

Still I do not, on the other hand, deem that the task of maintaining the Turkish Empire is to be despaired of, providing too many things are not demanded from these people at once, and that their attention is not confused and distracted from the more immediate and essential subjects they have to deal with, of which their financial condition is no doubt the first.

With respect to the question of the Rayahs, I have already more than once treated it.

The changes to be made here must be made gradually; because, in the first place, the Rayahs themselves could not be made fit at once for vast or sudden ones; and secondly, because the Mussulman population, on whom, for some time at least, the Sultan can alone count as an army, would not, without disgust, bear violent and abrupt ones. But they must be made, visibly and really, by such administrative measures from time to time as are best calculated to elevate the character of this class, and fit it for the employment of the State; and by such judicial measures as will procure for it, as rapidly as the state of society allows, a practical civil equality before the law.

As to the course which the British Embassy should pursue on all these matters, it has been often thought over by me. There are two sets of persons: the one say, "Bully the Turks; you can get them to do nothing but by bullying;" the others say, "Leave the Turks alone, and they will find out what is best for them."

In regard to the first plan, if we wanted simply to obtain something for ourselves, and to crush this people in obtaining it, the advice would be sensible enough; but it is surely clear that if you make a people lose all self-respect, if you drive them as a set of slaves to any task, even if it be one calculated in itself to be useful to them, you destroy that which is the first essential in a State which you wish to make, or to keep, independent—its vitality, its patriotism, its individuality. The first instant, moreover, at which the lash ceases to fall, the herd stops; nor can anything done wholly unwillingly be done well.

On the other hand, if you leave the Turks entirely to themselves, the effect of climate, of character, of old customs, still, at least amongst the masses, would prevail over the notions of the few, who are more sensible of the necessity of changes, than disposed to constant and strenuous efforts to make them.

My notion, then, is that the best language I can hold is one of friendly encouragement on the one side, painting, perhaps, in somewhat flattering colours what has been already done in the way of reform, and friendly remonstrance on the other, demonstrative of the absolute and rigorous necessity of further changes.

Above all, I think it most essential not to obtain (for the sake of a momentary triumph, simply in appearance) promises of greater things than can really be performed, a course which leads to endless dissents; faction making the one party, in the end, wholly incredulous as to the value of any promises, and the other equally careless as to the performance of them.

I have only to add, that when M. Thouvenel has communicated to me more

fully his ideas—and I fancy his intention is to bring forward some general programme, which may be called the French one—I shall be most willing and anxious to co-operate with him in all that seems practicable or advisable, without disputing or caring about the title of authorship; while, on the other hand, I shall state, with equal frankness, my objections to such portions of his scheme as appear to me unsuited either to the country or the occasion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 9.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 14, 1859.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch on the expenses of the Sultan, I had some conversation with M. Thouvenel as to such a joint representation as that which your Lordship suggested.

He said he was perfectly ready to make any isolated representation such as I might myself make; but he could not make a formal joint representation without authority from home.

I am convinced that any attempt to sound my colleagues in a similar manner would be equally unsuccessful; in fact, many of them would make use of my request in order to poison the Sultan's mind against me, and to destroy any influence over His Majesty I may possess; whilst the failure which I should ultimately experience would produce a directly opposite effect from that which your Lordship desires. It is, moreover, exceedingly questionable whether the Grand Vizier himself could venture to present any such representation as that in question to his Master.

I would, therefore, venture to ask your Lordship's permissiou to be allowed to pursue that course relative to this subject which I think most likely to be successful.

In the meantime, however, M. Thouvenel and myself spoke the other night to the Grand Vizier very seriously, at my house, on the matter; and I told his Highness frankly the despatch I had received.

What strikes me, at the moment, as the best plan, would be to induce the Ministry to resign on any occasion where the Sultan's exigencies might justify the measure; and to let it be generally understood that any Government which accepted office with different views and principles would meet with anything but countenance from the Great Foreign Powers. In this manner something like a constitutional spirit might be engendered, and the patriotism and independence of men in office encouraged. A fitting occasion, however, must be found.

In the meantime I had a long conversation with the Sultan, who, owing to the sympathy I had manifested in his illness, was especially communicative and gracious; and I took the opportunity of alluding to the financial state of the country, and the ruin that would inevitably befall the Empire unless it was remedied. It is no doubt absolutely necessary that some limit should be established to the indulgence of His Majesty's reckless generosity and prodigal habits; but in reality, although at the present moment every farthing he demands has to be obtained on such onerous conditions as to be ruinous to the State, if anything like general order and economy were introduced into the financial administration, even the expensive tastes Abdul Medjid indulges in would be but of small comparative importance.

The Commission proceeds with its work; but far too slowly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 10.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 143.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 26, 1859.

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a letter from the Treasury containing observations on your views for the improvement of the finances of Turkey, as set forth in your despatch No. 105 of the 16th ultimo; and in recommending these observations to your Excellency's particular attention I have to observe that, unless there is integrity at Constantinople, no plan of reform in the provinces will be of any avail.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 11.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 193.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 4, 1859.

LOOKING for a suitable opportunity to carry out the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 97 of the 16th of August, relative to the extravagant expenditure of the Sultan, I agreed with the French Ambassador that the Representatives of the six Powers might ask an audience of the Sultan, and whilst congratulating him on the discovery of the recent conspiracy call his serious attention to the state of the country and the absolute necessity of order, economy, and vigour in the Government; and at our instigation Messrs. Prokesch, Labanoff, Joannini, and Rehfues, all agreed to adopt this course. But the Grand Vizier and Fuad Pasha, when our intention was communicated to them, declared, somewhat to our surprise, that they should be obliged to tender their resignations as soon as the audience which we solicited had taken place, as they felt sure that the Sultan would not fail to attribute to their instigation the course pursued by the Representatives.

A question then arose as to what steps we should take.

For my own part I deemed it advisable, on the one hand, not to add to the difficulties of the situation by provoking a Ministerial crisis; and, on the other hand, equally advisable not to forego the opportunity which the union of the six Representatives offered for endeavouring, by a joint representation, to produce some effect on the march of affairs. I therefore suggested that we should address ourselves to the Grand Vizier, who is the official organ of the Sultan, instead of to His Majesty himself, and that we should do this in such a manner as would give to our representation a common character, although each might communicate it separately (which his Highness Aali Pasha seemed to desire) to the Porte.

M. Thouvenel, who acted in this matter, as I must say I always find him act, in the most friendly manner, considered my idea a good one: and consequently at a meeting between his Excellency and myself, with Baron Prokesch and Prince Labanoff, the annexed memorandum was agreed to, as expressing our joint opinions; each undertaking to transmit it to the Grand Vizier, with a separate instruction to his interpreter. Mine is herewith inclosed; and it appears to have given Aali Pasha much satisfaction.

Count Joannini and M. de Rehfues took the same course as the four Representatives above-named; and the Memorandum was presented yesterday. It is, I understand, to be laid, together with the several instructions which accompanied it, before the Cabinet, and then submitted by all the Ministers collectively to His Imperial Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Identic Memorandum presented to the Grand Vizier.

LES Représentants des Puissances qui, en garantissant le maintien et l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, ont temoigné de l'intérêt particulier qu'elles attachent à sa prospérité, se croient en devoir, en face des circonstances graves du moment, d'appeler toute la sollicitude de la Sublime Porte sur la situation politique et financière du pays. L'Europe a marqué dans son sein une place importante à la Turquie; mais elle a bien compris qu'une caution extérieure ne serait pas suffisante pour réaliser ses vœux si la Puissance ainsi fortifiée au dehors ne s'aidait pas elle-même, et si son organisation ne se vivifiait par l'application graduelle et soutenue des réformes dont Sa Majesté le Sultan a librement et solennellement posé les principes. Une tâche si vaste, sans doute, ne saurait être l'œuvre d'un jour, mais sa poursuite ne comporte pas de rélâche; et dans la période de transition que traverse l'Empire entre les décombres d'un régime détruit et les matériaux non encore façonnés d'un régime nouveau, une impulsion constante est indispensable pour stimuler les retardataires, calmer les impatients, et contraindre les uns et les autres à travailler au bien commun.

Or, les Représentants ci-dessus désignés ont le regret de constater, sans prétendre en préciser la cause, que cette impulsion ne se manifeste pas de façon à atteindre le but auquel doit tendre elle-même la Sublime Porte. Ce malaise qui règne dans l'esprit des diverses populations de l'Empire ne disparaîtra que lorsque la masse de la nation entreverra clairement et dans un avenir prochain l'époque où elle jouira de la sécurité résultant du mouvement normal d'une société satisfaite d'elle-même, paisiblement occupée du développement de ses ressources, et dirigée par une administration attentive à ses besoins matériels, ennemie des abus, économe surtout et intelligente dans l'emploi des déniers publics. L'accomplissement de ces conditions générales de la prospérité des États est indépendante des différences de religion et de race; la question à résoudre est celle de l'établissement d'un Gouvernement sous lequel tous les sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, Musulmans et Chrétiens, au lieu de souffrir de maux analogues partageront les mêmes bienfaits.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Pisani.

Monsieur, *Therapia, ce* 3 *Octobre*, 1859.

LES circonstances graves qui viennent de se passer ici, et qui existent encore autour de nous, ont inspiré l'idée à moi ainsi qu'à plusieurs de mes collègues de solliciter une audience du Sultan, afin de lui faire parvenir nos opinions communes.

Il paraît toutefois que le Grand Vézir regarde une démarche dans laquelle nous avons espéré qu'il puiserait une nouvelle force, comme inopportune dans ce moment.

Il est naturel qu'après une telle déclaration venant de si haut et d'un personnage non moins respectable par ses qualités personnelles qu'éminent par sa position publique et officielle, nous ne prenions pas sur nous la responsabilité de l'acte que nous avons prémédité.

Mais, d'un autre côté, il nous a paru impossible d'accepter la responsabilité du silence auprès des organes accrédités de Sa Majesté sur les maux que nous prévoyons, si une main puissante, et affermie par la Providence Divine, ne dirige pas dans ce moment le vaisseau de l'État loin des écueils qui le menacent.

Vous prendrez cette occasion d'insister surtout auprès du Grand Vézir et de Fuad Pacha sur l'état financier du pays; vous parlerez de la nécessité absolue de l'économie de la part de tout le monde, tant de celle du Souverain que de ses Ministres. C'est en s'abstenant des dépenses que ni le Gouvernement ni le pays exigent qu'on puisse trouver, sans trop peser sur le peuple, les ressources nécessaires pour les besoins réels de l'Empire. Je dois ajouter que l'économie seule ne suffira pas; il faut de l'ordre, un système régulier, un budget connu. C'est inutile d'espérer le progrès de la Turquie aussi longtemps que cette

partie de son administration dont tout le reste dépend est tellement arriérée et vicieuse.

Enfin, vous remettrez à Aali Pacha, ainsi qu'à Fuad Pacha, une copie du Memorandum ci-joint. Ce document est d'autant plus important qu'il contient des sentiments unanimes des Représentants des Cinq Grandes Puissances qui ont garanti le maintien de l'intégrité de la Turquie. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a constamment prouvé la loyauté de son attachement à ce principe; et, pour ma part, il me fera un plaisir particulier, en travaillant pour le soutenir, d'être associé aux hommes aussi éminents que ceux auprès desquels vous êtes chargé d'être mon interprète.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 12.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 11, 1859.

I HAVE deemed it better instead of making a monthly report merely Consular, to make a monthly report comprehending the general politics and condition of the Empire.

I need hardly say that the chief point of present interest here is, as might be expected, still the recent conspiracy.

Little further light, however, is thrown upon it. It seems clear that Hussein Pasha, a man of energy and consideration, was its chief, and would have presided over its execution: his courage was tested at Kars, and few people could have been more fitted to take the lead in a *coup de main*. But in judgment and ability he is deficient, and could never have controlled the movement he was prepared to originate. Having been forced to leave the capital by his appointment to Larissa, the conspirators wanted a man of execution in his place; and they selected a certain Pasha who commands the fortresses at the mouth of the Black Sea. It is doubtful in what spirit this Pasha at first received their overtures; but at all events when they had confided to him fully their designs and resources, he communicated the same to the Seraskier. The Government then took the measures necessary to arrest the persons implicated, and destroy the plot at its roots. Hussein Pasha has arrived at Constantinople and been examined. All he denies, and that the principal conspirators deny, is the idea of assassination. They say that their wish was reform, and a change of Ministers and system through the Sultan, whose power, however, was to have been abridged in the new order of things. They deny also any idea of reaction in a legislative or administrative sense, although they avow that many practices which have been lately introduced, and which shock the Mussulman notions of propriety, such as the greater freedom given to women, would have been put a stop to, and the Mussulman feelings generally, as far as they were not incompatible with the introduction of European improvements, carefully consulted. The programme they now put forward is in fact a plausible one, but there is little doubt if their attempt had a first success, it would have soon assumed a fanatical character, and caused frightful disorders throughout the Empire. If, however, there were no other parties concerned than those who appear on the scene at present, the insurrection meditated could not have triumphed. The conspirators, indeed, seem themselves to have been sensible of this, but many say they had been led to believe that persons of the highest rank in the Empire were favourable to their plans. The Government affect, I think wisely, to believe that this was impossible, and without going deeper into the matter will condemn the persons now in confinement, under different categories; the most culpable receiving the sentence of death, which will not, I believe, be carried into execution.

The memoir transmitted to the Grand Vizier by the Representatives of the Great Powers has, I understand, been presented to the Sultan. It will be some days before I shall be able to say what exact effect it has produced.

The important consideration which these events bring forward is the great unpopularity of the Sultan, which has made people throughout the Empire, I

understand, sympathise with the revolution rather than with the constituted authorities.

The various Consular reports speak of this feeling.

With respect to the Empire generally, some of the districts bordering on Montenegro have returned to their allegiance. Drobniak, Piva, and some are still in arms, agreeing solely to the payment of a tribute, but refusing to receive Turkish Mudirs (sub-Governors) or Turkish guards. A difference, moreover, has just, I understand, arisen between the Russian and French Commissioners and their colleagues, but no details have reached me.

Disputes as to attacks and counter-attacks on the part of the border inhabitants still continue.

As to the Uskoks they are a lawless race, whose chief avocation is to pillage and murder; their own name is another for brigand, and it is probable that if any attack has been made upon them, its object will prove to have been in relation to this their peculiar character.

In Servia, the intrigues and efforts of Milosch to increase his power by means of the Skouptschina, or National Assembly, appear to have been checked by remonstrances addressed to him from St. Petersburgh, in consequence of which he sent a message to the Pasha at Belgrade, assuring his Excellency he, himself, had no disposition to alter his relations with the Porte, but that if the nation should insist upon changes, then he would submit its desires to the Sultan and the guaranteeing Powers.

The bearers of the firman recognizing Prince Couza were daily expected at Jassy, where the firman for Moldavia will be received first, and at Bucharest, where the firman for Wallachia will be read with the same ceremony.

The camp of Ploresti is broken up, and there is reason to hope that now that the Prince feels more secure in his position he will infuse more justice and moderation into his administration.

I understand his Highness's journey to Constantinople is deferred till the spring.

At Salonica, the arrival of Ismail Pasha, the new Governor, has raised hopes of a better state of things in that Pashalic, where the want of energy on the part of his predecessor had defeated his good intentions.

The prompt and energetic measures timely adopted by the Porte to put down the disturbances in Candia, aided by the conciliatory dispositions and ability of Cabouli Effendi, the Porte's Commissioner, have tended to keep the Greeks there quiet, and the Ottoman Government intends, on Cabouli's return, to consider what measures, if any, can be adopted for the general satisfaction and good government of the Island.

Mehemed Pasha with his troops still remains at Prosnevo, endeavouring to collect the taxes so long due.

In Syria the measures adopted by the local authorities to prevent the quarrel which had arisen between the Druses and the Christians at Beit-Miri, and in which several lives were sacrificed, from assuming greater dimensions, appear to have succeeded, and tranquillity seems restored.

The various statements of the proceedings of the Arab tribes in the neighbourhood of Mardin are very confused. But it is certain that they are plundering wherever they can venture to do so.

The recall of Omer Pasha from the government of Bagdad is owing to his attempting too much and doing too little; but his successor is a person not so fitted for his post as he ought to be.

He is, however, said to have been always very friendly in his disposition towards Great Britain, and will receive strict injunctions to continue so.

The complaints brought repeatedly against the Pasha of Erzeroum both by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Dalyell induced me to urge the Porte to replace him by a fitter person, and I have the satisfaction to state that Edhem Pasha, late Governor of Philippopoli, has been selected by the Sultan for the government of a province in which the Protestant community has had so much to complain of vexatious proceedings, and the good government of which is generally so important to the Empire.

On the 2nd instant Mouktar Bey, the official Agent of the Viceroy of Egypt at the Porte, left Constantinople in charge of instructions to the Viceroy, to put an effectual stop to the works of the Suez Canal. A copy of those instructions is inclosed in my despatch No. 168 of the 20th ultimo.

Mr. Colquhoun, under date of the 29th ultimo, writes to me as follows:—

"I understand the Viceroy has received copy of the despatches of which his Agent is bearer, through the French Agent. Whatever may be their nature, the temper of the Viceroy has been more upset than it has been for some time. He is in perpetual motion, having in his train 12,000 or 15,000 men; the last week he has encamped on a plain on the borders of Lak Mereotis, examining his Artillery in the use of some newly rifled brass cannon which have just come from his workshops at Cairo."

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 13.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 220.)

Therapia, October 19, 1859.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 193 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that a Cabinet Council was held on the 13th, in the presence of the Sultan, for the declared purpose of taking into consideration the financial embarrassment and general state of the country.

The Grand Vizier took this opportunity to represent the deplorable state into which the Empire was sinking, and recommended in language the eloquence of which I have heard much admired, that a general system of economy should be resolutely commenced, and steadily persevered in, and administrative order universally established. He added that the power of the Government to undertake this task must depend on the confidence given to it by the Sovereign.

His Majesty replied in language encouraging and becoming; but not satisfied with the simple expression of his opinions verbally, he communicated them subsequently in a public Hatt, of which a copy is inclosed.

Aali Pasha recognized the correctness of the statements made in this Hatt, but deemed it would have been better for the Sovereign not to have made so signal and official a manifestation of the condition of the country. He thought, moreover, that it would be necessary for the Cabinet to make some reply, pointing out clearly the measures which the Administration deemed advisable, and suggesting respectfully the necessity of the Sultan's affording in his own person an example to others with respect to the new course it was determined to pursue.

It is supposed by some that what passed at the meeting of the Council on this occasion (which it had been agreed should be kept secret until the Memorandum which it was resolved to lay before His Majesty was presented) was divulged to the Sultan by one of the Ministers (Riza Pasha), and that the Sultan was much displeased at what the Grand Vizier counselled.

By others it is said that His Majesty thought that if particular energy was required at this moment, a man of more energy than is generally allowed to the late Grand Vizier should be employed.

At all events, yesterday Mehemed Kabrizli Pasha was named Grand Vizier, and Aali Pasha, who has lately been complaining of the burden of public affairs, was offered a seat in the Cabinet, without a portfolio. This his Highness declined, urging his health as an excuse for retiring altogether from affairs.

The absence of a man like Aali Pasha from the Turkish Cabinet, whatever his defects, is always to be deeply regretted; but it is difficult to state the real importance of the change which has already taken place, until ascertaining what other dismissals and appointments may follow it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

P.S.—I also inclose the rescript appointing Kabrizli Pasha Grand Vizier.

H. L. B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Imperial Rescript respecting Reforms.

(Translation.)

My Illustrious Vizier,

FINANCE is the fundamental basis, and the means of attaining strength and prosperity. Without credit and public confidence, progress is impossible. When the natural resources of the Ottoman Empire are taken into consideration, it is certain that if its revenues were properly collected, and its disbursements regularly effected, it would, in a short time, gain strength and prosperity. But for some time past, owing to a variety of reasons, the injury done to the financial credit of the Ottoman Government has reduced the State to the crisis in which it finds itself; and the loans made at onerous and ruinous conditions of Galata merchants, in order to meet urgent and daily wants, as well as the divers sorts of paper-money that have been issued, have destroyed public confidence at home and abroad. To this being added a want of regularity in the mode of expenditure, the matter has come to this pitch.

As, by the grace of God, I propose, on my part, to use strenuous exertions for averting this danger, it is my positive Royal order that the Ministers also shall not be lax in their efforts for the same object; and that they shall, without mixing up any personal objects of their own, and without concealing anything, propose such measures as shall be of advantage to the State. Such as act in opposition to this incur responsibility in this and the next world.

Seeing that the cessation of this confusion depends upon efficacious measures, let, for the safety of our religion and our State, the radical and accessory means for that end, those for doing away with and correcting practices that entail superfluous expenditure, and those that are required for re-casting, by the grace of God, in a mode calculated to inspire public confidence the general administration of this Empire, be deeply and profoundly considered, and submitted to me.

17 *Rebiul-evvel*, 1276.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Imperial Rescript appointing Kabrizli Pasha to the post of Grand Vizier.

(Translation.)

My Illustrious Vizier,

OWING to the present withdrawal of Aali Pasha, it has become necessary to confer the office of Grand Vizier on another person. As it is certain that you will, in accordance with your judgment and sagacity, endeavour to transact and settle satisfactorily the affairs of our Government, that high office has been confided to your ability. Pay attention, therefore, and strive, in conjunction with the other Ministers of State, to perform in the manner desired all the important business of our Empire. May the exalted and holy God ever grant you his co-operation!

21 *Rebiul-evvel*, 1276.

No. 14.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 260.)

Constantinople, November 22, 1859.

My Lord,

REFERRING to my despatches No. 211 of the 12th, and No. 220 of the 19th ultimo, I have to state that the change of the Grand Vizier has hitherto not been followed by any other modifications in the Ottoman Ministry.

Understanding that the new Grand Vizier was anxious to obtain the commutation of the sentence which condemned the two leaders of the late conspiracy, Hussein Pasha and Sheikh Ahmed Effendi, of Sulimanieh, to capital punishment, and deeming also, myself, that the execution of these persons, however guilty, in the present state of the public mind, would be a dangerous and

untimely act of authority, I suggested to M. Thouvenel the idea of conveying to Kibrisli Pasha, confidentially, but in a manner he could make use of with the Sultan, our opinions as to the advisability of sparing the lives of the two criminals in question, who obtained, in consequence, from the Sultan the order that Hussein Pasha and Sheikh Ahmed Effendi should be confined in a fortress for life.

Though no knowledge of the conspiracy appears to have previously existed in the northern provinces of Turkey, the general opinion among Mussulmans unconnected with the Government has been, since its discovery, in favour of it, on account of the objects proposed by the conspirators; viz., the suppression of peculation and abuses in high quarters, and the diminution of the ruinous extravagance generally attributed to the Seraglio.

Indeed, the intelligence of the failure of the plot was not, I am credibly informed, satisfactory in Asia Minor, where a good deal of discontent prevails, and this especially at the head-quarters of the army of Anatolia; nor is such discontent surprising, considering the constant irregularity observed everywhere as to the payment of the military. The troops in Bosnia and the Herzegovina are, for instance, eight months in arrear, a hardship more severely felt by the Redifs, who, a year since, were taken from their homes and agricultural pursuits, leaving no provision for their families. Such insufficient funds as have from time to time been remitted, either direct from Constantinople or as have been afforded out of the half-collected revenue of the province, are absorbed in purchasing provisions, which contractors will no longer provide on credit.

The continued resistance of the revolted villages on the Montenegrin frontier had determined Dervish Pasha to strike a decisive blow, and a large body of Irregulars was collected for that purpose, but in consequence of the timely submission of the insurgent districts of Piva and Drobniak (in the Herzegovina), I understand that the force in question had not left Mostar.

As to the delimitation of the boundary, its progress has been attended with even greater difficulty than could have been expected.

Vassif Pasha refuses to recognize that portion of the new Montenegrin frontier laid down by the French and Russian Commissioners in the neighbourhood of Niksich, which gives to Montenegro three or four villages not marked in the official map. Much excitement exists, on the other hand, among the Turks of Niksich, regarding the cession made to Montenegro, and it will not be easy to satisfy the demands of those Mussulman proprietors whose lands, by the new arrangement, have fallen within the adjoining Principality. Nor is this all: the Commission, threatened with violence by the people of Spuz, was actually compelled to retire to Scutari, where, though the Porte sent orders for employing force, if necessary, in their behalf, it remained some time, though I am happy to say its labours have been recommenced.

On the Servian frontier, motives of economy have dictated a large reduction of force, and the army of observation stationed at Novi Bazaar, Pristina, Nisch, and Sofia, has been reduced to 8,000 men instead of 20,000, notwithstanding the military schemes of Prince Milosch, which it is presumed he can hardly push forward in the winter season; and, indeed, respecting which it appears he has been lately warned by Russia to be more cautious.

Little is known of the proceedings of the late Skouptchina, as they have not been published. But his Highness has at least gained two objects he had at heart, this body having first consented to the reduction of the number of Senators to about a fifth of that fixed by the Hatti-Sheriff of 1830, Article 17; and, secondly, given the Prince the power to collect money wherever it can be found, to meet the expenses of an increased military establishment.

The law of succession has been also promulgated, and allows Prince Michael, now declared heir-apparent, to adopt a succession in the event of his demise without male heirs; and provides that on any interruption of the adoptive line, issue of Obrenowitch in the female line may be chosen; and that even in the case of all the above conditions becoming inexecutable, whosoever may be declared Prince by popular election must assume the name of Obrenowitch, and be held to represent the Dynasty of Milosch.

This sufficiently shows that the recent Assembly was a mere tool in the hands of a party, and it is more than probable that it has overdone its work.

In Wallachia a new Government has been formed, under the presidency of M. John Ghyka (the ex-Prince of Samos). In reporting this appointment,

Mr. Green remarks: "It is difficult to say which trusts the other the least, Prince Couza or his Prime Minister;" and I believe myself that the Prince has formed a pretty just estimate of the character of the Minister, and the Minister of that of the Prince.

The first act of the new Administration was to slacken the restrictions imposed on the press by the late one; and as the caution-money required by the recent regulations will no longer be exacted, the newspapers have commenced reappearing.

The Hospodar left Bucharest for Moldavia on the 28th of October, and his presence at Ismail, where the inhabitants of the newly-acquired territory loudly complain of the exactions of the authorities, may prove beneficial.

It is to be observed that he seems tired of the part of Constitutional Sovereign he has hitherto professed to play even to affectation, and whilst taking upon himself all responsiblity for the acts of his Ministers, he has likewise assumed alone the supreme command of the army of the two Principalities.

From the configuration of the frontier in the neighbourhood of Bayazid (near which town the Russian, Persian, and Turkish territories meet), any displacement of boundary is at that point of more than ordinary importance. I have therefore called the attention of the Porte to the information which has reached me, that some of the pyramids of stone erected by the Boundary Commission for Russia and Turkey have been destroyed by the Kurds in the neighbourhood of Bayazid, although I learn at the same time from Mr. Dalyell, that, in consequence of orders from the Pasha of Erzeroum, measures are being taken for replacing the pyramids on their proper sites.

In contrast with the conduct of some Provincial Governors, I have to notice the universal satisfaction which is given by Ahmed Pasha, of Rhodes. He lately undertook a tour in the islands of the Turkish Archipelago, which are under his jurisdiction, for the purpose of ascertaining their condition and wants. By his unassisted efforts he established Commercial Tribunals at Scio and Lemnos, so that they and the other larger Islands of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Mytilene, are at present in possession of an institution by which it is to be expected that the interests of merchants, whether native or foreign, will be protected, and trade in general receive a new impulse. He also reformed many abuses, and made several regulations for the amelioration of the condition of the people, instituting a searching inquiry into the conduct of officials, including the Archbishop of Scarpanthos, who for many years has proved the scourge of that island, and who will be banished to Patmos.

I have laid some stress on these details, because they prove, first, that there are some Turks in high stations who understand the necessity of, and take an interest in, the improvement of their country; and secondly, that if (amongst the few Turks capable of undertaking such a task) a few Pashas were chosen who, invested with great influence and authority, should visit, inspect, and reform the administration of the principal districts of the Empire, much more would be done for ameliorating its conditions in a short space of time than will ever be effected by the Pashas of a second-rate grade, with a small local authority, who are either completely in the hands of a clique of persons in their province, or never venture to do anything without reference to Constantinople.

I have long pressed upon the Porte a plan of this kind, and great benefits will, I am confident, be the result, if I ultimately succeed in getting it adopted.

In Syria the unsettled state of Kesrouan continues. The peasantry still oppose their Chiefs, the Hazins, who appeal in vain to the authorities for aid to be enabled either to return to their homes, or to be put in possession of their property, confiscated by the leader of the revolt against their hereditary authority. Meanwhile some of the members of this ancient family are compelled to seek charity in the different places in which they are dispersed. Themselves fugitives, their families are at the mercy of the hostile population.

A sum of 29,000 piastres has been assessed on the Druses who burnt and plundered property, subsequently to the encounter of Beit-Meri. This sum is not considered adequate, and but a small portion of the pillaged property has been restored, the authors escaping hitherto punished.

Agents of the French Consul-General are traversing the disturbed districts. Twenty-seven persons compose the staff of that Agent, and large supplementary

pecuniary means placed at his disposal give him, says Mr. Moore, a preponderating influence and éclat in the country.

The Turkish Mudir sent by Khoorshid Pasha to govern temporarily in the Christian town of Zahleh is still there, but I am assured that that town is shortly to be restored to the jurisdiction of the Christian Kaimakam.

I have again called the attention of the Porte to the conduct of Mohamed Bey El-Assoad, who is said to be the persecutor of the native Protestants of Sidon.

With respect to Beyrout, Atta Bey has at last returned, and is showing, I am assured, every disposition to bring the outstanding questions confided to him and to Mr. Calvert to a speedy and satisfactory issue.

The Province is for the moment quiet, but it is reported that the Druses of the Hauran are arming, and it is feared that they may join their co-religionists of the Lebanon, and attack the Maronites, who also are preparing themselves for the attack, and for their own defence.

Of the Province of Damascus Mr. Brant, who is perhaps rather too disposed to notice things unfavourably, but who is nevertheless a man of judgment and ability, gives but a gloomy picture. The action of the Government, according to him, seems only to be felt in extorting money from the miserable peasantry for its own requirements, while it does not exhibit foresight enough to perceive the necessity of protecting those who furnish its revenue.

Meer Soleyman Harfoot, of Baalbek, is still detained in prison; no decision having been come to by the Porte as to his fate. His cousin, Meer Mohamed, is at liberty, and laying the villages of the Pashalic under contribution. The authorities, instead of using effectual means for seizing him, punish the villages that pay him money, although these are left unprotected, and fear the Emir's vengeance on their refusal.

In short, affairs here, without being much worse than usual, are no better, and exhibit the usual features of Oriental carelessness, incapacity, and vexation.

The hadji returned without having been molested by the Arabs, but it suffered from the extreme heat on the road, which occasioned an unusual mortality.

The prices of grain at Bagdad continue to be exorbitant, and the difficulty opposed to its purchase betray the influence exerted by the authorities, as well in order to enhance the value of the revenue paid in kind as to aid the speculations of favoured capitalists. Nor is it to this cause alone that the dearness generally prevalent, and the consequent distress of the population, are attributable. Bribery, under Omer Pasha, has been (according to Major Kemball) more rife and more frequent than under his predecessors, and the farmers of the revenue naturally seek to reimburse themselves for the high contributions they are called upon to pay by similar extortional practices in the collection of the taxes assigned to them.

Further disturbances have taken place in the district of Mohammerah, but without my participation, it seems, on the side of the Turks.

An incident has recently occurred at Bagdad which illustrates the growing power and influence of the sect "Bab," a sect which has of late made great strides in Turkish Arabia; its tenets having been, for several years past, secretly professed by a considerable and most insignificant portion of the population of every large town in Persia.

A Persian Mollah having publicly reviled "Bab" in the mosque, was cautioned by the Chief of the sect not to repeat the offence. This warning the former thoughtlessly disregarded, and on the second occasion his death was determined. The person selected to execute the decree (also a Persian, a confectioner by trade), in broad daylight, in the public bazaar, attacked the Mollah with a dagger, and was only prevented from dispatching him by the bystanders. Both parties were taken before the local authorities, who transferred them to the custody of their national representative, and to him the Babee, so far from denying or extenuating his crime, avowed his motives, expressed his regret that he should have failed in accomplishing his purpose, and boldly declared his intention to effect it whenever the opportunity should offer.

The Persian Consul hesitated to punish the murderer, but sent him to Meerza Hassan Ali, the Chief of the Babees, who, of course, declining to commit himself by openly acknowledging the man, returned him to the Persian Consul, to be dealt with as he thought proper. He was simply released, as soon as the

precaution had been taken to deport his intended victim to Persia, and thither he has since followed him.

Meerza Hassan Ali, though the ostensible agent, is not the real representative of "Bab;" his brother, Meerza Yagha, the secret of whose whereabouts is mysteriously preserved, being recognized by the Babees as the second incarnation of the looked-for Imaum, of whom the first was represented by the original founder of the sect, killed at Tabreez.

Your Lordship may remember that, some years ago, the life of the Shah of Persia was attempted by the Babees, and the dreadful persecution of them that followed. Most people believe that the subversion of the Hajjir Dynasty is still the main object of these fanatics, and that the attempt to effect this will, sooner or later, be repeated.

Mouchtar Bey's mission seems to have been attended with the desired effect; but, from what I hear, it is to be feared that new difficulties as to the Canal question will arise, and that the Porte will be pressed to give that consent without which the French Government admits that the works in question cannot be executed.

In concluding this brief sketch of the last month's events, I ought to say that, in recording the changes in affairs from time to time, I merely paint the variations of a kaleidescope the contents of which never really alter, although they are constantly taking a new position and appearance. The only thing that can create a really new state of things in Turkey would be a thorough reform in its financial system, and till we see what the new Grand Vizier will do in this respect everything respecting the future must be considered as uncertain.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 15.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 282.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 30, 1859.*

I READ with great attention the inclosure from the Treasury contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 143, relative to the report which I forwarded to your Lordship respecting the state of the Turkish finances; and I ought to state that that report was simply intended to give your Lordship what I believe had never before been sent to the Foreign Office—a short and rapid sketch of the financial state of this country, and my opinions thereupon without overburdening the same by details, or laying down as absolute doctrines ideas which after all must depend on facts in no small degree uncertain.

On some points, however, I cannot help thinking that my observations have been misunderstood, since the counter-observations made to them hardly apply.

Mr. Laing, for instance, seems to consider the suggestion which I made to the Turkish Government as to the advisability of employing a Turco-European Commission in order to establish the basis of a new financial system, and also my recommendation as to the employment, for some time to come, of Europeans in certain branches of any new financial administration that might thus be adopted, as counselling an abdication by the Ottoman Government of its own sovereign and national authority in financial matters. Now the question of Turkish ignorance on such matters being admitted, I know of no other way of informing the ignorant than by the employment of persons capable of giving the information required; and a Commission composed of Turks of eminence, and of Europeans specially versed in financial affairs, seemed, and still seems to me, the best mode of combining a system which has to be framed upon the two elements of a knowledge of Turkey and its resources, and a knowledge of the manner in which the resources of a country are generally made most available, and its receipts and expenditure best regulated. It seems to me also, I confess, that if a new financial system founded upon European practice be adopted, it would require, as a matter of course, for some time to come people versed in that practice to set it in movement; but I see nothing in all this which is either directly or indirectly a cession of the independent power of Turkey over her

financial concerns. It is by means such as these that the Turkish army and navy have been improved; and it is by means such as this, I am inclined to think, that its financial administration must be improved also. But the Turks are not Prussians because they employed Prussian instructors in the one case, nor English because they employed English instructors in the other.

Mr. Laing likewise states that my proposal as to such a Mixed Commission as I have described would not alone be sufficient to restore order and produce the benefits desired: that the publication of a Budget would be necessary, and that some means for paying debts, which, as I set forth in my previous statement, bear an enormous interest, should be devised. When a person recommends the building of a steam-vessel for such or such a voyage, it is supposed that he recommends that the vessel is not to be left in port, but to proceed on its route, when ready, by the ordinary stages; and of course the first object of a Commission, of the kind I advised, would be to draw up a Budget and point out the means by which the debt, bearing an enormous interest, could best be encountered and discharged. Moreover, I did point out various extraordinary resources which existed in the Turkish Empire for meeting an extraordinary debt of the kind in question, though I did not go into details as to the manner in which these could best be made available, because such details were not at the moment required.

What I showed simply was, that as far as we know of the ordinary expenditure and receipts of this Empire, at the present moment, the one pretty nearly balances the other, and that the said receipts might be enormously increased even by common management in their collection. As to the extraordinary expenses (owing to debts of a peculiarly onerous kind), these might be met by dealing with anything like vigour with the various means which I alluded to as being at the disposal of the Government of the Sultan. But, as I observed, before we can come to any precise conclusion upon these points, it will be necessary to know still more clearly and positively than we now do, what the actual receipts and expenses of Turkey now are, and what the exact amount of debts of various kinds is; and the Mixed Commission, if furnished by the Turkish Government with due powers and proper materials, is, perhaps, the best sort of body that could be devised for attaining the object here in view. As to the question of responsibility, as to the incurring of which Mr. Laing justly recommends due caution, it is, nevertheless, to be mentioned that though a great portion of the difficulties in which the Turkish Government now finds itself involved is attributable to the misgovernment of the Turkish authorities, a certain part of them also is due to the changes we have of late years been urging upon the Turkish Government, and which, though they are calculated in the end to improve the Ottoman Empire, have tended, momentarily, to embarrass the Ottoman Treasury; this, at the time of the death of Sultan Mahmoud, being in a very different condition from what it is at present.

I do think, therefore, that having, though in a limited degree and with the best motives, brought the Turkish Government into a new position, from which it must either emerge victoriously, or in which it will altogether sink, we are in the same limited degree already responsible, and called upon to assist the Turkish Government as far as we can, consistently with the interests of our own policy and country.

The question here simply resolves itself, as it seems to me, into what those interests are, looking upon them in a large and comprehensive manner, with respect to this part of the world. If it is according to our interests to maintain it, if the Ottoman Empire, it is as much according to our interests to maintain it, if possible, from sinking beneath the effects of its internal embarrassments, as from sinking before the sword of a foreign foe: but, of course, it will be necessary to avoid, by any misplaced indulgence or useless aid, adding to that negligence, supineness, and false self-security into which the Ottoman Administration is always more or less prone to fall. There are, with respect to the fate of all Empires, and almost all individuals, certain moments on which their future existence may depend; and a timely succour to men or States, struggling manfully against difficulties, may turn the tide of their fortunes. But it is necessary in such crisis to know that the manful struggle is really being made; and I am glad to find that while Her Majesty's Government is prepared to consider certain measures which might greatly benefit the commerce and internal prosperity of Turkey, but for which some alterations in our Capitulations are necessary, if it sees that the Turkish Government is in earnest with respect to the reforms it has now in hand, it is not disposed to alter those Capitulations without some proof that the language held on this subject is sincere.

As to the mode of raising the funds necessary for the works on the Danube, the question is one on which Her Majesty's Government is far better able to form an opinion than I can be; but I cannot help fulfilling a duty by saying that, as the resources of the Turkish Empire are known to be, at the present time, in so embarrassed a condition, the expenses of the Danubian Commission should be very closely watched. Nor is it to be forgotten that the opening of the Kustendji Railway tends not only to diminish the requirements of the future permanent works that are projected, but also that of the temporary works which are now being constructed, concerning which I think it might be desirable to fix, as early as possible, upon some definite point at which the continued outlay is to cease.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 16.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March 5.*)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 21, 1860.

THE Turkish Government has recently been acting up to its promises, and in some degree according to the system I some time since suggested, that is to say, a regular budget is being drawn up through the aid of the Mixed Financial Commission appointed last year at my recommendation, and the depreciated paper-money called kaïmés, the existence of which has tended so prejudicially to influence the exchange, is on the point of being withdrawn; an arrangement being also made for withdrawing gradually, and, as I think, too gradually, the beshliks, or present silver currency which is current in the provinces, and which ranks much higher than the kaïmé, though it is considerably lower in real value than the sum for which it passes current.

In order, however, to complete the amount necessary for withdrawing the kaïmés, it is the intention of the Porte to levy on Constantinople and its neighbourhood where this paper now circulates, a special tax, whether on the tenants of houses and lands, or on those lands and houses themselves, is not quite certain.

If on the latter, as houses and lands can only be held by law by Turkish subjects, and when possessed by Europeans are only possessed under some fiction or arrangement which represents the proprietor to be a Rayah, the Turkish Government will naturally be able to place the same tax on that property which is possessed irregularly by Europeans that it does on the same property held regularly by Rayahs.

With regard to a tax on the tenants of lands or houses according to the value of the rent paid, I think also if that tax is levied fairly on Ottoman subjects and foreigners, there can be no reasonable ground of complaint.

The letter and spirit of our Treaty of 1838 is to the effect that British subjects should be, with respect to internal impositions, on the same footing as the most-favoured Turkish subjects; nor can the exemption from haratch, a personal tax, imposed formerly as a mark of degradation on Christian Rayahs, from which the Capitulations declare that Englishmen shall be free, be held, I think, as granting an exemption from that general taxation not then contemplated, and to which it did not refer.

The obvious injustice of allowing foreign residents to be exempt from the ordinary taxation imposed on native residents, even of the most-favoured class, needs no comment; and unless I hear from your Lordship to the contrary I shall consider that matter settled by your Lordship's despatch No. of relative to the Principalities: this view being also in conformity with the views of other foreign Powers—Russia alone, I believe, excepted.

Another question has, however, arisen both here and in the Principalities on which I take a different view, I believe, from some of my colleagues. I allude to a tax which has been laid not only on all shopkeepers, but also on importing merchants.

The foreigners keeping a shop cannot, I think, object to pay, for the liberty of doing so, what the native subject pays. This is a tax upon a profession and upon a person; but with respect to merchants importing goods, and who sell such goods only in wholesale, the case is very different. I do not look upon this as a tax upon a profession or a person, but in reality a tax upon foreign goods, and though I am disposed to consider that our Commercial Treaties with Turkey would fairly admit of alteration, still as long as they exist their principle should be strictly maintained, and I think we ought to resist any tax of the above-mentioned description, not merely upon our own subjects importing goods, but also upon Turkish subjects or Moldo-Wallachians. The pretension in question is in fact reinstituting the very abuse which the Treaty of 1838 tended to destroy; and if I find that the attempt I thus denounce is insisted upon, I shall, if not advised otherwise, strenuously oppose it, and endeavour to get as many of my colleagues as I can to do so likewise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 17.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 100.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 8, 1860.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 104 of the 21st ultimo, on the subject of the Porte's measures of financial reform, and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government concur in your views with regard to the taxation of foreign residents in Turkey.

I have further to state to you the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that taxes on exports ought to be lowered by the Porte for the advantage of Turkey herself.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 18.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 122.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 28, 1860.

IN my despatch No. 104 of the 21st instant I alluded to a measure which the Turkish Government was likely to adopt with respect to taxation and the withdrawal of the caïmé (paper money).

A detailed account has lately been given by the Ottoman Government of the last loan of 5,000,000*l.* raised for the purpose of withdrawing the paper money in question.

This loan only produced actually 3,888,272*l.*, part of it having been sold at 85, and the remainder at 60; the sum realized in piastres being 548,637,702½.

The amount of caïmé in circulation being 618,979,160 piastres, a further sum of 70,341,458 piastres is still wanted to effect and complete the measure in contemplation. This sum the Porte purposes to make up partly by voluntary contributions of bankers, merchants, &c., partly by a tax on property to be paid by landlords, and estimated to produce 35,000,000 piastres, and partly by a tax on industrial pursuits, to be levied on shopkeepers, tradesmen, &c.

The Turkish Government in suddenly promulgating the decree on this subject has acted, as it often does act, without sufficient consideration or preparation.

First, it was hardly necessary, for the small amount which a tax on shops in Constantinople will supply, to awaken a question which, unless discussed and determined beforehand, was certain to create difficulties. Secondly, it seems unjust to tax first the proprietor for his property, and then his tenant in virtue of that property. The two taxes, in fact, will ultimately fall upon the tenant, and would do so if both were levied on the landlord; and yet, had they both been levied on the landlord as proprietor, inasmuch as the tax would then have

been a tax on proprietors, and consequently on persons held by the law to be Ottoman subjects (these alone being able to hold real property), no dispute would have arisen.

But, on the other hand, the object for which the present tax on shops is required is of a nature the most urgent; the benefit it will confer—a benefit in which foreign trade will largely participate—is great; the impost is but for once; and if it were now abandoned, the effect would be ruinous.

The point, however, here under discussion is, can a foreign subject be justly called upon to pay this tax on shops or not? As to the tax on proprietors or property, there can, as I have said, be no difficulty, since no Englishman can publicly claim to be a proprietor; and if he is so indirectly or clandestinely, he must take the consequences of the position he has assumed.

Looking at our Capitulations alone, I find two passages, viz.:—

Article XIII. "That all Englishmen and subjects of England who shall dwell or reside in our dominions, whether they be married or single, artisans or merchants, shall be exempt from all tribute."

Article XXXII. "That no kassabie (excise or duty) on animal food shall be demanded of the English, or any subjects of that nation."

The Turkish translation of the first Article ought to be, I am told, "haratch or poll tax," instead of "tribute." At all events I doubt whether either of these Articles so worded—established under circumstances so different—could justify our claiming the exemption from the tax (*i.e.*, the tax on shops or trades) now under consideration,—a tax levied equally on all classes whether Ottoman or foreign, and having for its object a great public benefit.

By the Treaty of 1838, Article III, indeed, it is laid down that "if any article of Turkish produce, growth, or manufacture, be purchased by the British merchant, or his agent, for the purpose of selling the same for internal consumption in Turkey, the British merchant, or his agent, shall pay at the purchase and sale of such articles, and in any manner of trade therein, the same duties that are paid in similar circumstances by the most favoured class of Turkish subjects engaged in the internal trade of Turkey, whether Mussulmans or Rayahs." And though it might be questionable whether the word duties applied to goods could strictly be construed into taxes or persons, yet I think the general sense of the Article is that English subjects may vie with Turkish subjects in any trade or profession in Turkey on equal terms.

But the Russians and Swedes have in their old Treaties words more general than ours, as may be seen from the following extracts:—

Article III of Treaty between Russia and Turkey of 1783:—"Pareillement on ne doit pas exiger d'eux (les Russes) le droit nommé haratz ou quelque autre impôt, et après qu'ils auront payé les douanes établies en vertu de ce Traité pour les marchandises qu'ils auront avec eux, les Pachas, Kadis, et autres officiers seront tenus de les laisser passer sans empêchement."

Treaty with Sweden:—"On ne demandera point de haratch des sujets Suédois qui sont établis en Turquie, soit mariés ou non mariés, qui font le commerce, et on ne demandera pas également le haratch des autres sujets Suédois résidant en Turquie, et ils seront exempts de tout autre impôt ou contribution."

Under these passages the Russians claim exemption from every species of tax, and the Russian Legation means to stand out upon this Article; and if its resistance is successful an immense obstacle will be placed in the way of any possible amelioration of the Turkish finances, and consequently of Turkish improvement altogether,—since the privileges asserted must either prevent this Government from increasing its resources by any species of taxation, or by exempting foreigners from that taxation, and only imposing it on Mussulmans or Rayahs; it will cramp the industry and check the wealth of its own subjects, and throw into the hands of persons whose means will be derived from their residence and pursuits in this country, but from whose means the Government of the country can derive no support, every lucrative occupation or profession.

The wording of the Russian Treaty of 1783 is, however, so broad and sweeping, that without some change had taken place in that Treaty, by subsequent arrangements, it might be easy to dispute the justice of the exemption now claimed; but it would not be easy to dispute its legality.

A great change, however, as I have just stated, in the whole system of trade

in this country did take place by the Treaty of 1838, above alluded to, into which change Russia subsequently entered.

Previous to that time nearly all trades were in the hands of Corporations, as had been the case not many years previously in Europe. Foreign residents could not and did not exercise any of these trades. They imported goods, and might travel through the country with their goods; but they were not in the position, as to general residence and traffic, of Ottoman subjects.

Now the Treaty of 1838, in the Article quoted, gives them all the privileges as to residence and traffic of Ottoman subjects. The Russians have enjoyed all the same privileges, conferred by the Treaty of 1838, that we have; and, therefore, though their Treaty of 1783 is rather different from our old Treaties, the one is as much abrogated as the other by the succeeding Treaty. We all stand on precisely the same ground, and none can be favoured or imposed more than the other.

The question, then, is whether we can claim the right to pay no taxes, which was accompanied by the privation of many privileges under the old Treaties, and the right of possessing these privileges, previously withheld from us, but granted under the new Treaty; or whether, when we contend that we have the right, by the Treaty of 1783, to engage in all trades and professions in the same manner as the most favoured class of Ottoman subjects, we do not thereby abandon any privilege with respect to persons engaged in the said trades and professions which the most-favoured class of Ottoman subjects does not enjoy.

As for myself, I should not, whatever my opinions are, have, under any circumstances, compelled the payment of the present contribution by British subjects without reference to your Lordship; and of course I shall not enforce their paying what other foreign subjects do not pay. I think, moreover, that even in assenting to the right of the Turkish Government to tax foreign subjects it would be well to place limits upon the exercise of that right, even for the sake of the Turkish Government itself, as well as for that of its subjects. But I cannot help thinking it will be most unjust to give a foreigner all the advantages, with respect to trade and residence, of a native, and yet subject him to none of the burdens.

This question should be taken up and settled or resettled. If it was thought worth while to deal with the Capitulations generally, they might be remodelled, and made generally more applicable to existing circumstances; or if it were deemed easier merely to deal with difficulties as they practically arose out of or coupled with the Capitulations, then the Governments might simply agree through their Representatives here to explanations, to be given in common, to those Articles which admitted of doubt, or might become impracticable or inapplicable in their present form.

This measure, however, which the Turks ought to have provoked beforehand, will hardly be in time for the existing difficulty; and whilst the tax is generally levied, the point at issue with the Embassies and the Legations will probably have to be held in abeyance.

I have, however, deemed it better that the whole matter should be discussed here at the present time by the Representatives with Fuad Pasha, who may then state his own case; and I have consequently requested the Diplomatic Body to meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the English Palace on Saturday next.

After that meeting the general feelings of the Diplomatic Body will be more clearly seen, and the future course to pursue, if the matter is to be taken into consideration by the different Cabinets, more easily determined.

I shall, therefore, again trouble your Lordship on this matter after the meeting I refer to has taken place; and I shall then endeavour to supply any deficiencies which may appear in my present communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 19.

Private Memorandum by Sir H. Bulwer.—(Received at the Foreign Office, March 18.)

Constantinople, March 7, 1860.

WITH respect to the special tax for completing the withdrawal of the caïmés, one meeting has taken place amongst the Representatives themselves, and one with the Representatives and Aali Pasha; Fuad Pasha being unwell.

I deemed it advisable that in this manner all should hear equally the language of the Porte, and that all should exchange their general ideas as to the obligations which their several Treaties reciprocally imposed.

The Turkish Government makes this statement:—

We have long been aware that nothing is so destructive to commerce as the uncertainty which now prevails in all money speculations, owing to the constant and immense fluctuations in the exchange; fluctuations kept up mainly by the depreciated state of the caïmés or paper money.

This is ruinous to us; it is also, however, prejudicial to all persons settled here and doing business here, foreigners as Ottoman subjects.

We have done our utmost to remedy the evil. By a loan we have procured the funds which were necessary to extinguish the greater portion of the notes in question. A small number remain, however, which ought to be extinguished without delay.

To obtain the funds for this we have instituted a contribution, 10 per cent. on the rent of property in Constantinople, all of which is levied on Ottoman subjects; and 5 per cent. levied on the rent of houses inhabited by persons engaged in trade: amongst these are foreign subjects, and as these are precisely in the same position as native subjects, and moreover with respect to their trade or occupation will derive the same advantages that the native subjects will do from the measure we have in view, we think we may fairly claim that they should equally pay this contribution.

We deem that the right of this claim is founded on our Treaties, and especially the Treaty of 1838; but at the same time, as we do not wish to decide this question, or treat it in any abrupt or hasty manner, or without due consultation with the respective Governments with which we have entered into stipulations, we solemnly declare that we shall not hold this special tax, occasioned in a special locality by a special and urgent want—the satisfying of which will be a common benefit—as any example as to the future, or as any reason for prejudicing, one way or the other, the general question as to taxation which has to be discussed.

Upon this statement all the Representatives have concurred in holding pretty nearly the following language:—

We appreciate the position that is described to us. We recognize the benefit which the tax in question is to secure. We acknowledge that that benefit will be shared by all persons, foreigners as natives, and we shall not object to our various subjects paying the tax in question; we will even advise them to do so on the condition, clearly stipulated, that the special case forms no general rule, but we cannot undertake to force them, nor can we allow them to be forced, unless our Governments subsequently sanction the proceeding; and, on a suggestion of mine, Aali Pasha agreed to waive all question of force, and to write the different Representatives a note, saying that the Ottoman Government would simply communicate to the different Chancelleries the names of those who refused to pay.

With respect to the general question of taxation and the principle invoked by Aali Pasha, we also all of us expressed our several opinions, and stated what were our several Treaties.

My own opinions, founded, I think, on justice, policy, and the views which the Treaty of Commerce I negotiated in 1838 was intended to carry out, may be thus stated:—

In former times trade was carried on in a perfectly different manner from at present, and foreigners occupied in this country a perfectly different position.

A few merchants, settled in the principal ports, received goods in the wholesale, and either sold them to some native merchant who resold them in detail, or sent some agent with them through the country who sold or hawked them.

The care of the Government seems to have been directed to preventing the foreign merchant from paying taxes himself, though our Treaty simply stipulates as to his exemption from two taxes which my last despatch, No. 122 of February 28th, set forth; but no provision seems made as to taxing merchandize except at its entry.

As to the trades and professions, they were in the hands of Turkish corporations, and the foreigner could not enter into them, nor did he compete in detail trade with the native.

The consequence of this state of things was, that goods might be taxed at any price after their entry, and the internal traffic of the country was not practically open to foreigners.

The Treaty of 1838 made a general change in these particulars.

No further charge was to be placed on goods than the general import and export dues; and British subjects were to be placed on the same footing as native ones with respect to trade and traffic in the interior. This was not stated quite so clearly, perhaps, as it might have been, partly because the Treaty was of necessity made in a great hurry, its possibility depending on chances which a day might alter, and some fears being entertained that if we insisted absolutely on opening shops, competing with the corporations, and, in fact, taking precisely the position of a native, it would have led to long discussions; but, nevertheless, what we desired was this, and we said quite enough in the Treaty to allow us to contend that we had obtained it.

The natural consequences have followed: corporations have disappeared or nearly so; foreigners everywhere exercise retail trade; and the goods which have paid the import duty are never charged with any other.

What I hold is that, both for the sake of the Turks and for our sake, we should still follow out, without chicane on our side or allowing chicane on the other, the system we had in 1838 in view.

At a time of Turkish exclusive privilege it was fair enough of us to claim and hold counter privileges; but if we can now clearly and fully obtain all privileges in a country which the natives of that country possess, in regard to residing or exercising trades or occupations in that country, I do not think we can fairly claim more. I am prepared, indeed, to contend that this is all we hoped for in 1838, or wished in 1838 to obtain; and that the Act was framed with a view of obtaining it, and not of obtaining more.

I hold, consequently, that according to Treaty, as according to policy and justice, we should take our stand on these grounds:—

No further duties, without express stipulations, which affect our imports and exports, or importers and exporters.

With respect to retail trade, exercise of professions, residence and the like, the same privileges as the Turkish subjects—no more, no less; and in order to make this condition more clear and more beneficial, I would bargain for the abolition of all corporations which are in a certain extent monopolies, and which ought, in my opinion, to have long since been done away with, as I believe they would have been had it been clearly understood that we accept the fair and equal condition on which we should then be placed with all Turkish subjects.

This arrangement would be beneficial to the Turks, because it would open to them a fair and equitable source of revenue, and relieve industry from the remnant of old monopolies. It would be advantageous to foreigners, since directly the Turks saw that if they received all the privileges of Turks, and made fortunes in Turkey, their calling, and the income and gain they derived from it, would be a gain and an income to the Turkish Government itself; the jealousy which now not unnaturally exists would disappear, and the Porte would be as anxious to promote the settlement of foreigners in Turkey as it is now the reverse.

In fact, what can be more preposterous than to pretend that a Government is to keep up all the expenses of a Government, maintaining order, protecting property and the like,—and that persons not natives of the country should then come and reside in it, carry on business in it, derive large fortunes from it, and yet pay nothing to the State, which would have to derive its income from its own subjects who are to be placed in an unequal position as to all the means by which wealth is obtained?

The views I thus entertain are shared in by the Representatives of Austria,

France, Spain, the United States, Sardinia; nor, in fact, was a single dissentient voice in favour of any opposite opinions, except that of the Minister of Russia, supported, at first, by the Minister of Prussia; the language of both, however, becoming subsequently more moderate.

As to Russia, it is clear if she could establish the principle that Russians are to have all the privileges of Turkish subjects, and to pay none of the imposts, she has only to encourage still further the system of adopting Turkish subjects as Russians, and every Turkish subject would have the strongest interest to become a Russian one.

It is moreover clear, also, if the hands of the Turks are thus fettered, and the possibility of their systematizing their finances, or obtaining a revenue, prevented, a chance as to their reorganization is over; and I cannot help thinking it was the intention of the Russian Minister to make a bold dash at this on the present opportunity, and that without the fair and full discussion we had together he might have succeeded.

The language of Aali Pasha was admirable throughout; fair, firm, and conciliatory; and I think it only remains with us now to take the lead and settle the principle that has been called in question, by authorizing some understanding amongst the Representatives about it at this place. Russia would hold out alone, the more especially as though her old Treaty exists until a new one is made as to importations and exportations, she is in other respects only on the footing of the most-favoured nations.

Before attending the meeting with Aali Pasha, I called a meeting of the principal merchants here, and requested their opinions, expressing my own. Mr. Hanson, Mr. Privilegio, M. la Fontaine, in short, all the principal merchants re-echoed my opinions, both as to the advantage to be derived to all parties from getting rid of the caïmés as proposed, and as to the general principles of taxation which I have stated; and though I asked everybody present to express frankly his opinion, no one contradicted the above gentlemen.

It is, however, as your Lordship will observe, already understood that British subjects will not be in any way constrained to pay this new contribution until your Lordship's pleasure is known upon it.

On the part of the British, indeed, I understand there will be a perfect readiness to give voluntarily their aid to the Government in this crisis, but the Ionians, I have little doubt, will make objections.

No. 20.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received May* 4.)

(No. 218.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 24, 1860.

I HAVE refrained for some time from troubling you with a general statement as to affairs in this Empire, deeming that a too frequent exposition of those circumstances which affect it might weary the patience without having a claim to the attention of your Lordship.

It appears to me, however, that at this season, one of those periodical reports which I have heretofore at times addressed to you might not be unwelcome, and I shall pass rapidly in review the principal events which have occurred since my arrival in this country, and then describe as rapidly the characteristic features of the present moment.

Hardly had I arrived, when the melancholy account of the scenes of carnage which has rendered the name of Jeddah notorious in our annals, reached here. A spirit of commercial rivalry, inflamed by religious fanaticism—a fanaticism which the struggle in India had, in no small degree, contributed to arouse—were the main causes of that disgraceful and murderous riot which naturally alarmed the Christian residents in the Ottoman Empire, and as naturally awakened the indignation of the Christian Powers.

In justice to the Ministers of the Sultan, it is only fair to say that they received with no less horror than dismay the intelligence of a massacre which numbered amongst its victims the Consuls of England and France, nor did they hesitate at offering the most prompt and ample reparation—a reparation which I shall only hold as complete when the indemnity which is under the consideration

of the Porte, and which I expect in two or three days from this time to announce as agreed to, is definitively accorded.

It was not, however, only the massacre at Jeddah that produced, at the time to which I am alluding, a general uneasiness and alarm. Throughout the whole of Turkey there reigned a feeling of mingled apprehension and irritation, which the brutally-mangled victims of Montenegrin barbarity (soldiers deprived of their noses and ears, and thus only escaping from their savage enemy) did not fail to increase. Dervishes from the further East on the one side, and refugees from different European States on the other, each, though from different motives, stirring up the opponent classes of the population; the one vainly thinking to aid their cause in Hindostan by a Mahometan movement in these countries, and the other hoping that any outbreak here might unsettle the condition of the other States of Europe, traversed the Provinces and agitated the capital itself by fallacious prophecies and false reports; and some credit is undoubtedly due to the Government for the moderation and energy it displayed amidst a state of things so critical. The forces of Prince Danilo were defeated at Mostar. In Crete, a condition of affairs bordering on civil war and insurrection was, if not thoroughly amended, considerably softened down and improved by a double display of force and conciliation. In Thessaly, a rising of the Mussulmans, which at one moment seemed almost certain, was prevented; and in the Northern Provinces of the Empire generally—provinces in which, for a moment, contempt for the local authority, rival feuds, and lawless habits, had produced incessant conflict, brigandage, and confusion—a vigorous and detrimental effort to restore obedience and order was so far successful as to reduce things to the ordinary level of partial submission and imperfect administration which are normal in those districts. In this capital, a police little seen, but by no means ineffective, discovered a variety of half-hatched conspiracies, which, by generally warning or removing their leaders, sank into nothing; and on the whole, whilst I regretted there was not the wisdom, activity, and concentration of purpose sufficient to establish the powers of government on a firmer basis, promising permanent tranquillity, I was certainly struck by the dexterity and judgment with which the most glaring evils were mitigated, and clouds that looked so black and menacing dispersed without a storm.

The agitation, however, which subsided in those spots where the Turks had free scope for their action, remained in those frontier Provinces only nominally subjected to the Sultan. The Moldo-Wallachian Principalities took "Union under a foreign Prince!" as their war-cry against Turkish authority; whilst Servia, over the faction and discontent of which old Milosch (then inhabiting Bucharest) had an habitual sway, suffered its dissatisfaction to be concentrated into a rising against Prince Cara Georgevitch, and the election of the wily and cruel octagenarian who is now at the head of the Principality.

On both these occasions, the only policy which the Porte could pursue was that of compromising with events. It acceded to the election of Couza as Prince of the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities under certain conditions, and accepted as much of the demands of the Servian Skouptchina, or Popular Assembly, as related to the bringing of the Obrenovitch family back again into power.

In these respects it is difficult to criticise its conduct, inasmuch as that no other course, not manifestly more dangerous, was open to it; for, although we must confess that the Moldo-Wallachian and Servian questions were thus merely adjourned, and will have (like most of the questions concerning this Empire, now rising into serious discussion, now again sinking back into silence and obscurity) to be finally disposed of in a more clear and decided manner; still, what was done at the moment was the best for the moment.

Scarcely, however, had the difficulties which these matters occasioned disappeared, when more serious ones arose in the prospect of European war, which, though in its origin confined to Italy, was not unlikely to extend much further; and this Government was called upon, with an empty exchequer, to make immense pecuniary sacrifices in order to meet a danger, of a vital nature, that could not be overlooked. Great sacrifices were made; and it must be allowed that they produced all that could have been expected from them, and that the regular and irregular forces put on foot were found more than sufficient, notwithstanding all the rumours of plots and revolutions that were abroad, to maintain order, and to prevent even so much as a local disturbance or dangerous symptom of disaffection.

The work, nevertheless, which this Government had upon its hands was by no means easy of execution, for insurrection amongst the Rayah population was not more to be feared than the rising amongst the dissatisfied Mussulmans; and indeed, a plot which was detected in the summer of last year, and at the head of which was a General of some distinction, bore evidence to the fact that if the dominant party at the Porte has not been able to do all that might justly satisfy the Rayahs' demands, it has done enough to provoke a large portion of the Rayahs' ancient masters: a consideration which should not, most decidedly, check all reasonable efforts towards progress in the same direction, but which should put some limit upon rash counsels and extravagant expectations.

At last, and when a new Grand Vizier was appointed for the special purpose of endeavouring to profit by an intervening moment of repose for strengthening credit and reforming the finances, the French Government for the first time announced openly its support of the celebrated Canal scheme of M. de Lesseps, and that gentleman arrived here under the avowed patronage of the French Ambassador. Hence a new cause for consternation, and for distracting the minds of the Turkish Ministers from the pressing exigencies of their internal affairs. Fortunately, by the skill and tact of Fuad Pasha, and a suitable forbearance on the part of the Foreign Representatives most concerned, this matter was at least deferred, and placed in a position which, when it has again to be considered, will have in a certain degree settled its character, and diminished a portion of the dangers by which it was previously surrounded.

In this rapid sketch of the principal events of the last year and a-half, I have as yet said nothing of occurrences in Asia, because they have been purely of a local character, disturbing, but not threatening, to overturn the established order of things. Desultory warfare with the Arab tribes, dissensions in the Lebanon, and the ordinary effects of a weak and bad administration in Syria, have been doubtless sources of constant regret, but not of any serious alarm. Nor has there been much deserving especial notice, except the total failure of Omer Pasha's administration; for certain violent and illegal acts during which he is shortly about to be placed on his trial.

Montenegro.—The principal subjects which now demand attention are, first, the Montenegrin frontier. The Commissioners have marked out the Montenegrin frontier line, but have left the quarrels and conflicts as to private claims of property unsettled all along the line. Sir Francis Gilbert justly points out the folly of this course, if there is any intention to make the delimitation itself of any practical use, and the Pashas who govern the provinces adjoining to Montenegro expressed the same opinions as Sir F. Gilbert very clearly. For my own part, I should have wished the Commissioners to have made a vigorous effort for determining at all events the principal questions subject to doubt or disagreement, but some of these gentlemen were evidently averse to prolonging their stay in a disagreeable country, where they were employed in a disagreeable duty; whilst others, following perhaps the policy of their Governments, which is, I fear, to leave the germs of discord behind them, and thus invalidate the advantage which the Commission, if its labours had been fully carried out, was calculated to produce, showed so much disinclination to undertake the work, which the carrying out of my views would have thrown upon them, and the opinions of my colleagues seemed so little clear or certain, that I found it useless to persist in my plans, and have got the other Representatives to agree with me in recommending what appears to me the best course after that which is abandoned, viz., some regular means of direct communication and understanding between the Prince and the Pashas in the frontier provinces, and the reference of cases not in this way decided, to the Consuls of the Five Powers.

Suez Canal.—There is still pending the question of the Canal of Suez. It is singular, but as yet I have been unable to obtain any clear notice as to what M. de Lesseps is doing on this subject, how far the works are being proceeded with, or how far French immigration is going on. I am, however, persuaded that if Egypt is to be prevented from becoming a French Colony, a very clear and decided conduct is to be maintained on this subject. The canal itself may be a myth, and lead to no practical result; but the ascendancy and long-growing determination of the French to obtain a hold in Egypt is no myth, and has a practical object, whatever may be the result that will attend the endeavours to obtain it; nor can we implicitly rely on any firm or bold policy here. This

Government will only be held firm if it finds we are so, and if, therefore, we mean to deal practically with this question, we must look at it practically as a question which we should either resolutely oppose, or be prepared to see carried against us. In the meantime the whole colonization scheme which is connected with it, whatever may be done eventually as to the canal itself, should surely be stopped, and the intervention of the French Government appealed to, if necessary, on the subject.

Syria.—Thirdly comes the question of Syria. To expect the same state of things in Syria that exists in a well-, or even ill-, governed province in Europe, is out of the question. The warlike and more than half-barbarous mountaineers are in one quarter habituated to a state of military independence. In another, the wild Arabs of the Desert have through all times defied civilization, and resorted to plunder wherever there was not a superior force to overawe their temerity, or punish their misdeeds. In the plains there exists a peasantry thrifty and industrious, but for ages oppressed and subdued. How can all these, by the wand of an enchanter, be at once called into an homogeneous class of cultivators, artisans, shopkeepers, and merchants obedient to the law, and acknowledging that equality before it which distinguishes the citizens of our modern communities? It appears that, for some time at least, there is only a choice between the two extremes of disorder generated by licence, and submission, the consequence of power, which will rarely be unaccompanied by oppression. At the present time, however, these two extremes appear unhappily associated. Wherever the Turk is sufficiently predominant to be implicitly obeyed, laziness, corruption, extravagance, and penury mark his rule; and wherever he is too feeble to exert more than a doubtful and nominal authority, the system of government which prevails is that of the Arab robber and the lawless Highland chieftain.

The state of things now existing in the Lebanon appears, indeed, to be unfortunately calculated to prevent the progress of civilization, and defy the principles of order. There is first the Turkish authority, which has a nominal supremacy, but it is on every side hemmed in by the privileges accorded to the great Mountain tribes, to whom every right accorded seems the constitution of an abuse. Then there is the Kaimakam, or leader of the Druses, who governs this peculiar people on the one side, and the Christian Kaimakam (himself a Catholic), who governs the Catholic and Greek Christians on the other. Society amongst these tribes is what it was two or three centuries ago in the north of Scotland. The head of a great family exercises an uncertain sway over his own clan and the smaller clans, whose obedience and support he is forced to purchase by concessions to their appetite for plunder and revenge. A sentence has to be executed against a Druse or a Christian in the Lebanon. He owes money out of his own district, and its payment is demanded; or he has assaulted or murdered a man out of his district, and has to be punished. We will suppose the party injured is an Englishman: what takes place? The English Consul addresses himself to the Pasha, who says "Yes!" and addresses himself to the Christian or Druse Kaimakam, as the case may require. The Kaimakam says "Yes!" but he is in no wise concerned in the debt that is claimed, or the crime that has been perpetrated; it was out of his territory, where the disorder which may prevail is of no import to him, and with which he has no community of sympathy or interest. On the other hand, the debtor or the criminal is one of his own people, from whom he has received or expects a service; and without any inducement to compel him to be honest, or to punish him for not being so, he has every inducement to shield his delinquency. Is it marvellous, then, that nine times out of ten, the English Consul is never refused what he demands, but never obtains what he seeks? The Turk himself has in reality no strong desire that his own order should produce effect, being, it is said, glad to show that those Governments which have been established independent of his own are an injury to the Powers who constituted them; and when the pains he apparently takes to satisfy the foreign and complaining functionary fail, he shrugs his shoulders, and says, "What can I do? you know well enough I have no power!"

Nor do these evils stand alone. Although the majority of Christians under the Christian Kaimakam are Catholics, there is a considerable number of Greeks who hate their brother Christians worse than they do the Mussulmans, and who are, in fact, more oppressed by them than they would be by the Mussulmans.

As the patron of the Catholics, moreover, founding the title on a traditional

pretension which ought assuredly to have been annihilated in 1840, steps forward the powerful Government of France. The Maronite is his pet and protégé: anything done against him offends French dignity, and must be resented by the French Consul-General, who is, in fact, the Christian Kaimakam.

Thus, as far as the Lebanon is concerned, I confess that I look upon all hope of radical improvement as utterly hopeless, unless some new arrangement, some agreement, simple and concentrated in its character as to the government of that country, is entered into by the Porte, and consented to by the Great Powers. Some changes for the better, however, might be made; and it would, doubtless, be a great change for the better if tribunals were established at Beyrout, before which the Maronite or Druse could be brought, especially if the claims of the Catholic monasteries to an independent jurisdiction were done away with.

The abuses of the Lebanon are, however, only a small part of the general condition of Syria, which is so bad in all respects as to necessitate absolutely the supervision of some one of experience and intelligence, invested with adequate authority to effect prompt and radical reforms; and the appointment of such a person is one of the points which I intend to insist upon as soon as the conclusion of the Bairam permits the renewal of business.

Moldo-Wallachia and Servia.—4th. With regard to Moldo-Wallachia and Servia. The visit of Prince Couza is expected during this summer, and only delayed from the hostile disposition of the Chambers, and the dislike of His Highness to wear a fez on his presentation to the Sultan for investiture, which has of late years been the custom.

These difficulties are transient or easy to be overcome, but the task of prevailing on the Government of the Principalities to flatter the pride of the Porte by the ostensible signs of respect and submission, and of getting the Porte to establish solid friendly relations with the Principalities by seeking to consult and promote their interests, is no easy one, and can only be accomplished by the united and constant efforts of the Representatives here, and of the Consuls-General at Bucharest and Jassy.

As to Servia, the rumours of approaching insurrection so long rife have, in a certain degree, subsided, and the presence of a Servian deputation here is likely to be productive of advantage.

The whole of its demands amount, indeed, to little short of independence; and are certainly in no wise required for the prosperity of the Servian nation at this moment. But in favour of these, none of my colleagues have as yet expressed themselves well-disposed, and this fact alone is of no small significance, and can hardly, one should think, but have its weight at Belgrade. There are, however, other subjects whereon the Servians have just reason for complaint, and with respect to these we shall use our united influence with the Ottoman Government on the side of Servia.

I cannot help, on this occasion, observing, that in the various réunions of the Representatives on various subjects which have taken place at my invitation, the result has always been to produce a joint decision, and as matters have been discussed solely in reference to those matters, and without any personal feeling of vanity or attempt at individual influence amongst ourselves, it has generally been found that our differences have been in no wise important.

Finances.—5th. The subject which I confess to have had most at heart since my appointment to this post, understanding that it is the object of Her Majesty's Government to sustain and advance the condition of this Empire, is the establishment of something like order in its finances; and although it would be presumption to say that I had made the progress which I hoped and desired, I must still give to myself the credit of having laid the foundations for a solid improvement. By the determination with which I checked the breach of faith of Safeti Pasha, who was applying to other purposes the English loan, especially granted for the withdrawal of the caimés, and also by my continual remonstrances as to the necessity of getting rid of the depreciated paper-money, which not only disordered all commercial transactions, but created an immense and perpetual loss to the Turkish Administration, whether as to the foreign debt on which it had to pay the interest, or on articles of foreign manufacture which it had to purchase, the pound sterling on these occasions having to be bought at from 160 to 170 piastres, have been so far effectual that the caimé is now almost withdrawn, and by June will have ceased to exist; whilst the exchange

has fallen to about 115 piastres, a reduction of 45 piastres in the pound, and a saving of so much to the Turkish Government in its monetary transactions abroad.

But this is not all. By the institution of the mixed European and Turkish Financial Commission, established on my representations, sounder and clearer ideas as to finance and administration are finding their way into the mind of Turkish officials; the first and almost immediate consequence of which will be a regular budget, for the formation of which each department has to send in and to justify the account of its expenses. This has engendered, in its turn, a certain attempt at economy and retrenchment in these various departments, and I am assured that when the present statement of regular expense and receipt is published, it will show a balance in favour of the latter.

As the facts will have to be, in a certain degree, tested and sifted by the Mixed Commission, there will be some guarantee for their authenticity; and when the Turkish Government fairly carries out its intention of publishing annual budgets this will not only be a satisfaction to the people, but a check upon the Sovereign; nor should I fail to add that by such publication the Ottoman Government will be in advance of both the Russian and Austrian Governments.

The great and main impediment in the way of such improvement as would otherwise be possible, consists in the loans contracted at Galata for short periods for temporary emergencies, for which the incoming revenue is being constantly given as a security, and for which, at each renewal, immense sacrifices are exacted. This burden on the annual revenue, with other engagements of a similar character, amounts to a very large sum, and how to get this sum is the present question.

My first advice to the Turkish Government is to endeavour to make evident its own efforts, and the desire to take advantage of its own resources; first, by making some regulation as to the property called "vacouf," which is under different titles the property of the State, and which has only at present a very uncertain and limited value, since, on failure of direct descent, it reverts to the Church or Government, but which, by being converted into real property, could bring a large resource to the Exchequer, and be of immense service to the encouragement of industry in the country; secondly, by making out a table or specification of the different mines and forest which are of immense value, but which are wholly unproductive, accompanied with a permission to foreign companies who will undertake to render them available to have the grants made in their own name, and not in the name of Rayahs, who too frequently defraud the Government on the one hand, and the foreigners whom they represent on the other; and thirdly, by the employment of prisoners and the large number of Circassians who are now not only utterly useless, but very expensive, in organised companies on certain roads, which would open the mines aforesaid and a large tract of fertile country to the Black Sea, from which they are but a few miles distant. This at once creates a new source of wealth, and testifies an activity and determination towards practical and material improvement of which the Ottoman authorities have hitherto given no efficient proofs; but after all these measures, a loan will still be wanting. If this Government seeks it from doubtful sources and second-rate capitalists, little will be done; and if money is advanced without certain stipulations as to its employment, either the advance required will not be found, or will be ineffectually thrown away. But if any great houses will undertake to supply the Ottoman Government with what is immediately necessary on such conditions as I could point out, I think they will be doing that which will prove highly beneficial to themselves, and at the same time be the saving of this Empire, which is at this moment in one of those crises in which utter ruin or great progress depends upon the conduct it pursues and the aid it may obtain.

I bring all these considerations before your Lordship, because if we are really interested in the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, it is desirable to give it at least such moral support at this time as is in our power; whilst I should also add that all those reforms, respecting which we have professed ourselves concerned, depend on that financial condition which can alone furnish the means of effecting them.

Without financial order there is no possibility of administrative improvement; with financial order it is impossible for a State to be wholly misgoverned.

If your Lordship favoured the project of encouraging the immigration of Europeans into this country, by placing them in a situation of equality with the native population; and if your Lordship also favoured a change in the Capitulations, which by improving the means of production in Turkey, would, and must eventually, be most beneficial to foreign commerce, which cannot but depend on the internal prosperity of the State with which such commerce is to be carried on, it would, I venture to say, be possible to give a new life to these people and their Government which, on the one hand, should not be oppressed and annihilated, but which should, on the other, be submitted to a well-regulated control, which without crushing the national energies which constitute its force, should gradually eradicate the corrupt influences that cause its weakness.

In the meantime I must impress this fact in the strongest manner on Her Majesty's Government, viz., that there is at the present moment at the head of affairs, three or four men equally remarkable for their integrity and ability, who have risen to their exalted position solely on account of their integrity and ability; and I feel confident that your Lordship will agree with me that when men without any other advantage than that of integrity and ability rise to the first places in a Government, whatever in other respects that Government may be, the State which such Government represents cannot be considered lost beyond redemption.

Such a sympton in Turkey, though perhaps the only startling one I could give in the history of its improvement, is also perhaps the very best by which such improvement could be illustrated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 21.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 203.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 12, 1860.*

HER Majesty's Government are glad to learn by your Excellency's able report No. 218 of the 24th of April, that in spite of all drawbacks you entertain hopes of improvement for Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with you both as to the weak points of the Empire and the value of the remedial measures which you suggest.

You should endeavour to obtain the equality of Europeans with the native population.

You should also propose to me, from time to time, such changes in the Capitulations as you think may be useful.

But there is one thing which must not be forgotten: the Capitulations rest on the principle that Turkish rule and Turkish justice are so barbarous that exceptional privileges are required.

No one would think of asking for separate Tribunals for Englishmen in France, or for Frenchmen in England: but so long as law in Turkey is undefined, so long as Pashas are allowed to sell justice and protection, so long will the privileges of Consular Tribunals be necessary. In proportion, therefore, to the progress of improvement in the government of the provinces, in proportion to the increased protection of property, and the advances made towards an impartial and regular administration of justice, will it be possible to relax the Capitulations.

I send you a copy of a private letter which I wrote lately to Aali Pasha on this subject.

I am glad to learn that there are three or four men of integrity in office at Constantinople.

Let them choose men of an integrity similar to their own to govern the provinces, and much may be done. But they must be upheld by a good system of finance, an impartial administration of justice, and a well-disciplined regular army which can be restrained from plunder and massacre.

On the particular subjects of your report I shall give you instructions from time to time as occasion calls for them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 22.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 334.)

Constantinople, June 16, 1860.

My Lord,

I CANNOT disguise from myself that the state of things here is most serious. The Empire, notwithstanding the difficulties which oppress and the abuses which undermine it, might nevertheless have stood its ground, and the Turkish Government gradually worked on its way (under the encouragement and protection of friendly Powers) towards a more satisfactory condition, if it had been given a fair chance, and allowed that time which is the usual condition of safe and sure progress. But it appears evident that a plan of agitation for exciting the animosity of the rival creeds and races, the one against the other, is now being actively carried out in European Turkey, and every part of the Sultan's dominions where foreign influence can make itself felt.

As to the designs of Russia, they seem to me clear. She formerly prepared means of external force and external conquest. These were found inefficient in the last war, and destroyed. She now prepares means of internal disaffection, internal dissolution, in respect to which it is easy for her to do much, and difficult for other foreign Powers to do anything in the way of combating her efforts, especially as she affects to conceal her political motives under the religious mask of Christian charity and fraternity. All that is now taking place is thus explained; the Bulgarian discontent; the Servian discontent; the discontent now breaking out for the first time amongst the Armenians, and which an Armenian General in the Russian service has been actively employed in fomenting; lastly, the recent demonstration at St. Petersburgh itself.

I may, doubtless, be mistaken, and be led away by delusive appearances or exaggerated statements; but whilst it does not seem to me certain that Russia is at this moment prepared to make a bold and ostensible move to overthrow this Empire, it does seem to me certain that she has decided on its proximate fall; and that the manner in which this fall is to be brought about is decided upon also: the first necessity in order to carry out the projects in contemplation (in the manner anticipated) being, to keep up a constant state of agitation and insolvency, which, by preventing all improvement in the condition of the Empire, must end in its destruction; nor can the Porte at this moment counteract projects so insidious without extraneous assistance. This is, indeed, the point on which I now wish to concentrate your Lordship's attention.

The first thing necessary for Turkey is financial order, and the first step towards it was the framing of a regular Budget. This, as I have stated in a former despatch, has been done.[a]

With respect to the amount of the present receipts, there can be no doubt, since the greatest part of the revenue is farmed; with respect to the present amount of expenditure, the account given is also pretty near the truth. But what is still required is, a close examination into, and a strict control over, the State expenses on the one side, and a better organization as to the collection and distribution of the revenue on the other. The Sultan has promised me, in regard to the first, that each department shall be forced to furnish every detail of its proceedings to the Mixed Financial Commission, of which I have often spoken, and which will shortly assume a more general and positive character; whilst, in regard to the second, the Government has, in a similar spirit, resolved that proper rules should be laid down by the aforesaid Commission, and efficiently carried out by a Finance Department, constituted on a new basis, and containing Europeans with the special knowledge required for the task assigned to them.

Now, according to the present Budget, I hear that the receipts and expenditure pretty nearly balance each other, and it is no exaggeration to say that the control and revision proposed are likely to diminish the expenditure by at least one-third, and increase the receipts in the same

[a] I am promised a copy from the Commissioner, but have not received it.

proportion, in which case there would be an excess of more than half the present amount of revenue, that is, of more than 5,000,000*l.* sterling. I could go into details to prove the probable accuracy of this calculation, but they are not here required. It is, however, evident that if such calculation is a just one, it would afford ample security for a loan of 5,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* or even 7,000,000*l.* or 8,000,000*l.*, providing the revenue at this instant was not forestalled. I should say, therefore, that a loan to that amount could safely be made, providing the control promised as to expenditure was given, and the new organization as to revenue was carried out; and providing also, that the loan in question was applied strictly, in the first instance, to set the current revenue free.

The next measure necessary is to get rid of the amount of pressing debts not yet in any way settled, and which naturally bear down public credit, and prevent anything like regularity in accounts. The large amount of available State property at Constantinople alone, to say nothing of mines, forests, and public lands elsewhere, would, if properly managed, more especially if Europeans were allowed to purchase, suffice to deal with this incumbrance. Indeed, nothing would be easier than to place such property in the hands of respectable merchants here, charged to estimate its value, and to issue notes, payable at certain epochs, so as to allow time for its sale; these notes, representing half the property or two-thirds of the property to be sold, could be at once delivered to those creditors whose claims at this instant can neither be denied nor satisfied.

A large sum, calculated at 5,000,000*l.* sterling, might also be got by converting what is called "Vakoof" property, which only descends, as I have said in former despatches, in a direct line, into "Mulk" property, which the proprietor can will away and dispose of at pleasure.

A new and considerable resource to the State is here opened, and the increased duty upon imports, now under consideration, would also offer another. But such operations require some little time, and cannot be effectually carried out except by competent persons and with a certain capital in hand, since with anticipated receipts and increasing demands the Government is living at present, from day to-day, on usurious loans of small amount. This is why I say a loan is imperatively required. I will explain the present state of the capital in order to show, indeed, how much such a loan is a matter of immediate necessity.

The enormous interest granted of late by the Turkish Government has induced all capitalists in Constantinople to lend money to that Government, and in most cases the large capitalists have borrowed from the small ones in order to complete the sums required; added to this, the contracts with the Government, or the debts with the palace, have equally concerned the large and small contractors and tradesmen, so that it is no exaggeration to say that almost all the capitalists and tradesmen in this city are at this time creditors, directly or indirectly, of the State.

On the other hand, the poorer class depends almost entirely on the capitalists and tradesmen, and thus from the highest to the lowest there is a general cry on the Government for money, and a general discontent at not getting it. The army and navy are likewise dissatisfied and badly off, and the funds coming in which should go to their support are already in the hands of parties to whom they are given for old accounts. It is impossible that things should go on long in this manner, and the question is whether the English Government, in the present emergency, could or would, alone or with other Governments, guarantee a loan which should be made on specific resources, and with the most clear and binding conditions as to its application.

My opinion, I confess, is that it would be both safe and politic under present circumstances to give Turkey such aid on such conditions, and, at all events, I really see no other possible means of preventing, ere long, a crash of which it is difficult to foresee the consequences.

I know the practical difficulties which lie in the way of such a guarantee, on our part, as that to which I have been alluding. Those difficulties may, perhaps, be insuperable, but at all events I have deemed it advisable to place the case which suggests it strongly before your Lordship. I understand, moreover, confidentially that some negotiation as to

a loan is now going on in London, but I do not believe any basis is as yet laid down as to it. I mention privately the name of the party concerned,* since it seems to me that something might possibly be done in this manner, namely, Her Majesty's Government might state to any contractor that it would hold the Turkish Government responsible for any loan contracted with it, if it approved the terms and stipulations on which the said loan was made.

Nothing, I repeat, should be given without the clearest understanding as to the measures it would promote, and the security on which it should rest; but, accompanied by proper measures and resting on proper security, an advance at this moment would not only benefit Turkey who received, and the foreign capitalist who made it: such advance would also be an especial benefit to foreign commerce, and British commerce in particular in Turkey—a commerce which will be crippled and ruined if the present state of things long continue.

My conviction is that a suitable sum of money properly applied might save everything here at this time, and that when it was once known that the Government was relieved in some degree with respect to the immediate pressure on its finances, the other perils that environ it would melt away. But, on the other hand, unless some such supply on tolerably reasonable terms is found speedily (although, as I have always said and believed, these people do rise above expectation in a great emergency), I am bound to say that I deem a very serious catastrophe may any day occur, and take by surprise those who have not set a just value on the critical circumstances of the present juncture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 23.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 291.)

Foreign Office, July 3, 1860.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 334 of the 16th ultimo, respecting the present unsatisfactory state of the Turkish Empire, and the urgent necessity which exists for the Porte to obtain a loan in order to meet her immediate wants, I have to state to you, with reference to my telegram of the 22nd ultimo, that although Her Majesty's Government regret to learn the difficulty under which the Turkish Government labours, yet they must decline to give any guarantee to assist the Porte in raising the money she requires, for no security can be given that the same waste and profusion which has hitherto characterized the Sultan's expenditure will not occur again.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 24.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 379.)

Therapia, July 4, 1860.

My Lord,

THE situation of things here remains much the same. The French Ambassador and Russian Minister entertain great apprehensions as to an outbreak. Such an event, no doubt, is possible, but I do not think it probable; at all events such a crisis is not yet, I am disposed to say, arrived.

The fact is, that my colleagues judge matters a little too much, perhaps, in this country as they might judge them, under similar circumstances, in a country with different habits and feelings.

The army and navy and functionaries are three months in arrear, and

* Goldsmidt.

Constantinople is a city of persons employed in the service of the State, and of those who live by them. This is serious; but it is not, perhaps, quite so serious as it appears; for delays and irregularities in payments, here described, are of immemorial usage, and as, somehow or other, the Porte always ends by paying up arrears, people usually murmur, but have patience.

It is, however, a condition of things producing natural disquietude, and which, in any moment of excitement, would be favourable to, if it did not of itself actually produce, insurrection.

What I am endeavouring to do is to get the Turkish Government, without relying on foreign loans, to make a great internal effort, and thus, and by a fair explanation of its difficulties, to deal with, at all events, a large portion of its present embarrassments, which would render arrangements as to the rest, and especially as to finding a present supply of money, more easy. But, at the same time, if a certain sum of money could at once be found for present and urgent necessities, it would be of great use, and might possibly prevent great calamities.

The present crisis has arisen in this manner:—

The Government was certainly preparing the means for a better financial system, and for dealing with the difficulties which stood in its way, but, in the meanwhile, the old system continued. This consisted in borrowing by anticipation on the incoming revenue; and as, when the revenue came in, the parties who had lent it once lent it again, things went on, though at a great and absurd loss.

When, however, the demand of Russia and the constant announcement of projected insurrections broke down all confidence here, the machinery I have been describing broke down also; nobody would make fresh advances to take up those already made, and the Government thus finds itself with an empty exchequer, and its revenue for the next five or six months pledged. I have stated this already in my despatch No. of , but I repeat it here, because the position in question cannot be too clearly explained, or too forcibly insisted on.

If the Porte keeps its engagements, which chiefly concern English houses, as to the bills given on the revenue, it will be in the difficult situation of employing soldiers and functionaries to collect funds which are at once handed over to others, whilst they, already in arrears, will receive nothing from those funds.

It is not impossible that in such a case a state of disorder would ensue rendering the collection of all revenue impossible.

On the other hand, supposing the Porte, seeing these difficulties, seizes the revenue (for her army and her functionaries) which she has pledged, and on which bills have been drawn on London, and are now in circulation; this may create, not only here, but at home, very serious embarrassments and losses, which, after all, would be losses of English capital.

What would be required to escape from this dilemma is, that some party should advance for four or five years the sum which is now payable in four or five months. This sum, say 2,500,000*l.*, could be guaranteed by the very same securities on certain branches of the revenue which are now allotted to the present creditors; and upon the whole I think there would be much more certainty in providing for the service of the State, and spreading its obligations over a reasonable time, than in exacting the fulfilment of those obligations by arresting the service of the State and crowding the payment which has to be made into a period which renders such payment almost impossible.

What I think, then, most desirable is a loan which would pay off these delegations on the next few months' revenue; that need not be large: what would render it easier, in fact in my opinion easy, would be measures relieving the finances from other pressure, and such measures I am doing my utmost to enforce; but the one main point, the debt on the immediate incoming revenue, is the point that cannot be lost sight of, and must in some way or other be met.

I think I could satisfy any capitalist, if he were here, that a loan to the extent described might be safely made; at all events no time should be lost in seeing if anything can be done respecting it.

At the same time I do not encourage this Government to expect any such assistance which might paralyze its own efforts. I tell the Sultan's Ministers, on the contrary, that everything must come from themselves, and that at this moment it is essentially necessary, when all Europe fancies them bed-ridden, to show themselves erect, and capable of making one of those great efforts which have in other times distinguished their nation and saved their Empire.

I think I may say that I made, yesterday, some impression upon Fuad and Aali, whom I addressed in strong language on this subject, observing I should hold the same language to the Sultan; and I shall not be surprised if my conversation results in some great decision, since I insisted much on the impolicy of dealing with a great crisis in a paltry pettifogging manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 25.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 381.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, July 4, 1860.*

AS everything depends so much at this time on the state of the Turkish finances, I think it desirable to give your Lordship briefly the clearest account I can obtain concerning them:—

	£
Revenue, about	10,500,000
Expenditure, about	11,000,000
Deficit	£500,000

In the expenditure is included interest on foreign debts secured on the Egyptian revenue, a portion of the Custom duties of Smyrna and Syria, and Customs of Constantinople, and an internal debt also secured on Constantinople Customs; the whole amounting, with deductions already effected by sinking fund, to 14,860,000*l.*

The deficit of 500,000*l.* above mentioned, might be considered covered by the new Tariff of valuation, and other small sources not counted; but, on the other hand, 1,000,000*l.* has to be deducted from the revenue for five years to meet a vacuum created by persons having bargained for, and paid in anticipation, their taxes for that time.

This 1,000,000*l.* must be found by a decrease on the side of expenditure, and an increase on the side of revenue.

Thus, the whole consideration here is how to diminish present expenditure, and how to augment present revenue.

It is in no wise extravagant to say that, by regularity and an efficient control, the present expenses might be diminished one-third, and the revenue increased as much, by a proper system of perception.

To say nothing of the abuses in the way of peculation, everything that is bought for the army and navy is bought at a long and uncertain credit; and this alone would cause everything to be purchased at an extravagant price. A system of rations under which a contractor first bargains with the State to furnish so much in provisions, then bargains with the individuals who are to receive those provisions, and who often take a comparatively small sum of money instead, is an immense and useless loss to every party concerned, except the contractor.

In the same way the revenue is farmed for half its value; whilst the farmer squeezes out of the population a third more than he has purchased from the State.

It is easy to see that a suitable reform in the Administration would relieve the people, and fill the public coffers.

On both these points the Turkish Government has agreed. A Commission of Control is appointed; and a Ministry of Finance, on new principles, is promised. A sort of patent tax on retail traders is in

contemplation, and might be levied, without the slightest pressure, on persons making immense profits.

The projected change in the Commercial Treaties between France, ourselves, and this country, would also add considerably to the duties collected on imports, and to the general improvement and cultivation of the country.

The understanding that the mines and forests are for the future to be let to Europeans in their own name, and not in that of Rayahs, will, doubtless, draw a great supply of foreign capital into Turkey, and add considerably to its natural progress and financial resources.

Thus, on all these grounds, I repeat with confidence that it only depends on the Porte to raise its revenue by 5,000,000*l.* or 6,000,000*l.* sterling per annum.

We have now, however, to deal with present and pressing difficulties, and I shall proceed to state to your Lordship what these are; premising, however, that my information (such is the confusion in the accounts), is probably not perfectly accurate as to the amount of each different debt there is to deal with, though, as to the total amount, there is, I should hope, no very great difference.

	£
Loans made by merchants	500,000
Claims of various kinds, say	700,000
Debts of War and Navy Departments, for which a paper called "serghis" has been given	5,000,000
Scheins or bonds, payable in August, interest 8 per cent. ..	750,000
Hashuch Tahvils, interest 6 per cent., payable in January ..	2,350,000
Lastly, advances made on assignations of the revenue, principally for the next few months	2,500,000
	£11,800,000

The Treasury is empty, without it can count on 600,000*l.* or 700,000*l.*, which it is said to have prepared for the withdrawal of the remaining "caimés."

The only way to deal with this state of things is, I think, boldly and openly; finding resources applicable to the situation, and stating fairly what that situation is.

In the present confusion, and general distrust consequent on it, foreign capitalists can only be applied to in aid of efforts made by the Turks themselves; and the Turkish Government is called upon to see resolutely what it can do by its own means.

It is from this point of view that I shall regard the present crisis:—

1. To deal with loans to merchants, claims, &c.

A Commission of respectable Europeans and Ottoman subjects might have assigned to them the public property for sale, with the power of creating a loan on it, if found convenient; Europeans being allowed to purchase such property.*

A bureau should be established composed of Europeans and Ottomans who should examine all claims, and give to those recognized as valid an order on the said Commission, which order should be received in payment of property if the holder wished to purchase, or should be paid to him as the public property is sold; or should be settled, if a loan is effected and there is money in hand, at once. There might, indeed, be various ways of managing this transaction; but the great thing is to have the guarantee, and to let people see their interests are to be taken care of, and that the Government is endeavouring to do all it can to accomplish that object.

Another bureau should be charged with collecting debts due to the Porte, which should be paid to the Commission charged with paying the debts of the Porte.

The 5,000,000 serghis might be consolidated into a stock bearing interest of 7 or 8 per cent. As this is a fund in part created to pay the expenses and arrears of army and navy, the Sultan might resign (which would be an act both popular and useful) from his Civil List a sum constituting the interest on this stock, and providing by a sinking fund for its

* A mere Turkish Commission would not satisfy us to the property being fairly dealt with; and the Government makes no objection to the employment of Europeans here.

extinction; and I think the Sultan would be disposed to make this sacrifice. Indeed, His Imperial Majesty would even then be left with a revenue of about 1,000,000*l.* sterling.

The "scheins" and "hasneh tahvils" might be dealt with by being at once also consolidated into a debt bearing interest at 8 per cent. This interest, and the annihilation of the bonds in question, must be provided for by allowing any one having "vakouf"* property to acquire the privileges over it attached to "mulc" property, for, say 100 years (after which it would return to the State) on the following conditions:

Every person now paying 5 piastres† should pay 20 piastres, 7½ going to the "vakouf," and remaining unalienable with the property; the remaining 12½ going to the State.

All persons wishing to capitalize this last payment for the term of their lease, should be able to do so at a fixed standard value; and the Government should receive "scheins" and "hasneh tahvils" in acquittal thereof; by which measure the bonds in question would shortly be absorbed.

Thus, the only remaining and most difficult point to deal with would be the assignations on the next four or five months' revenue, which renders Government simply impossible.

The Porte might frankly explain this, and make the best arrangements it could concerning it, either with the creditors to whom assignations have been given, or with persons who might lend money for four or five years, on the securities now held for sums which have to be paid in four or five months. I do not think this difficult, providing the other demands on the Turkish Government had previously been satisfied.

In short, I do not think things desperate, if firmness, and energy, and elevation of character, are shown by those at the head of the State; nevertheless, they are certainly most serious.

The aim of my project is to pay the outstanding debts by finding new funds for meeting them, and thus having the ordinary annual revenue not only undiminished, but with a great prospect of increase.

What, I confess, fills me with some dismay, the more I come into contact with these people, and acquire a real knowledge of the state in which they are, is, first, the hesitation they manifest in adopting measures adequate to the necessity of the times, for providing eventually for the claims which can be deferred. Secondly, the absolute necessity of finding funds for the moment, which, under the circumstances in which the Turks are placed, they absolutely require, but which, at this sudden emergency they can hardly find without assistance from abroad, on which assistance, nevertheless, until the great mass of their obligations are put out of the way, by having sufficient guarantees assigned to them, it is almost impossible to count.

I can, in short, see no way out of the existing embarrassments but a general plan reposing on the better management of the public resources, and an augmentation given to those resources on the one hand, and an immediate supply to meet immediate and urgent wants, to be found from foreign capital on the other.

Such supply need not be great; if the measures of which I have spoken are adopted, 2,500,000*l.* would probably suffice. But, however necessary this supply is, I could only advise or encourage its being given, if it were a part and complement of a general system which, if really adopted with a probability of being persisted in, would produce a totally new condition in Turkish finances.

Under such circumstances, I should wish for it most earnestly; and this, not only with reference to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, but also with reference to the immense losses with which a sudden disaster here might affect English commerce and English interests, since there can be little doubt that these would suffer immediately to double the extent of that sum which, advanced at this moment on a sufficient security

* I have already explained the difference between "vakouf" property, which passes from the proprietor's family when there is no direct descent, and "mulc," which he may dispose of as he thinks proper.

† This would be estimated a very small increase for the advantage obtained.

that it is not to afford a temporary aid, but to effect a radical improvement, might prevent a general catastrophe, whether in the shape of absolute ruin or momentary bankruptcy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 26.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 4, 1860.*

WITH reference to proceedings best adapted for the future administration and progress of Turkey, I should say that if I rightly understand M. de Thouvenel's views as given in Lord Cowley's No. 731 of June 13 to your Lordship, I fear that my own would differ a good deal from them: 1st, as to the expediency of sending Commissioners of Inspection into the Provinces; 2ndly, as to that of employing Christians on those Commissions; and 3rdly, as to centralizing the inspection of which I speak, in some way or other, at Constantinople.

I will even go so far as to say that not only is this the best, it is the only, mode in which anything can be done for the amelioration of the Provinces.

The evils of a Pasha's government depend much upon this functionary being at one fixed spot, and subject only to the influences of that spot. It is, moreover, far more easy to find five or six men of character than thirty or forty. These five or six men travelling through certain divisions of the Empire with extraordinary powers, and doing prompt justice, having a few simple rules to guide them as to principles, would invigorate the Turkish authority; and by not staying in the Provinces, or inhabiting any particular spot in them, would not fall under provincial influence. That Christians should be attached to them, I look upon as essential. These men may not be high-minded, but a Greek will speak more clearly to a Greek as to his grievances than to a Turk; and the Greek who receives his countryman's complaint, however submissive outwardly to the Turk, feels for the national grievance, and will, in one way or other, bring it before the Turkish superior. Besides, it is little by little that you may in this way reform your Greek race itself.

The notion of a Reform Committee composed of Ambassadors is hardly practical. They would rarely agree as to remedies, though they might as to the grievances. My difference with M. de Thouvenel, if there is a difference here, is a proof of this. They would, moreover, be apt to batter down the Turkish authority, and confuse the Turkish mind. I do not mean by this to exclude their influence, but I think it must rather be a discretional than a positive one.

Let the inspection I mention be created with the Central authority here, and with that Central authority all the Representatives would from time to time confer as to reports that reached them.

It is not, as I said lately, nicely framed and complicated laws that are required; it is justice in the simplest form, and in its universally recognised principles, that has to be established: the only novelty for which a special instruction should be given being that it should be equal justice between Mussulman and Rayah that is now required.

The Commissioner encouraged when he punishes, as well as when he praises, would effect this, or if he could not, no one can.

I am disposed to think that your Lordship's idea of a High Tribunal or Great Council might well form part of the system here sketched out: members of this tribunal might, indeed, be employed in the way described, as Commissioners. But the whole plan wants consideration, in order to bring it into practical shape. I cannot, however, sufficiently repeat that what is most wanted now, is the revival of authority which always lapses between two periods, one of great terror and despotism—that of the

Janissaries; and, the other, one of reaction from such terror and despotism—that of Turkish reform.

What happens now, happens always in similar circumstances; but this does not render it less dangerous.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 27.

The Marquis de Plæuc to M. de Lavalette.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 9 Juillet*, 1860.

POUR répondre au désir de votre Excellence j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre les renseignements les plus récents que j'ai pu recueillir sur la situation financière de l'Empire Ottoman. Ces renseignements me paraissent se rapprocher assez de la vérité.

Votre Excellence sait de combien de difficultés sont entourées les recherches de cette nature; aussi me garderais-je bien, quoiqu'en Turquie depuis huit mois, de faire un rapport sur son état financier, et je prie votre Excellence de ne considérer ces renseignements que comme les plus grandes probabilités. Aucun exposé ne nous a été fait jusqu'ici par les Ministres des Finances qui se sont succédés, et je commence à me l'expliquer par le désordre et la confusion qui sont tels que personne, je le crois fermement, ne sait complètement jusqu'à quel point le Gouvernement Turc se trouve engagé.

Si donc je ne crois pas trop m'éloigner de la vérité c'est uniquement parcequ'ayant enfin obtenu des Budgets formés sur les modèles fournis par moi en Décembre dernier, il m'a été possible de sortir du vague des allégations de tous ceux qui parlent de la situation financière, et de soumettre, en quelque sorte, à la question, avec un point d'appui certain, un assez grand nombre d'hommes qui, plus ou moins, sont initiés aux mystères financières de ce pays.

Les charges du Trésor non plus que ses ressources ne figurent pas dans leur totalité au Budget qui nous a été présenté, et les documents devront être complétés avant de pouvoir être consultés utilement et publiés.

Tels qu'ils sont cependant ils marquent un premier pas utile fait pour arriver à comprendre ce qui se passe ici et j'ajouterai qu'il a fallu à l'Administration des efforts réels pour décrire dans des divisions si nouvelles et avec autant de détails les origines des recettes et l'affectation des dépenses.

Les recettes inscrites au titre de l'année de l'Hégire 1276 (1860) sont de 1,209,394,363 piastres, soit en francs 241,878,872 (la piastre étant calculée à 20 centimes), auxquels il faut ajouter quelques prévisions nouvelles nées depuis la confection des Budgets et evaluées à 14,000,000 de francs.

Les probabilités sont qu'avec des réductions qui ne nuiraient en rien aux services publics, les intérêts et l'amortissement des différents emprunts contractés à l'extérieur, les intérêts et l'amortissement d'une dette intérieure consolidée, la Liste Civile, les pensions, &c., et les services généraux des différents Ministères, pourraient être assurés.

Mais en dehors de ces exigences, des dettes de toutes natures avec clauses de remboursement dans des délais très-courts ont été contractés, et en vue d'assurer le remboursement de quelques unes d'elles, une partie des revenus de l'année courante a été engagée à divers créanciers pour une somme sur laquelle on varie trop pour que je la mentionne ici; mais dans tous les cas les prélèvements faits par ces creanciers privilégiés paralysent en ce moment tous les services et placent le Gouvernement dans cette alternative, ou de cesser de fonctionner, ou de manquer à ses engagements en enlevant aux créanciers dont il s'agit les délégations qui leur ont été accordés.

Si ces délégations étaient les seules charges du présent, ce ne serait qu'une crise momentanée; mais il existe encore une série de créances remboursables cette année et les suivantes, et dont l'importance est complètement en désaccord avec les ressources actuelles du Budget; j'en joins ici

le tableau, sous toutes réserves, car les notes marginales vous indiqueront de combien d'incertitudes ces chiffres sont encore entourés.

Vous remarquerez, par exemple, qu'il est question des déficits des deux exercices précédents, et je n'ai encore pu savoir si ces déficits ne feraient pas double emploi avec les créances dans les provinces qui sont inscrites dans ce tableau pour 55,178,800 francs. J'aurais aussi voulu connaître l'importance des recouvrements à faire par le Trésor sur les exercices précédents, recouvrements qui fussent venus sinon compenser entièrement, au moins atténuer les déficits dont je viens de parler; mais nul ne les connaît et l'on s'occupe, paraît-il, à les rechercher.

Quoiqu'il en soit, les engagements auxquels le Trésor devra faire face, en y comprenant aussi les créances auxquelles des revenus sont assignés et qui ne peuvent plus longtemps arrêter le fonctionnement régulier de l'état, s'élèvent à 1,744,330,000 piastres, soit en francs 348,866,000 francs.

Je ne puis m'empêcher de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que si ces dettes étaient un capital dont il ne ne s'agirait que de servir les intérêts et l'amortissement, les ressources du Trésor bien administrés suffiraient sans doute, et ce capital consolidé resterait relativement bien au dessous de celui de la plupart des Etats de l'Europe.

Malheureusement il s'agit ici d'emprunts usuraires, de dettes à la petite semaine pour fournitures non payés, renouvelées ou consolidées, provenant et de la Liste Civile et des Ministères, de toutes les sources en un mot, et je regrette d'entrevoir qu'il est parfaitement inutile de chercher à y satisfaire autrement que par un emprunt; ou, si cette ressource fait défaut, par les moyens empruntés aux plus tristes époques de quelques autres pays.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur des Finances,
(Signé) Mis. DE PLÆUC.

No. 28.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 489.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 8*, 1860.

YOUR Lordship is aware, by my despatch No. 473 of the 31st ultimo, of my having sent Mr. Dalyell to Salonica, in consequence of the alarming reports which had been given by the French Consul to the Marquis de Lavalette, as to the disturbed state of that town, and the probability of a Mussulman outbreak there.

I inclose Mr. Dalyell's report on this subject; it coincides generally with the opinion which I had previously entertained, viz., that the stories which were circulated were of an exaggerated nature, and that the state of alarm which they produced was one of the principal causes of danger.

The place is now quiet; but Mr. Dalyell considers that some causes of apprehension still continue to exist, if not at Salonica itself, at least in the neighbourhood, founded on the somewhat excited state of the public mind, and the reports which persons who are accused of being Russian emissaries spread through the province.

With respect to Constantinople, a variety of reports of a most alarming nature, fortunately based on somewhat slight foundations, were a short time since current; but the pains which I took to introduce a more quiet appreciation of the real state of things has been attended, I am happy to say, with good results, and as people have become more assured of tranquillity, the chance of its being disturbed has diminished.

The Government, moreover, has been taking great precautions; the military force is increased; the patrols doubled; and as long as the army can be relied on, there is no great cause for fear. The general opinion of the authorities is that it can be so; and that there is little probability of a military insurrection adding to the complications by which the Empire is otherwise threatened.

This opinion as to the troops of the capital is probably well founded; but I am sorry to say that the reports lately received as to the spirit amongst the troops generally throughout the Empire are not satisfactory, and unless something can be done to satisfy the arrears of pay, their mutiny or their disbandment is a possible event. Moreover, were a mutiny of this kind to take place in any particular spot, it is difficult to say to what extent the example might be contagious; but, at the same time, it is not unlikely that Europeans estimate too lightly the patience under grievance and the established feeling of respect to the Sultan's authority, which will, under any but the most extraordinary circumstances, characterize the Turkish soldiery.

There are limits, however, to all endurance. The Sovereign and the Ministry are personally unpopular, and to keep the conduct of affairs tolerably steady amidst so much to agitate and trouble them, some means of at least satisfying the pecuniary causes for dissatisfaction becomes each day more essential. One simple means of dealing with a certain portion of the present difficulties would be a general bankruptcy; and a declaration on the part of the Porte that it cannot maintain its obligations to alienate the current revenue, the pledging of which has been lately the foundation of a variety of usurious loans.

It would be difficult, perhaps, to put too strongly the disastrous effects which this would have on Turkish commerce and credit: but at the same time, if money is not got in some way or other, and the class of creditors I am alluding to do not themselves offer to enter into some composition, it is difficult to suppose that the Government will be long able to continue to employ functionaries to collect taxes, and soldiers to protect the collection of such taxes, neither of these receiving the payments overdue—to which, under an ordinary state of things, such taxes would as a matter of course be applied.

In the meantime I inclose a communication I have received from Major Cox, and which is much in conformity with what I have generally stated as to the condition of European Turkey; and also a despatch from Mr. Mayers at Rustchuk, inclosing the orders that were given by Ismail Pasha, and which are a satisfactory proof of the energy of that officer now commanding at Widdin; and (I would add) of the conduct and sentiments of the Grand Vizier, whose instructions he is carrying out.

His Highness Kaprisli Pasha's absence from the capital is, however, a great inconvenience, and this inconvenience is increased by Fuad Pasha's departure; for amongst the many amiable and noble qualities of Aali Pasha, energy and decision cannot be reckoned. He sees the perils of the situation clearly; but he sees at the same time so clearly the danger of every remedy that can be applied to them, that his action is paralyzed (if I may so speak) by his intellect, and every evil which has finally to be encountered goes on day by day increasing in extent and in force.

My course would be to bring Kaprisli Pasha at once to Constantinople, and to name Omer Pasha at once at the head of the Turkish army in the European provinces, and to continue the work of the Grand Vizier by the means of Commissioners, who might be chosen from men of the most energy and ability the service of the State can command.

But the Seraskier and others now in office oppose the appointment of Omer Pasha; the French Ambassador and, I understand, M. Thouvenel contest his military capacity; and on the other hand, I am told that the return of the Grand Vizier will be the signal of troubles and insurrections, which his presence is calculated to prevent; and it is therefore impossible, under such circumstances, to take upon myself the responsibility of enforcing measures of which I shall not be able to direct the execution, and as to the result of which I cannot, moreover, be positive.

I have not, however, disguised my belief that the one thing now necessary here is the capacity of executing, as well as of forming, some general plan both as to the political and financial condition of the country; and that I also deem it unwise to leave a man like Omer Pasha, who, whatever his defects, is liked and trusted by the soldiery, and who has at least the talent of putting and keeping an army together, out of employment, when there is no other General in the Empire whose qualities have been tested, or whose reputation is general, and when at any moment may arise an emergency in which everything may depend upon the conduct of the army.

I have spoken seriously on the subject both to the Sultan and Aali Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Sir H. Bulwer to Mr. Dalyell.

My dear Mr. Dalyell, *Therapia, July* 26, 1860.

I DO not give you formal instructions, because if you can do any good, it will be by talking in the sense in which I have talked to you, rather than by following any precise rules I might lay down for you.

I cannot indeed, at this place, say precisely what is doing at Salonica, nor give you, consequently, precise instructions. But my sentiment is, that danger is to be averted by mutual confidence, and will be brought on by mutual fear. The secret meetings and precautions of one party are rendered more perilous by secret meetings and arming of another. And it is always to be borne in mind that mischievous persons are abroad spreading alarm.

It is not natural to suppose that, all of a sudden, the Turks wish to murder the Christians; if they do so, it must be from sudden apprehensions: increase their apprehensions, you increase the peril.

Such are my general axioms, which may possibly be modified by exceptional and local circumstances; these the local Agents must judge of. Speak to Mr. Wilkinson; see M. Tissot, if desirable; form a general opinion, and return.

Tell Mr. Wilkinson that I have telegraphed to Athens to send a ship, if one is there; and Husni Pasha is ordered to return to Salonica. If Mehemet Pasha should be relieved summarily, telegraph.

I have written on what I think the probable supposition, viz., that the authorities will do their best to preserve order, and that the Mussulmans are not suddenly seized with a desire to kill all the Christians without cause. But of course should it seem desirable, it will be well to let the authorities be told confidentially that if any Mussulman outrage does happen, every party implicated in it shall be made a terrible example of; that the Pashas who fail in their duty will be inevitably shot; and that the city itself will be probably destroyed. On the other hand, the Christians should be quietly let to know that if they provoke a conflict, they will have to pay the penalty of it, and that we shall as little protect insurrection on one side as lawless violence on the other.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Mr. Dalyell to Sir H. Bulwer.

Sir, *Therapia, August* 4, 1860.

I HAVE to report to your Excellency that on arriving at Salonica on the 29th ultimo, I found that, although a panic had certainly prevailed, public confidence was already restored.

It seemed to me that my remaining for any time might re-excite alarm, as had I proceeded to sift stories which appeared to have had little, if any, foundation, it might (and in this country probably would have been supposed) that some important discovery had been made, when, in fact, there would appear to have been little to discover. I however said to Mr. Wilkinson, who (if I may express an opinion on the subject) seems

to me to have acted throughout with much judgment, that I thought a report from him, a little later, as to the real causes of public apprehension, especially in respect to how far foreign intrigue may, or may not, have had anything to do with the matter, would be acceptable to your Excellency.

I proceed to state shortly what I did, and what I was myself able to ascertain.

I met on board the steamer in which I went to Salonica Ahmet Rassim Effendi, a gentleman employed in the Department of Foreign Affairs here, who had, at a few hours' notice, been sent by his Highness Aali Pasha to inquire into the correctness of the reports as to the alarming state of Salonica, communicated by the French Embassy. Ahmet Effendi seemed to me intelligent, and sensible of the necessity of vigilance and firmness: he has himself property at Salonica.

On my arrival, I placed myself first in communication with Mr. Wilkinson, and then with M. Tissot, the French Consul. The latter gentleman (for whom the French Ambassador had, as your Excellency is aware, furnished me with letters, and by whom I was most courteously received) told me that he had recently made three or four journeys into the interior (I gathered from his conversation), with instructions to ascertain the feeling at present subsisting between the Mussulman and Christian populations.

If the French Consul's reports had been approved by his Government, I can understand his mind being rather disposed to accept, in this instance, what on his own showing are rumours, well-founded possibly, but still rumours, as established facts.

He informed me that "meetings of Turks had taken place in the fortress," at least that "he was so informed by a Mussulman in whom he placed confidence." Merchants whom I subsequently saw, and who, from their every-day business relations with the Turks, are likely to have been accurately informed, doubted entirely the fact of any such meetings as described by the French Consul having taken place.

M. Tissot also stated to me that "Mehemed Pasha, the Commandant of the troops, had expressed his intention to remain neutral in the event of the Turks attacking the Christians." He added that the Turks then applied to Yussuf Pasha, a proprietor of some influence in the neighbourhood, for advice, "by whom they are dissuaded from any violent course;" and that Mehemed Pasha then withdrew his adhesion.

I heard by no means a favourable account of Mehemed Pasha; and would even suggest to your Excellency that his removal, a few months' hence (not at present, for removing him at this moment would only confirm in the eyes of the population the existence of rumours which they now disbelieve), might be attended with good results. But the French Consul has no proof, positive or circumstantial, that Mehemed Pasha used menacing language; and both the Military and Civil authorities, though, perhaps, not quite so quickly as they might have done, employed measures calculated to reasure the population.

I may as well mention, confidentially, to your Excellency that Mr. Wilkinson told me there is a private grudge between the French Consul and Mehemed Pasha, which, perhaps, did not dispose the former to form an unduly charitable opinion of Mehemed Pasha's presumed proceedings.

The merchants whom I saw said that they had been much alarmed by the French Consul's assertion that "there was positively a plot;" but that as soon as patrols were established by the authorities they regained confidence; also that "certainly the panic was most perceptible out of business hours:" and that, in fact, commercial affairs between the Turks and the Christians had gone on as much as usual. I endeavoured to impress on this gentleman, and, indeed, generally, in the words of your Excellency's instruction to me, that "danger is to be averted by mutual confidence, and will be brought on by mutual fear."

In our interview with the Turkish authorities, and indeed throughout, Mr. Wilkinson and myself acted I may say jointly, and although I took care to assure the French Consul that my instructions emanated simply

from my own Embassy I had the pleasure of obtaining (in Mr. Wilkinson's presence) M. Tissot's entire concurrence in the tenor of the language we proposed to hold.

Mr. Wilkinson and myself called on the Commandant of the town (Mehemed Pasha whom I have already mentioned,) and on the Kaimakam (or Lieutenant-Governor, acting in the stead of Husni Pasha, who was absent, but will by this time have returned to Salonica).

To Mehemed Pasha, after expressing our satisfaction that things had assumed a more reassuring aspect, I said that the language which the Porte had voluntarily held to your Excellency as to the determination of the Sultan to punish his officers in Syria who had failed in their duty, would be, it was hoped, a warning to all Turkish officers invested with power and confidence. I considered that it would be your Excellency's wish that I should make such observations unmistakeably, but with great courtesy; and they were perfectly well received.

To the Kaimakam, the principal civil authority, I held generally the same tone, requesting him to impress on Husni Pasha that not only in Salonica, but everywhere within his jurisdiction, we consider the Pasha, and the Pasha alone, absolutely and directly responsible for anything that may occur; and I especially mentioned Serres, an important town in the Pashalic, where the Greek and Turkish elements in the population are nearly equally balanced, and where the Mudir* (Subordinate Local Governor) is stated to adopt a line independent of his superior and irritating to the Christians.

I may say to your Excellency that Husni Pasha himself would seem to be, though a man of a certain ability, vain and superficial, and I suspect that some of the dissatisfaction on the part of the Turks at Salonica may have arisen from the feeling that the Pasha, in order to court the Consuls, is disposed to prefer Greeks to the Local Turkish Beys, in his disposal of petty places and sources of emolument.

As to the origin and causes of the public apprehensions, which certainly very generally prevailed, I would add that although I am disposed to think that the panic was exaggerated, and although good and not bad relations habitually exist at Salonica between all classes of the population, there were incidents which may have served to excite, even if they did not partially justify, the alarm.

In the first place the news from Syria had produced a feeling of dread, a shrinking from the Turks, and clinging together on the part of the Christians, and very probably in some degree a counter-sentiment on the part of the Turks.

In the middle of this, some church bells taken from a number stamped with the Russian Eagle, and which arrived at Salonica some months since (it is stated as a present from the Russian Government to Greek Churches in the town and neighbourhood—a fact in regard to which I have requested Mr. Wilkinson to inquire and report to your Excellency), were cleared from the custom-house, and put up in a Greek Church within, or on the very limit of, the Turkish quarter, and close to a mosque. These bells were rung at the hour that the muezzin calls from the minaret the Mussulmans to prayer; a proceeding which naturally excited considerable dissatisfaction among the Turks.

It is said that the Mussulmans sent a deputation to the Turkish authorities, and expressed their determination, if this were continued, to enter the church and destroy the ornaments.

The Greek Bishop, on the plea of alarm, ordered the ringing of the bells in all the churches of Salonica to be discontinued.

The Turkish Kaimakam (Lieutenant-Governor) requested the Bishop to resume the ringing of the bells, stating that he (the Kaimakam) would be answerable that nothing should occur.

The Bishop declined.

In the meantime, it is stated (this, also, Mr. Wilkinson will, if possible,

* This Mudir has, I understand, been changed since the arrival of Ahmed Effendi at Salonica. Cabouli Effendi tells me that he will see that the new Mudir goes to his post forthwith.—R. A. O. D. August 5, 1860.

verify, and report to your Excellency) that a person known as a Russian emissary was found tolling one of the bells.

However, the ringing of the bells had, before my arrival, been resumed, in the Greek church in the Turkish quarter as elsewhere.

I am quite ashamed to trouble your Excellency with so many minute details, but they seem to me necessary in order to comprehend the matter.

Before concluding, I should represent to your Excellency that the general impression in Salonica is, that there are a good many Russian emissaries at present in the interior.

The neighbourhood of Mount Athos, and the circumstance that large estates are held by its various monasteries in Thessaly and Macedonia—as, indeed, in many other Provinces of the Empire—afford peculiar facilities for foreign intrigue; and Russian steamers connected with the Black Sea Company have been, for some months, running along the coast, carrying few passengers and little cargo—certainly without any great success as a commercial speculation.

It did not so much strike me that the French Consul was designedly playing into the hands of Russia, as that he was making the most of the undoubted causes of discontent which exist in every Turkish province; and also, I am disposed to think, holding out to merchants and others with whom he comes in contact the benefits to local trade and increase of personal security which would attend a foreign occupation of any part of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. A. O. DALYELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 28.

Major Cox, R.E., to Sir H. Bulwer.

Nisch, July 28, 1860.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency my arrival at Nisch, from whence I propose to proceed to Widdin, and thence by Bucharest to Jassy.

I do not propose to visit Monastir, as a journey thither would add three weeks to my tour; neither do I propose to visit the towns on the Danube, unless your Excellency should consider it necessary.

I believe that my tour through Bulgaria Proper, from Varna by Schumla, Tirnova, Gabrowa, hence through the district of Widdin, and through a portion of Roumelia, by Kesanlyk, Tatar Basardschyk, Sofia, and Nisch, will enable me to furnish a reliable report on the general condition of the Christian population. This report I propose to forward from Widdin or Bucharest.

Should your Excellency desire to forward any orders to me, they might be communicated through the Consul at Bucharest or Jassy.

I may observe that, up to the present moment, I have not been able to substantiate any cases of violation of females, dissimilar from those which occur in all communities; nor have I had brought under my notice any instance of what could be strictly called forced conversion to Mahometanism.

Nevertheless, the Christians at large, and the peasant class in particular, have some just grounds of complaint, which I shall have the honour to enumerate in my report; but even they, with the exception of the equality of the testimony of Mahometans and Christians, do not appear to present any serious difficulty in their removal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. COX.

Inclosure 4 in No. 28.

Instructions addressed by Ismail Pasha to the Governors of Rustchuk and Giurgevo.

(Traduction.)

EN donnant aux Gouverneurs des deux Provinces de Silistré et de Vidin des instructions et des ordres portant sur des améliorations qui ont pour but le bien-être et la sécurité des populations, son Altesse le Grand Vézir, lors de son passage à Vidin, m'a laissé copie de ces instructions et m'a chargé par sa lettre du 15 Zelhidjé, 1276, d'en surveiller l'exécution dans ces deux provinces qui forment le territoire de la division placée sous mon commandement, avec ordre de le tenir au courant des motifs qui peuvent s'opposer à l'entière exécution de ces instructions, comme négligence des autorités locales ou toute autre circonstance. Je m'empresse donc de vous faire connaître la part de contrôle et de surveillance qui vous revient dans le district qui se trouve dans le rayon de la garnison confiée à votre commandement, et qui portera sur les objets désignés dans le résumé ci-joint des instructions de son Altesse.

Vous détacherez à cet effet un de vos officiers les plus intelligents pour procéder à l'arrestation des malfaiteurs qu'ils peuvent rencontrer dans les différentes directions de leurs tournées. Ces messieurs s'informeront sur tous les points de leur passage si les objets désignés dans la liste ci-jointe, dont ils auront des copies, ont reçu un commencement d'exécution, et rechercheront les causes de l'inexécution partout où ils l'auront reconnue. Ils s'imposeront la tâche d'instruire les populations du contenu des instructions Vizirielles et du but dans lequel ils font leurs tournées. En même temps ils visiteront les lieux qui leur seront désignés par les populations comme étant le repaire des brigands, et mettront tous leurs efforts à les saisir; ils en poursuivront la piste dans le cas de besoin avec toute la persévérance qui peut amener le succès.

De votre côté, vous vous tiendrez au courant de la mise en exécution des mêmes instructions Vizirielles dans le chef-lieu où vous résidez, et vos rapports, joints à ceux qui vous seront transmis de la part de vos officiers détachés, m'informeront dans les plus minutieux détails de l'état des choses.

Je ne saurai trop vous recommander à vous aussi bien qu'aux officiers que vous aurez à détacher de mettre dans la rédaction de vos rapports toute l'attention et tout l'esprit d'impartialité qui peuvent les mettre à couvert d'une inexactitude ou d'une assertion pour laquelle vous n'eussiez en main les preuves les plus palpables.

Je vous recommande aussi toute la discipline qui convient à des détachements dont la mission a pour but la tranquillité et le bien-être des populations. Les officiers détachés n'exigeront des habitants aucune corvée, payeront strictement tous les objets qui leur seront fournis en nourriture, fourrages, &c., et observeront dans leurs relations avec les habitants tous les ménagements qui conviennent à leur mission.

Agréez, &c.

Traduction de la Liste jointe à la dépêche ci-dessus.

1. Les zabtiés seront recrutés parmi des hommes capables et actifs qui jouissent parmi les populations d'une bonne réputation de moralité.

2. Les autorités civiles veilleront à ce que les habitants ne recèlent pas les malfaiteurs; elles procéderont par des rassurances envers ceux qui les recèlent par crainte, et demanderont des garanties pour ceux qui seront soupçonnés de recéler les malfaiteurs par méchanceté.

3. Les entrepreneurs des dîmes n'ont le droit d'exiger le transport des denrées que pour des échelles d'une distance d'une journée (allée et retour), et moyennant trois paras le kileh de Stamboul. Pour des distances plus grandes on passera des marchés de transports sous les yeux des Conseils locaux entre les entrepreneurs et les habitants, sous la condition expresse de la bonne volonté de ces derniers. Les Caimacams et les Mudirs s'assureront de l'intégrité de ces dispositions par des tournées qu'ils feront à cet effet aux époques des déterminations de dîmes ou à d'autres époques

convenables. Afin que les populations connaissent leurs droits ces dispositions seront publiées dans les langues Turques-Bulgares, et Turques et Grecques.

4. Les Mudirs avertiront constamment les populations des dispositions suivantes :—

Qu'elles n'ont rien à donner ni aux entrepreneurs des dîmes et impôts ni à leurs employés, ou à ceux des impôts, sur les moutons, ni aux zabtiés, ni aux officiers ou soldats des troupes impériales, ni à qui que ce soit, si ce n'est que moyennant le prix intégralement payé ;

Que les zabtiés en mission seront munis de teskérés indiquant leur mission, avec lesquels ils auront à se présenter devant les Mukhtars ; que des Mukhtars seuls ils auront à recevoir le logement, et qu'ils auront à payer en monnaie ou en quittance leurs consommations ; que les quittances qu'ils donneront serviront aux retenus à faire chaque mois sur leurs soldes au profit de ceux qui leur auront fourni ;

Que le prix de transport pour les chevaux et voitures seront régularisées par l'autorité à tant par heure, et que ni les habitants ni les passagers n'auront à exiger au-dessus ou au-dessous de ces prix ;

Qu'aucun passager n'aura le droit de loger chez l'habitant dans les localités où il existe un auberge ou autre lieu affecté aux passagers de toutes les classes, auront à s'adresser aux Mukhtars pour obtenir le logement et payeront toutes leurs consommations [*sic*].

5. Les Cadis ne percevront pas au-delà des droits légaux.

6. Les convois d'hommes de recru ne se livreront à aucun sorte d'excès envers les populations ; les commandants de ces convois recevront tous les avertissements propres à leur faire redoubler d'attention.

7. Les entrepreneurs de l'impôt sur les moutons ne percevront que cent paras par tête de mouton ; on ne payera aucun impôt sur les agneaux.

8. Les porcs seront taxés à raison de 10 piastres par tête ; ces animaux d'une âge au-dessous d'un an ne seront susceptibles d'aucun impôt.

No. 29.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 490.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 8, 1860.*

DURING the last two months I have, as your Lordship is aware, been constantly engaged with discussions relative to the Turkish finances.

The ignorance which I must presume prevails in the Turkish Government itself, and the differences which have occurred in the information I have from time to time received from it, have formed one of the greatest difficulties I have had to contend with ; since a plan which was good under one state of circumstances, and under one amount of debt, might not be so, the circumstances and the amount of the debt to be dealt with being different ; and I say this, because during the last conversation I had with Rushdi and Aali Pashas, many facts presented themselves in a different point of view from that in which they had appeared previously, and many statements were quite different from those which had been formerly made.

The amount of the general debt seems, however (as I imagined would prove the case), pretty much what I have stated it to be, but the amount of each particular debt is by no means the same. What stands out from it all, however, are these two facts : the greatest portion of debts that now press upon the Treasury may be consolidated and a fund provided to pay the interest, and a sinking fund ; but there remains afterwards about 7,500,000*l.* sterling which the Government says could be paid with something less than 6,000,000*l.*, and for dealing with which a sum of money is urgently required. Of this, 5,000,000*l.* would be to relieve the current revenue for the next seven or eight

months, which is now handed over to capitalists as a guarantee for sums advanced and spent ; the Government remaining in this way actually with its expenses undiminished, and indeed by the present state of circumstances increased, and altogether without the ordinary and natural means to meet those expenses.

The remaining 2,500,000*l.* is for debts of various kinds, and especially for arrears due to the army and navy, and the different functionaries throughout the Empire.

It is clear that this condition of things cannot be left as it is ; at the same time, never having been able to fix the Government, notwithstanding all its wants, all its exigencies, its constant demands and our unceasing conversations, to any specific project or engagement, I addressed Aali Pasha the other day the inclosed letter, embodying therein what I conceived was the substance and intention of one or two of your Lordship's telegraphic despatches, and if the answer prove perfectly satisfactory, I think we might safely advise any foreign capitalists to enter upon the loan that would be required ; but Aali Pasha is so timid that I doubt about his taking any effectual measures with respect to the State property, or the property called "vacouf," or venturing, in short, upon any of those bold and decided steps which in extreme circumstances often constitute prudence. At all events, I have deemed it better to put on record this last effort, and also my general opinions.

There can be no doubt that the best way of escaping from external European influence would be to employ able Europeans in the Turkish service ; that the best way of practically executing new ideas would be to employ those who have been brought up since such ideas came into vogue ; and that this is not a moment when a statesman should falter as to the adoption of a course of policy so clearly required. But I own that after the experience I have lately had, I am somewhat disheartened ; and that, at all events, as long as the present Administration lasts—and I confess I should be puzzled to name a better—I shall, if pretty well convinced of its good intentions, never be certain of its resolute action.

At the same time, bad or weak as it is, we have to deal with it, and with the situation which exists in connection with it ; and whilst, on the one hand, I see no means of safety for either without a loan from Europe, on the other hand I know no stronger means for establishing a salutary authority over affairs than that which such a loan properly employed and guaranteed, might effect ; whilst I think it not unlikely that many of those things which men will not promise without being certain of a result, they would yet get courage to perform, if that result in the shape of five or six millions were before them clearly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

Therapia, ce 6 Août, 1860.

MON Gouvernement ne peut pas garantir un emprunt à moins qu'il n'existe quelque combinaison générale parmi toutes les Grandes Puissances à cet effet, et à l'heure qu'il est je sais rien d'une telle combinaison ou entente. Mais il s'énonce prêt à favoriser un tel emprunt auprès des grandes capitalistes pourvu qu'il voit ici une disposition d'adopter les mesures qui pourraient conduire, moyennant un emprunt, à un avenir financier solide.

Or, les conditions sur lesquelles je pourrais conseiller le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à s'y intéresser, sont—

1. Que l'arrangement financier auquel cet emprunt sera appliqué soit complet, et détruise entièrement le système de prêt à cours termes.

2. Que toutes les dettes flottantes qu'on a l'intention de consolider aient leurs intérêts assurés par une garantie spéciale.

nature of the feelings of horror, resentment, and indignation which have been excited in this country by the atrocities lately committed in Syria.

From the time of the Treaty of Kainardji of 1774 to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, Turkey was fettered in her internal government by her engagements to Russia. By repeated Treaties and Conventions, by armed interference at one time, and specious protection at another, the Christians of the Turkish Empire were made the subjects of the Czar quite as much as of the Ottoman Porte. But a few efforts were wanting to break the last links which bound the people of the Principalities, Bulgaria, and Bosnia, to the Sultan, and make him either a vassal of Russia or an Asiatic Power.

At this time Great Britain and France interfered. The siege of Sebastopol and the provisions of the Treaty of Paris converted the exclusive protection of Christians by Russia into an engagement, general in its nature, respectful to the Sultan in its form, by which it was hoped the lives and properties of the Christian subjects of the Porte would be guaranteed, and their condition gradually improved.

It was therefore with a shock of amazement, as well as of horror, that the intelligence of the massacres of Hasbeya, Zahlé, Deir-el-Kamar, and Damascus, was received in Great Britain. It was not that a barbarous Mahometan or Pagan tribe had murdered by wholesale other tribes with which they were at enmity—it was not the utter inhumanity which marked and deepened the shade of these murders—it was that Turkish Pashas and Beys, chosen by the Sultan to govern and protect his subjects, were evidently abettors and favourers of these massacres. Among these Kourshid Pasha was one of the most prominent. The troops commanded by him either looked on in apathy, or actually participated in the worst of these massacres. Fuad Pasha, sent on a special mission to inquire and to punish, proposed actually to leave this man in the administration of the Government whose powers he perverted, and it was not till a British Admiral interfered that he consented to deprive the Pasha of his authority. Achmet Pasha at Damascus gave full sway to the dissolute mob which murdered and plundered Christians. Othman Bey, at Deir-el-Kamar, did still worse; he disarmed the Christians, and then admitted their murderers to slay the unarmed multitude.

When the news of these events, even in imperfect reports, reached this country, men naturally said, "The blood and treasure of Great Britain and France were poured out freely to maintain the independence of the Sultan. They asked no territory, no exclusive privileges in return; they asked only that the Christian subjects of the Porte might be treated with humanity, to the great advantage of the Sultan himself. An outbreak of fanatical Mahometans we could well understand. But this treachery, brutality, and cruelty, on the part of persons selected by the Sultan himself to govern his best Provinces, shows either some deep design to exterminate the Christians, or an unheard-of degree of weakness and apathy at Constantinople, or an amount of venality and corruption which it is difficult to credit."

You must not be surprised that such feelings should be excited, and such reflections made; nor would it be of any use to conceal from the Porte that either the whole system of Ottoman Government must be replaced by one founded on integrity and justice, or the Sultan must prepare himself for the abandonment of his cause by his best and most persevering allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 31.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 517.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 20, 1860.*

AS a good deal of confusion seems to prevail in public opinion with respect to the state of Eastern affairs of late years, the origin and nature

of the Hatti-Humayoun, the position of the different European Powers and the conduct which has been and is to be pursued by Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, I think it not amiss to put before your Lordship clearly the views which I entertain upon these matters, and the facts with which those views are connected.

Previous to 1840, the two great influences at Constantinople were those of Russia on the one side, which had established her power over the Turkish Councils by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and of Great Britain on the other; which was known not only as essentially interested in maintaining the Sultan's authority but also as having, through her great naval position in the Mediterranean, the most adequate means for repelling any Russian aggression, which it was then thought would have the Black Sea for its starting-point.

The influence of England was, at the period to which I am now referring, immeasurably increased by the Syrian campaign; for through her means at that time not only the projects of Mehemet Ali for the independence of Egypt were controlled and checked, but the Province of Syria was also taken from him and restored to the Porte.

This event gave, I may say, almost unlimited authority to the advice of Her Majesty's Ambassador, and as a proof of that authority, and in return for the assistance which had been rendered by a Christian Power, the decree called the Edict of Gulhané was issued at Lord Ponsonby's instigation: that decree granting equal rights to all classes of the Sultan's subjects, and containing, in theory at least, the foundation for a new system of government. My immediate predecessor, Lord Stratford, inherited the position which this edict, and the events which had produced it, occasioned. He found at Constantinople a very remarkable man who, with great defects, had great energy and tact, a certain knowledge of Europe, and an immense ambition. This man, Reschid Pasha, attached himself naturally to our Embassy, then all-powerful, as a means of attaining his own views; and Her Majesty's Ambassador could not but find it a great convenience to have a man like Reschid Pasha acting on cordial and unreserved terms of intimacy with him. Up to the period of the late war with Russia Lord Stratford and Reschid Pasha together were thus able, except during trifling intervals, to carry things pretty well their own way; nor was the immense wealth, however corrupt its sources, which Reschid Pasha accumulated during his continuance in office, without its effect in maintaining his influence in a capital where much, I need hardly say, is effected by largesses, and what might elsewhere be not improperly termed bribes.

But a new state of things, which has not always been sufficiently considered, commenced with the war to which I am alluding. Previously few people had imagined that any large European army, without it was the army of Russia, would interfere in the affairs of the East, and this added much to the consideration which was attached to our maritime force.

At the war a new feature in affairs presented itself. The French not only sent a much larger army than our own to the Crimea, but this army created for itself a great reputation; and, as our navy had not any opportunity of showing its superiority over the navy of our ally, the impression left was certainly one which added greatly to the respect and fear felt for the French name, and diminished in thus much the almost exclusive respect which had been previously paid to our own. One of the first symptoms of this change was the decrease of Reschid Pasha's power. The understanding which had existed between this statesman and the British Embassy was accompanied, as I have said, by many advantages, but it had also the disadvantage of uniting together all the younger men of ability in Turkey who were aspirants to power, or who were not willing to submit to the complete supremacy of Reschid; these became in this way arrayed against Reschid and against the British Ambassador, and they selected for their patron the French Ambassador. A struggle commenced with alternate success, but in which Reschid's rivals must be considered on the whole as victorious, since, notwithstanding all his abilities, influence, and reputation, he was on several occasions driven

from office, and only regained it by some violent effort, which made his tenure of power, whenever he repossessed himself of it, feeble and insecure. His death ended the contest.

I arrived here at that time. Had I been disposed to pursue the previous policy of Lord Stratford I should have committed an anachronism, for the grounds on which that policy had been based and supported no longer existed.

The position of France, the position of Great Britain were changed, and Reschid Pasha had left no successor. The only course, therefore, that was open to me was to conciliate those whom I found administering affairs; to convince them there was no personal hostility towards them on the part of Her Majesty's Representative; and, instead of continuing any conflict with M. de Thouvenel, to endeavour to carry on, without lowering the just pretensions of my own Government and country, affairs here on a friendly understanding with him.

The results of the Peace, moreover, had in no small degree affected the general diplomatic state of things here. This Embassy and that Embassy had no longer altogether an isolated line of policy. A sort of Council of the Five European States had been created with respect to Eastern affairs; and it was necessary to act in such a manner, if anything was to be done, as would ensure the concurrence of my colleagues, disputes with whom, unless imperatively called for, were to be avoided.

I give this sort of sketch because in it must be sought the clue of my conduct; nor have I yet said all.

As long as Russia had a large military establishment in the Black Sea, with which she flattered herself that she could at any time reach the Turkish capital, and as long as her position here was one highly gratifying to her vanity, if it did not perfectly satisfy her ambition, her conduct was not likely to be fretful or restless, nor had she any strong motive for attempting to excite insurrection amongst the Rayah population. The destruction of her fleet, and the great blow given to her moral authority by the events of the last few years, has caused the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to be at once mortified and dissatisfied, and it was thus led to seek by the only means yet left to it to regain its former ascendancy, and to annihilate the consequences of its late defeats. The course I allude to is clear. It consisted in creating troubles in the heart of the Turkish Empire itself. An additional motive, therefore, was given to Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Ambassador for endeavouring, as far as was in their power, to strengthen the Government, and to support it against those insidious attacks which, under the plausible pretext of reform and protecting the Christian population, were likely to be, and were, as I think it is now sufficiently manifest, really directed against it.

The preceding narrative will explain with tolerable clearness the policy I have pursued up to this time, and the causes for that policy: and your Lordship will be able, after reading my observations, to determine how far I have been hitherto right, and to point out any change you may think expedient in my line of conduct—a line of conduct which is to be considered as generally conciliatory towards the Representatives of other Powers, without being unduly subservient to them, and as tending to support the Ottoman Government as far as it is possible, without, however being blind to its defects, or the necessity for its amelioration, and as indifferent to the patronage of any particular English party in Turkey, and simply friendly to any individual, or set of individuals, who administered, with tolerable honesty and ability, public affairs.

I should wish, however, now to say a few words on the subject of the Hatti-Humayoun to which such reference is constantly made as a sort of catch-word, but of which, notwithstanding, I venture to say nothing very accurate is generally known.

The Edict of Gulhané, to which I have alluded, contains every principle set forth in the Hatti-Humayoun, the latter only going more into details; but in going more into detail, it has hardly arrived more definitely at any positive result.

It is easy to say that there should be impartial justice, just and equal

laws, and suitable tribunals, and no exclusion from office on account of religion; but when all this is said the really difficult task yet remains, that of framing specific measures by which general propositions so loosely stated are to be carried out; and I confess my opinion is that the Edict of Gulhané having already laid down what may be considered a general principle of action, that which was wanted at the time of the promulgation of the Hatti-Humayoun was not a new and vague declaration of general principles, but an agreement upon certain clear and positive acts, and a provision for carrying out those acts and giving them execution.

If this could not have been done off-hand, I think it should have been stipulated that a Mixed Commission should have been formed for elaborating the requisite reforms, and providing the funds which were to be applied to any purpose for which money was certain to be wanted.

In fact, there are, I believe, at this time excellent regulations laid down as to prison discipline; but there are no prisons, for there is no money to build them. In the same manner, I understand that a plan exists for forming new tribunals; but these tribunals will require new functionaries, and there is no money with which to pay such functionaries.

Another great error has, I think, been committed under the notion that Turkey has to be assimilated to the rest of Europe; people have been too prone to look upon it as if it was already like the rest of Europe. European codes have in this way been in some instances adopted, without considering that these codes could only really be of practical advantage if there were a set of persons capable of understanding and applying them, and if the state of the country made them applicable. I say all this, because now may be the time to remedy defects; nor will I hesitate to express my conviction that one or two very simple measures, about which there could hardly be any dispute, and respecting which there need be no delay, would be worth ten times more than any vague enunciation of abstract theories.

It was with this view, indeed, that after consulting with the most intelligent men I could find both amongst the Mussulmans and Rayahs, I brought one or two measures before the Sultan and his Ministers fourteen or fifteen months ago, and I am still in favour of the adoption of those measures, since they entail little expense, would produce an immediate effect, and, if not immediately of great importance, have in themselves the germ of their development.

Your Lordship is acquainted with what those measures are; but I am willing to wait, before again urging them, the return of the Grand Vizier and the results of his practical experience.

All that I say is, let whatever is done then consist not merely in words, but in acts; and let those acts be in reference to Turkey and Turkish society, and not an imaginary country or a society other than that which we have to deal with.

As to the formation of tribunals and laws on a European model, these can only become efficient as the result of practice or example; and I am more and more convinced that the only way of proceeding efficaciously in this matter would be by the European Powers agreeing amongst themselves as to a code of laws and a system of tribunals which should be applicable to all foreign residents in Turkey. This great step once taken, and the Turks seeing daily its effects, they would ere long, as a matter of necessity and convenience, follow the model set to them, and it would be easy at once to establish rules for mixed tribunals in the first instance, and prepare for the establishment of Turkish tribunals which might, within a certain number of years, deal justly both with Turks and Europeans.

There are technicalities and peculiarities of practice which would probably create difficulties. English lawyers might insist on certain forms; French on others: but I am convinced that the great end in view should be considered superior to any minor sacrifices which might be required to attain it; and that the only consideration as to legal forms that merits attention, is how best to combine clearness with simplicity, avoiding all unnecessary expense and all unnecessary formality.

There would, moreover, be one great advantage in commencing a law reform in the East in this manner. The first step would be taken by Europeans; and the dilatory effects of the Turkish character would not operate upon, nor retard, their proceedings.

It is, moreover, somewhat unjust to expect that the Turks should be able to form laws and tribunals which should be satisfactory to Turks, Rayahs, and Europeans, when Europeans cannot form such laws and tribunals as would be satisfactory among themselves.

At all events, I press the subject seriously on your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 32.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 485.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1860.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's interesting despatches from No. 517 of the 20th ultimo to No. 534 of the 22nd ultimo.

Those despatches tend in no way to diminish the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government respecting the future fortunes of the Turkish Empire.

In your despatches Nos. 534 and you represent the corruption of the Seraskier in the strongest terms. You represent that he has at his disposal 6,000,000*l.* sterling yearly; that the army is unpaid, ill fed, and ill-clothed, while he is getting rich; that he makes contracts on terms disadvantageous to the State, that he may obtain bribes from dishonest contractors; and that if he is kept in his present position, in spite of remonstrance, a revolution may be the consequence.

These representations are supported by the notorious fact that the pay of the army is everywhere in arrear, in some provinces not less than twelve months; that the soldiers are discontented, and that even at Constantinople itself a mutiny is dreaded which may place in jeopardy the existence of the Sultan's Government.

On the other hand, the French Ambassador is said to protect the Seraskier, and to declare that he is not so corrupt as the Captain Pasha, who is said to enjoy your Excellency's favour.

In the midst of these deplorable scenes the Sultan gives good words to everybody, but does no one act calculated to restore confidence or give strength to his Government.

There are some reflections which naturally arise from this state of affairs:—

1st. It is evident that it would be of no use to obtain money by loan from foreign capitalists, while the money raised by taxes is misapplied to feed the rapacity of the Sultan's Ministers. If no money is obtained by loan, there may come a day of reform; if money is obtained by loan, and there is no change of system, there surely will come a day of revolution.

2ndly. It is lamentable to find that while the counsellors of the Sultan are corrupt, his foreign advisers are disputing for influence. If the Captain Pasha is as corrupt as the Seraskier, let the Captain Pasha be dismissed as well as the Seraskier. Great Britain has no interest in maintaining in office dishonest Ministers of the Sultan.

3rdly. If any remedies are to be applied to the grievous diseases of Turkey, we must first find the men who can apply them. The wisest measures would be of little use administered by corrupt or foolish men. It seems to Her Majesty's Government that if four or five persons can be found who will honestly, without fear or favour, control the army, the finances, foreign affairs, and the Department of Justice, there may still be hope for Turkey. Nor is it necessary to go beyond the circle of the present Chief Ministers of the Porte to find such men.

Let the present Grand Vizier take upon himself the entire government of the army, and see that they are paid, fed, and clothed. Let Rushdi Pasha, the President of the Council of Finance, take care that the taxes levied by the collectors do not exceed the taxes imposed by the Sultan, and are duly received by the Treasury. Let Fuad Pasha remain at the head of foreign affairs. Let Aali Pasha, at the head of the Council of the Tanzimat, take care that justice is done to Christians and to Turks.

If these four men are allowed by the Sultan to name and dismiss all other functionaries, without danger of being overthrown by some dark intrigue, a new spirit may be infused into the Administration. But for this purpose the Sultan must be firm, the four Ministers must be stern in punishment, and determined to resist corruption in every shape.

You will say that there is no money in the Treasury to pay the immediate expenses of the State. But public credit must follow, and cannot precede reform. The soldiers who have waited twelve months may wait a little longer, if they are assured of regular pay for the future.

You may read this despatch to the Grand Vizier if he should return, and to Aali Pasha whether the Grand Vizier returns or not.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSEL

No. 33.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 575.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 4, 1860.

I INCLOSE Aali Pasha's answer to my communication of August 6, relative to financial matters and the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government might aid in procuring a loan for Turkey.

M. de Lavalette has just informed me that M. Thouvenel acquiesces in my views, and speaks in a flattering manner of my mode of

them. Aali Pasha's letter is not sufficiently clear. The only way will be for the two Governments to leave it to the Embassies to fix these conditions with Aali Pasha, and make the course they take depend upon the representations of the Embassies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Aali Pasha to Sir H. Bulwer.

Excellence, *Sublime Porte, le* 28 *Août*, 1860.

LE Conseil des Ministres a pris en sérieuse considération le mémoire et le plan de quelques réformes financières que votre Excellence a bien voulu nous communiquer.

Les soins que vous avez eus de chercher les moyens les plus propres pour remédier à l'état de pénurie auquel les finances de l'Empire ont été réduites par suite de plusieurs causes, et pour relever notre crédit, ont été appréciés au plus haut point par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et considérés comme un nouveau témoignage des sentiments et des intentions bienveillantes qui animent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine à l'égard de l'Empire Ottoman.

Nous nous empressons de reconnaître que la plupart des mesures proposées par votre Excellence appartiennent à la catégorie des réformes utiles et nécessaires. Seulement il est superflu de vous dire qu'une organisation si importante et si fondamentale exige même dans ses détails beaucoup de soins et de réflexion de la part des hommes compétents et

spéciaux. En conséquence les fruits qu'on doit en attendre ne peuvent être cueillis que dans une époque plus ou moins éloignée.

D'un autre côté votre Excellence n'ignore pas que plus que la moitié des revenus d'une année est affectée à couvrir certaine dette flottante à courte échéance; que les dépenses auxquelles cette partie des recettes était destinée se trouve à découvert; que le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut disposer d'aucun moyen pour pourvoir aux traitements des fonctionnaires et l'entretien de l'armée, et que les besoins pressants résultant d'un pareil état de choses entravent la réalisation de toute espèce de réforme et de progrès.

Pour faire donc cesser cette crise et pour établir notre système financier dans tous ses détails sur une base satisfaisante, un emprunt étranger est de la première importance.

La réalisation de cet emprunt dépend absolument des offices bienveillants de l'Angleterre et de la France.

Quant aux garanties qui seraient nécessaires d'offrir en échange d'une si grande assistance que ces deux Puissances ne nous refuseront pas, comme nous l'espérons fermement, la Sublime Porte croit devoir expliquer ici sa manière de voir comme il suit:—

1. Que les deux Délégués financiers choisis par les Gouvernements Anglais et Français, nommés et payés par la Sublime Porte, seront adjoints aux membres du Haut Conseil des Trésors nouvellement créé. Le produit de l'emprunt sera réalisé et employé par la décision et sous la surveillance du dit Conseil.

2. Le Conseil aura également à discuter et à proposer au Gouvernement les réformes financières, et un système complet de contrôle; il aura à examiner les Budgets des différentes Administrations qui devront être préparés sur la base arrêtée par le Gouvernement; à inviter au besoin au Conseil les Chefs des dites Administrations pour leur demander certaines explications qui paraîtront nécessaires par rapport à leurs Budgets respectifs; à faire ses observations au Gouvernement Impérial sur la manière la plus économique de toute espèce de dépenses administratives, sans qu'il soit permis d'en changer le fonds dont l'urgence aura été reconnue par le Gouvernement.

Ce qui précède nous paraît renfermer les garanties les plus amples que les capitalistes peuvent demander. Le Conseil Suprême des Finances créé en dernier lieu dans le seul but de procéder à l'amélioration du système financier de la Turquie; d'établir les Budgets de différentes Administrations; d'organiser un système général de contrôle, et d'exercer une surveillance convenable et renforcée maintenant par deux nouveaux membres jouissant de la confiance des deux Gouvernements, ne laissera rien à désirer et ne pourra permettre aucun doute sur la sincérité des intentions de la Sublime Porte.

C'est aussi aux délibérations de ce Conseil, ainsi complété, que le Gouvernement Impérial soumettra, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire plus haut, les mesures que vous avez bien voulu nous suggérer.

Je prie donc votre Excellence de transmettre cette réponse au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et de bien vouloir l'appuyer auprès de lui pour obtenir la nouvelle assistance dont je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter ici l'urgente nécessité.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

No. 34.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 513)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 19, 1860.

UPON a fair and just consideration of the note of the Turkish Government addressed to your Excellency, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 575 of the 4th instant, I have to observe:—

1st. That the plan of leaving the Army and the Civil Service unpaid

with a view to borrow for the purpose of supplying those necessary branches of administration seems a very improvident arrangement.

2nd. That if there are debts to be paid off within short terms it seems desirable rather to use the credit of the Government for extending those payments over terms of thirty or forty years, than to leave the Army and Civil Service to be paid by loan.

3rd. If it is meant by the term "good offices of England and France" to ask those Powers to guarantee a Turkish loan, England on her part has determined not to accede to such a proposal.

4th. It appears to Her Majesty's Government that the first step is to ascertain what is the ordinary revenue of the Sublime Porte; the second, to provide that that revenue, and no more, is collected; the third, to ascertain what are the proper estimates for the Army, Navy, and Civil Service; the fourth, to see that the sum allotted to these branches of administration is honestly and economically applied. When these four things are done the credit of the Porte will no doubt stand higher than it now does, and a loan, if required, may be raised in London and Paris on good terms.

5th. Her Majesty's Government have no wish to send to Constantinople an English functionary to give unpalatable advice which will not be taken; but if the Turkish Government wish to examine their finances with a real purpose of reform, it may be possible, though difficult, to find an English gentleman who, with a French colleague, will be ready to become a Member of the Turkish Council of Finance.

You may read this note to Safvet Effendi, and if desired give him a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 35

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 603.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September* 12, 1860.

I DULY received your Lordship's despatch No. 443 of August 25, and read a large portion of it yesterday to Aali Pasha. After begging to convey my grateful thanks for the obliging manner in which your Lordship does me the honour to speak of me personally in that despatch, I beg also to state that I most entirely and cordially agree in the sentiments which your Lordship expresses, both as to the recent events in Syria, and the course which ought to be pursued by the Turkish Government wherever its rule extends.

Your Lordship will indeed easily recognise that my own views have been in strict conformity with those of your Lordship on these subjects.

To say nothing of the constant and numerous other instances in which I have urged upon the Porte a course of more energy, the suppression of abuses, and the promotion of reforms, I may refer your Lordship to various notes and communications addressed to the Porte and to the high functionaries of the State within the last twelve months, and reported in the despatches of which a list is inclosed;* and I would wish especially to call your Lordship's notice to the following passage in a recent letter from me to the Acting Grand Vizier:—

"Il m'est démontré que sans des changements radicaux le Gouvernement Ottoman ne peut pas durer.

* No. 44, July 19, 1859; No. 67, July 26, 1859; No. 83, July 26, 1859; No. 105, August 16, 1859; No. 109, August 21, 1859; No. 111, August 23, 1859; No. 127, August 31, 1859; No. 153, September 14, 1859; No. 158, September 16, 1859; No. 160, September 16, 1859; No. 177, September 27, 1859; No. 193, October 4, 1859; No. 204, October 11, 1859; No. 210, October 12, 1859; No. 216, October 19, 1859; No. 220, October 19, 1859; No. 221, October 19, 1859; No. 232, October 25, 1859; No. 240, November , 1859; No. 260, November 22, 1859; No. 282, November 30, 1859; No. 298, December 14, 1859; No. 318, December 29, 1859. No. 4, January 4, 1860; No. 46, January 20, 1860; No. 108, February 21, 1860; No. 109, February 22, 1860; No. 111, February 22, 1860; No. 176, April 2, 1860; No. 185, April 4, 1860; No. 251, May 16, 1860; No. 269, May 23, 1860; No. 297, June 6, 1860; No. 308, June 8, 1860; No. 309, June 8, 1860.

"Il est possible, il est même facile de maintenir le Souverain sur le Trône, de donner au peuple Turc une haute main dans les affaires, s'ils montrent de l'intelligence et de l'énergie à la tête du Gouvernement du pays; mais il est de toute impossibilité de faire de ce vaste territoire une ferme pour être exploitée par quelque Pashas et leurs Kiahayas; il est impossible même de l'exploiter seulement au bénéfice de la race Turque; et il est également impossible d'en exclure l'esprit, l'intelligence, l'influence Européenne.

"Si on ne veut pas entrer franchement dans ces idées, tout ce que nous ferons maintenant pour replâtrer la situation sera de la peine perdue.

"Il faut envisager l'Empire Ottoman comme un Royaume qui doit être gouverné et administré de la meilleur manière possible pour ses habitants en général, ainsi que pour la dignité et la puissance de son Chef.

"L'habitude des affaires, une ancienne suprématie, et il faut ajouter un certain tacte et une certaine force instinctive donnent à la race des Osmanlis une position avec laquelle nulle autre race dans l'Empire ne peut rivaliser, si celle-ci se donne la peine qu'il faut se donner partout quand il s'agit de maintenir ou d'acquérir le pouvoir; mais il ne faut pas que les Turcs s'endorment sur leur position actuelle, ni qu'ils exagèrent le rôle que cette position leur accorde.

"Pour rester à la tête de ce pays, il faudra faire preuve de qualités supérieures; la corruption, l'inertie, les côteries favorisées, les préjugés inopportuns, sont incompatibles aujourd'hui avec la suprématie que les Turcs désirent maintenir.

"Ils sont maintenant à la tête des affaires. Ils sont à même d'employer l'intelligence et l'activité de l'Europe, et d'avoir les qualités qui rendent l'Europe supérieure à la Turquie dans leur solde, sous leur main.

"C'est ainsi qu'ils auront chez eux une force capable de résister une force semblable au dehors; c'est ainsi qu'ils pourront élever peu à peu leurs employés et leur peuple à la hauteur de la civilisation générale des autres Etats, lesquels sans être ni aussi grands, ni en possession d'un sol aussi fertile, ni d'aucune manière aussi doués par la Providence, jonissent d'une grande puissance et d'un grand prestige, tandis que l'Empire Ottoman tombe en ruines, accablé de sa propre faiblesse.

"Ce sont des vérités dures à dire; mais cependant ce sont des vérités qu'un ami de la Turquie doit dire avec une franchise presque rude.

"Si les Turcs employaient et estimaient les Européens, s'ils ne les traitaient point comme des inférieurs quand ils les emploient (de cette façon ils n'auront que des Européens indigne d'être à leur service), ils mettraient de suite une nouvelle rigueur dans leur Administration, et ils auront une intelligence bien autrement expérimentée à leurs ordres, tout en formant des employés indigènes capables de se passer de ce secours passager dans une autre génération.

"Faut-il dire toute ma pensée? On exclut aussi trop les jeunes gens (qui ont été élevés dans les idées du temps) des places qu'ils sont, peut-être, capables d'occuper avec honneur et avantage, et on emploie trop une quantité de personnes dans les plus hautes charges qui ne comprennent ni la position de leurs pays, ni le rôle qui leur est confié.

"Sans recourir aux Européens, on n'organisera jamais ici une Administration sur des bases satisfaisantes; sans recourir à la race nouvelle, on ne mettra jamais de l'énergie dans les affaires.

"On ne doit point, en effet, se dissimuler ce qui est au fond de toute cette mauvaise administration que nous déplorons.

"On ne considère pas assez le Gouvernement ici comme une machine qui doit être faite pour le pays; on considère plutôt le pays comme un esclave qui doit satisfaire aux besoins et aux caprices des gouvernants. Les places sont devenues l'Empire; et si elles ne sont pas dans les mains de certaines personnes, on regarde le pauvre Empire comme perdu.

"L'Empire c'est le Souverain, c'est le territoire, c'est le peuple. La dignité du premier, les ressources et les richesses du second, la bonheur du troisième, voilà l'Empire.

"Votre Altesse a la haute intelligence capable à comprendre ce fait: il faut avoir l'énergie et le caractère (même dans ces temps actuels) nécessaires pour le faire valoir."

With regard to Syria especially, in addition to my various written communications on this subject, in the early part of the spring, and before any serious troubles broke out in the Lebanon, I had a meeting with Rushdi Pasha, Aali Pasha, and Fuad Pasha, to which I was resolved to have a witness, and took, consequently, with me the first dragoman.

At this meeting I told these three men, the leading men in the Empire, that, unless they sent a High Commissioner and troops to Syria, and took up the whole question of that province (which I had been urging them for the last twelve months to do) in the most serious manner, I should throw the responsibility of what might occur upon them.

Recently again, as to the examination of the accounts of the Military Department, and also as to the nomination of incapable functionaries, I have taken, as your Lordship is aware, a very decided part; and the consequence has been a most determined intrigue against me.

The poor Sultan, indeed, is so surrounded at this time that it is next to impossible for him to get at the truth, and those who desire to make fortunes by his favours represent any one whose conduct is likely to check the abuses by which they profit as the enemy of the Monarch and the Empire.

For my own part, the course I have taken hitherto has been to defend, as far as I could, the integrity of the Turkish dominions; but to do my utmost to correct the abuses in the government of them, and if the time should arrive when I believe the attempt I have been engaged in is a vain one, I shall then not fail to announce my conviction frankly to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 36.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 634.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 26, 1860.*

AALI PASHA despairing of a loan at this moment, and begging me again to give some ideas as to how he could act in the present crisis, I wrote him the inclosed letter, which the Marquis de Lavalette seemed to think contains the best plan that can be adopted, and if the 2,000,000*l.* sterling can be got here, and the present plan for paying the soldiers, accompanied by the other measures I formerly advised, may at once be adopted, this Government will, I think, have got a chance of getting through its financial difficulties. But I confess I almost despair, in Fuad's and Kibrizli's absence, of any positive measures, and I am getting rather averse to mingling more in the matter by useless counsels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

Chère Altesse, *Therapia, ce 14 Septembre, 1860.*

J'AI eu une conversation avec M. Falconnet, qui trouve la position de vos finances si désespérée qu'il ne veut pas s'en mêler, et ne donne aucun avis qui puisse mener à un résultat quelconque.

J'ai donc consulté de nouveau mon Mémorandum, et comme les deux Gouvernements de l'Angleterre et de la France y ont adhéré, je pense qu'il vaut mieux pour moi de n'y rien changer, et mieux pour vous d'y

adhérer autant que possible, et dans ce cas je puis encore écrire pour qu'un financier Anglais vous soit envoyé ici immédiatement.

A l'égard de la question spéciale d'émission d'un papier monnaie, c'est toujours une mesure à adopter avec précaution. Il y a toutefois plusieurs manières de modifier son mauvais effet, et il y en a que je préférerais à d'autres. Mais sans que l'affaire soit dans mes mains, et que je sache que toutes les autres conditions que je pourrais suggérer seraient acceptées, je ne voudrais pas encourir la responsabilité d'un conseil partiel. Afin de ne pas me refuser à votre demande, tout en me tenant aussi près que possible à mon projet original, il me paraît que quelque chose peut être adoptée sur les bases suivantes :—

Mettez les propriétés de l'état dans les mains d'une Commission telle que je l'ai désignée, qui aura la faculté d'émettre des billets sur la valeur des propriétés contre lesquels les caimés en circulation devraient être retirés.

De cette façon vous remplissez votre promesse autant que vous le pouvez dans ce moment, touchant les dits caimés. En même temps vous pouvez émettre de nouveaux caimés numérotés, en justifiant cette mesure sur les besoins d'une monnaie quelconque et l'impossibilité de faire une émission en or ou en argent ; le chiffre de ces nouveaux caimés devrait être calculé sur l'étendue du district où ils auront cours, et sur les besoins du commerce.

Vous avez retiré 4,000,000*l.* sterling de la monnaie qui serait pour le commerce de Constantinople et que ce commerce ne trouvait pas trop. Si vous étendez maintenant la circulation des nouveaux caimés jusqu'aux provinces avoisinantes vous pouvez, il me semble, émettre encore sans danger cette quantité, mais vous devez pourvoir à son amortissement graduel.

Pour cela il faut un tirage chaque année d'une septième partie, ce que vous ne pouvez faire qu'en allouant une somme analogue sur un revenu quelconque. Ce revenu doit être mis dans les mains d'une Commission Mixte où les Européens trouveraient leur place.

Ainsi ces caimés auront une valeur fixe, car on saura que chaque année une certaine partie sera retirée à leur valeur normale. Ils n'auront pas toutefois cette valeur, c'est vrai, mais si vous faites un emprunt vous le ferez sur des bases semblables, c'est-à-dire, vous feriez une dette de tant de millions sterling pour laquelle vous ne recevrez que tant. La perte donc sera la même à peu près dans l'un comme dans l'autre cas.

Voici à la hâte mon idée, mais comme toute mesure de ce genre a de grands inconvénients, je ne vous donne pas une opinion absolue, mais seulement une opinion relative aux circonstances et à votre position actuelle selon ce que vous m'en dites.

Pour parler avec confiance je dois être au centre de vos affaires, les avoir toutes dans mes mains, et avoir le pouvoir de les diriger avec une autorité absolue : alors j'ai la conviction que je pourrais vous faire sortir de tous vos embarras. Je dois toutefois vous prévenir que sans que nos mesures en général puissent produire de nouvelles ressources au Trésor, de nouvelles charges sur le Trésor ne pourront avoir en définitive qu'un résultat fâcheux, et voici pourquoi j'insiste sur la nécessité d'un grand ensemble de mesures propres à augmenter votre revenu et à diminuer les dépenses : et non pas une mesure aujourd'hui et une autre demain, par laquelle nulle aura l'effet qu'on devrait en obtenir.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 37.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 561.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1860.

Sir,

THE time seems to be arrived when the advice of the Great Powers may be of advantage to the Porte, and, if sincerely adopted and acted upon, may save the Sultan from those dangers which too evidently menace the security of his Throne.

The reports you have received from Her Majesty's Consuls in the Turkish Empire, and especially the answers to the "Queries" which you sent to them, furnish the materials for a judgment upon the present administration of the Turkish Empire.

It seems to be the general result that the administration of Turkey has been considerably improved in the last thirty years, but that it still leaves much to be desired. This is especially the conclusion to be drawn from the interesting despatch of Mr. Longworth, containing an account of his conversation with the Grand Vizier.

It may be observed, generally, that the periods most dangerous for a Government are not those in which a people is kept in abject subjection and weakness, but those in which the subject, having acquired wealth, knowledge, and strength, turns his eyes to the examination of the defects of the Government under which he lives, and is ready and able to form combinations to wrest from his rulers the redress of the grievances under which he suffers.

The Turkish Government is precisely in this condition. The Christian subjects of the Porte, instead of being purposely kept in a state of poverty and ignorance, which was at once the climax and the safeguard of oppression, have been allowed to carry on trade, to acquire property, and, indirectly, to exercise influence in the State. But the Turkish mode of administration has not improved in the same proportion. Many vexatious practices are still retained, and there is still allowed to Turkish Governors that arbitrary license which in good hands may possibly be a benefit, but in bad hands is sure to be a scourge. This, therefore, is a period in Turkish administration when the Christian subjects of the Porte are sure to feel their grievances keenly, and are most likely to combine for their removal. They have knowledge, wealth, and numbers; they will be apt to prepare physical strength for a struggle with their Mahometan masters.

The reform of the Turkish finances, which ought to be an easy operation, will be attended with the greatest difficulties. Turkey is not encumbered by a very large debt; it has an ample revenue. Two simple rules would seem to be sufficient for the guidance of this branch of the State. The one is, to collect by the least-oppressive means the sums necessary for the purposes of the State, and no more; the other is to apply with honesty and economy the sums thus collected to pay the Army, Navy, Administration of Justice, Civil List, and other expenses of the State.

I am afraid the Turkish Government sins against both these rules. More is collected, and in a vexatious mode, than the State requires, and the sums thus collected are not honestly applied to the necessary expenditure of the State. Some part, perhaps a large one, is intercepted by the collectors, who make the peasant pay more than his due, and, if he appeals to the Pasha, bribe the Pasha for his connivance. Another part is diverted from its proper purpose by the Ministers of the Porte, who leave the Army and Navy unpaid, while they grow rich by the means which should be applied to defend the State.

Financial confusion, discontent in the Army and Navy, complaints of corruption, misery in the provinces, and disorder in the capital, are the inevitable effects of these gross abuses.

It will be the first duty of the Representatives of the Great Powers to point out this fatal defect, and suggest the obvious remedies.

The evidence afforded by the Reports of the Consuls shows sufficiently the abuses which prevail in the collection of the revenue. A separate Department of the State should be made answerable for that collection, and no Provincial Governor should be allowed to screen those collectors who wring from the peasant more than is due from them.

In like manner, an account should be required of the sums paid to each Department for Army, Navy, Justice, Foreign and Home Department, and Civil List. The Commissioners will, with the assistance of the Grand Vizier, be able to ascertain whether the sums received by the

Department are actually spent on that part of the public service which is under their administration.

It will be no part of the business of the Representatives to inquire whether these sums are wisely applied; into such details they cannot usefully enter: but their business will be, to inquire whether they are actually applied to the public service, or go to feed the foul stream of political corruption.

In urging the reform of financial abuses, you will endeavour to obtain the assent of all your colleagues in denouncing corruption, whatever may be the hands which receive the bribe, and whoever may be the Minister into whose coffers the gold thus ill-acquired may flow. It would be a public, nay, a European misfortune, if the Representatives of the Great Powers should assume the patronage of some favoured Minister of the Porte, and endeavour to maintain him in wealth and dignity at the expense of the essential welfare of the State and of the unfortunate peasantry of the provinces. Too often have those who preside over the misgovernment of Turkey secured impunity by playing one Christian Power against another, and escaped from the performance of solemn promises by the rivalry of jealous Ambassadors. Let it be your care loudly to disavow, and practically to abjure, all partiality. If such passions are allowed to prevail, it will not be the fault of the Sultan if the evils of his administration remain uncorrected; it will be the fault of that Christian Power which screens and covers the corruption of his officers.

It will be essential, therefore, to ascertain in what manner the 11,000,000*l.* sterling, or whatever sum the revenues of the Porte may amount to, is distributed. Upon this distribution, with the reserves I have mentioned, the Commission may have many valuable remarks to offer, which I will not here anticipate.

The next great question is the administration of justice.

It appears, from several of the Reports of the Consuls, that, while the inferior Courts admit Christian evidence, the superior Courts do not. Thus the spirit of the Hatti-Humayoun is evaded.

In some provinces the Hatti-Humayoun is not even published; in many, perhaps in most, its provisions are disregarded.

The Reports of the Consuls furnish the materials with which you can construct a plan of reform for the administration of criminal and civil justice in Turkey.

It is desirable that, with a view to improve the condition of the Christians, and to strengthen the position of Turkey by ensuring justice and equality to all the subjects of the Porte, the Representatives of the Great Powers should meet in Conference at Constantinople. You are therefore instructed to propose to the Ambassadors and Ministers of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, to meet and to compare the Reports of their respective Consuls, with a view to give, collectively, advice to the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 38.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 571.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 25, 1860.*

THE Turkish Ambassador, M. Musurus, communicated lately to Lord Palmerston during my absence on the Continent, and afterwards to me, a message addressed to him by the Grand Vizier, requesting very earnestly the assistance of the British Government, either by guarantee or otherwise, with a view of procuring a loan of 2,500,000*l.* sterling, for the purpose of supplying the urgent wants of the Turkish Treasury.

I applied immediately to persons upon whose intelligent acquaintance with Turkish finance I had reason to rely. My object was not to seek at

once the power of obtaining a loan for the Sultan, but rather the means of correcting the judgment of the Government as to the present financial position of Turkey.

I send you the result in the shape of two inclosures to this despatch.

The first contains what I believe to be a tolerably accurate balance-sheet of Turkish finance; the expenditure being divided into Departments, and the receipts given in a gross sum.

The second is a short paper of remarks drawn up by a gentleman in whose judgment and information I place great confidence.

From these documents it appears that the year 1859-60 gave the—

	£
Expenditure	13,281,655
Receipts	11,268,994
Deficiency	2,012,661

It is obvious that unless the taxes are made more productive, or the expenses vigorously retrenched, the Turkish Government is proceeding rapidly to bankruptcy. But if a million could be added to the revenue by a tax on houses, or duties on stamps or customs, and if at the same time a million could be reduced from the expenses, the credit of the Turkish Government would be at once restored, and there would be little difficulty in renewing the floating debt which at present hangs upon the Treasury.

But unless steps of this decided character can be taken, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion, with the writer of the paper, that a temporary loan would merely postpone the difficulty, to return again in a more aggravated form, and would thus do more harm than good.

Still more pernicious would be a re-issue of inconvertible paper. Such an act would destroy all faith in Turkish promises and probity.

You are directed to express these views to the Grand Vizier, and communicate them to the Representatives of the Four Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 39.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 656.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 15, 1860.*

WITH respect to your Lordship's despatches Nos. 485 and 512 of the 11th and 18th of September, my shortest way of answering them would be to give your Lordship in as few words as possible my ideas as to the general state of the Turkish finances, as to what can be done at the present time about them, as to what has been done.

1. In regard to ascertaining the revenue and forming an estimate of the expenses according to the existing system; this, after much trouble and difficulty from the want of accurate accounts, has been at last effected.

2. The control which your Lordship suggests has been in a certain degree provided for by means of a Mixed European Commission, which, however, is formed on a wrong basis, as I pointed out at the time, and must be improved.

3. The establishment and carrying out of a better system of perception can only be done by a proper Ministry of Finance: this I consider as *a sine qua non*, and no other but one which has the greater number of its principal employés Europeans can suffice; of this I am sure. The Turkish Government neither refuses nor assents.

4. The revenue may be considered at the present time to be at about 10,000,000*l.* or 11,000,000*l.* The expenditure may be taken at something over; but I am really afraid of stating a figure. I have sometimes been told they balanced, and figures shown are to that effect; at others, an excess of 500,000*l.*; at others more. Perhaps 1,000,000*l.* would be near the mark.

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The expenses by the control I have pointed out, if efficient, would be diminished by, at least, 2,000,000*l.* or 2,500,000*l.*

The receipts by a proper Ministry of Finance would be increased in the same proportion.

It is on this fund that the State would have principally to count in its subsequent arrangements, and this is why a proper Ministry of Finance is an absolute necessity.

I now come to the debts, which throw the Government at this moment into such confusion.

I will take them at about 18,000,000*l.* sterling. This would include claims not yet arranged, set down at 2,000,000*l.*; the Government now says only 16,000,000*l.* exclusive of foreign debts.

I must then separate these 18,000,000*l.* into two divisions, one of 12,000,000*l.*, the other of 6,000,000*l.* First, these 12,000,000*l.* have to be paid; it is clear they cannot be, but an interest of 7 per cent. on them might. The capital, therefore, must be converted into a debt, with interest, and if this interest is duly secured it assumes the value of capital.

The 6,000,000*l.* remaining, however, which I have named as a debt are not in fact a debt, but a debt that has been paid and left a vacuum in the treasury which has to be supplied. This vacuum has been created in the following manner: The Government has placed the revenue of the next seven months out of its power. It has made it over for sums received and spent. Thus the whole of the expenses of the State have to be paid for the next seven months, and there is nothing to pay them. Indeed, for the last two or three months there has been nothing but what has been found by short loans at 35 or 40 per cent.

It is this 6,000,000*l.* which it was wished to borrow. If a loan cannot be made, what is to be done? You may refuse to pay other creditors and go on, but you cannot refuse to pay the army, navy, and civil functionaries, or the attributes and action of a Government cease. A simple way would be to make some arrangement with those to whom the revenue has been thus alienated, and to spread the sum they have now to receive over a series of years.

This, of course, has been thought of, but found impossible. The creditors will not consent to relinquish the obligations they hold. They got the money, in fact, advanced on bills at short date: if these bills are not paid,—and they cannot be paid if they relinquish the receipts which were to acquit them,—it entails immense losses, perhaps bankruptcy, on all the various houses which have dealt in these transactions, and 4,000,000*l.* or 5,000,000*l.* would, I hear, fall on English houses.

This then not being possible—for it was the first thing to think of—where are the 6,000,000*l.* to come from? There is no money in the treasury. In the present condition of the Empire any extraordinary amount of taxation for the purpose would probably excite universal insurrection, for it would unite all classes and sects in a common cause; besides, the returns from taxation would be slow—the want is immediate. After thinking over every other method, the only one I can see is the following one—a forced loan for about 1,000,000*l.*, or 1,500,000*l.* which is all the country would bear. It might be taken in plate, and exacted from men of all ranks who are in employment. But there would still remain 5,000,000*l.* My notion in respect to these would be this: to place the State property easily disposable, which the Government only values at about 1,000,000*l.* sterling,* in the hands of a Mixed Commission, which should issue treasury bonds. The existing caimés should be taken up by these bonds,† which would be received in payment of the State property (sold always by competition), and 5,000,000*l.* of new paper money would then be issued.

It is to be remembered that this sum, either in metallic or in paper, is in a certain degree required for the ordinary traffic to replace the 5,500,000 of caimés which have been recalled, and for which no substitute of any kind has been created. But in issuing this new paper it must be kept

* The Government much understates this, because it does not like the expedient.

† The number of "caimés" out is, on the contrary, understated; the Government must be made to find property that would balance the value of the old "caimés," and it could do this.

wholly distinct from the former, and its current value maintained. My advice for this would be as follows:—

The new paper (which would only circulate in and about the capital) should be numbered, and one sixth drawn and paid at par every year; for which purpose a fund should be allotted and placed in the hands of a Mixed Commission. The value of the paper would thus be sustained, and the Government, in fact, succeed in spreading over six years this sum of 6,000,000*l.* it has now to pay in six months.

There is much, doubtless, to say against such a project, but I see no other better; for no other can meet the next six months' expenditure; and unless this can be met it is impossible to think of the other reforms; for the Turks are so far right when they say "unless we can pay our army, and navy, and functionaries to-day, how can we sit down and make plans for to-morrow?"

All, however, who are in the habit of lending money at high interest and for short terms will oppose a general scheme which is to meet the general embarrassments.

They would prefer renewing from three months to three months their present loans, and thus sink the country for their own profit daily and daily deeper in the gulf in which it would finally and irretrievably be lost. But in my opinion one great and decisive measure, comprehending the whole condition of things, is the only one to adopt.

I have dealt purposely in generalities, without entering into figures or details, in order to give as broad and clear a view as possible of the actual state of things, and explain why the 6,000,000*l.*, so often talked of, have to be found somehow, and that immediately; and why I think a new paper issue, as under the regulations I have laid down, the old paper money being recalled, is not a bad expedient. A loan at moderate interest was the simplest mode; and when that is got this paper money may be, if advisable, withdrawn: but that loan being now impossible, the measure I have suggested seems to me somewhat ingenious, and not impracticable. Having, however, put it before the Porte for consideration, I do not urge its adoption, for the success of any measure will depend on its mode of execution, and as over this I can have no control, I cannot be sanguine as to any result.

As your Lordship will perceive, the whole value of the plan of consolidating the other outstanding engagements must depend on changing the actual deficit into a surplus. Nothing would be easier in skilful and honest hands. But credit can only be re-established when these are found.

The Turks are wholly ignorant in financial matters, and such an education as that required is not given in a moment. The Greeks and Armenians, though clever in commerce and speculation, are as ignorant as the Turks as to the general principles of finance and financial administration; consequently the revival of Turkish credit and the employment of foreigners in the financial departments are in my opinion, as I have frequently and now repeat, inseparable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 40.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 619.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1860.*

AS the Hatti-Humayoun was issued on the 18th of February, 1856, and has consequently been nominally in force between four and five years, I have to instruct you to make, either separately or in concert with other Representatives of the Great Powers, an inquiry—

1. Whether the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 has been published in all parts of the Turkish Empire.

2. How far the Articles 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 25, have been carried into effect.

3. Whether any progress has been made in carrying the remaining Articles into effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 41.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1,124.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 9, 1860.*

THE reports from Her Majesty's Consular Agents in Turkey, a printed summary of which I was instructed by your Lordship's despatch No. 1,040 of the 25th ultimo to transmit to M. Thouvenel, appear to have made a considerable impression upon his Excellency. He said to me yesterday that they confirmed the opinion which he had long held, that the reforms most necessary in Turkey were the reconstruction of the Medjlis, and a better administration of justice. Many persons objected that the material, that is, the persons who could ameliorate either the one or the other, was wanting. This was true to a great extent, but still everything must have a beginning, and if the members of the Medjlis were to be chosen by election, the people would find out within four or five years the fittest persons to nominate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 42.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 15, 1860.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Lord Cowley,* stating the impression made upon M. Thouvenel by the Reports of Her Majesty's Consular Agents on the state of things in the Turkish Provinces; and I have to recommend to your attention the opinion expressed by M. Thouvenel respecting the reforms most necessary in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 43.

Mehmed Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to Lord J. Russell by M. Musurus, November 20.)

(Confidentielle.)

Excellence, *Constantinople, le 8 Novembre, 1860.*

IL est d'une utilité impérieuse que, parfaitement instruit de l'état actuel des affaires de l'Empire, et des projets du Gouvernement Impérial au sujet des réformes que Sa Majesté Impériale a la ferme résolution de mettre en exécution, vous soyez en mesure d'en rendre compte au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et d'éclairer l'opinion publique en Angleterre sur ces mêmes intentions. J'y tiens d'autant plus que l'expérience m'a fait acquérir l'intime conviction des sentiments de sincère amitié dont les Ministres de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre ont été de tout temps animés à l'égard de l'Empire Ottoman, au point que son existence et sa prospérité constituent une règle invariable de leur politique traditionnelle pour les affaires d'Orient.

Partant de ce principe, je vous ouvrirai ma pensée en toute franchise, en débutant par les affaires à jamais regrettables de la Syrie. On ne saurait révoquer en doute l'énergie avec laquelle son Excellence Fuad

* No. 41.

Pacha a rempli, et remplit encore, la tâche qui lui fut confiée par notre auguste Maître et Souverain de punir tous ceux qui ont pris part aux derniers désordres de la Syrie, et de rétablir l'ordre dans le Liban; ce qu'il serait parvenu à accomplir jusqu'à présent sans l'intervention armée qui, par sa présence, ne fait qu'exciter la haine et la méfiance des habitants du Liban, paralyser ainsi tous les efforts du Commissaire Impérial, et porter un coup sensible, quoique déguisé, au principe de l'indépendance de l'Empire. Je suis cependant convaincu que les mêmes sentiments humanitaires qui se sont indignés au récit de ces cruels événements reconnaîtront également la justice sévère avec laquelle les auteurs de ces outrages ont été poursuivis et châtiés. Et, si même quelques autorités Musulmanes en furent coupables pour avoir manqué à leurs devoirs, la peine que leur culpabilité a encourue leur fut infligée sans la moindre considération de rang ni d'aucune autre condition.

Par les communications du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères vous aurez dû apprendre que, pendant ma récente tournée dans les provinces de la Turquie d'Europe, j'ai consacré tous mes soins à remplir fidèlement les ordres que notre auguste Maître et Souverain a bien voulu me donner en me confiant la mission de m'enquérir de la situation de ses sujets et de faire droit à toutes leurs justes réclamations sans distinction de race ni de religion. Les punitions exemplaires dont j'ai frappé et les fonctionnaires qui se sont livrés à des actes contrevenant à leur mission, et les fermiers des dîmes pour avoir perçu de l'argent en sus de ce qui leur était dû, ainsi que quelques autorités du clergé Grec tant pour les extorsions qu'elles avaient commises que pour leur conduite scandaleuse; le règlement définitif de la propriété dans la province de Nissa qui y donnait lieu à des dissentiments continuels entre les Chrétiens et les Musulmans; la mise sur un pied assez convenable de la gendarmerie dans les provinces; l'amélioration des Conseils Provinciaux, en y introduisant des membres Chrétiens choisis d'après un mode d'élection basé sur les principes de la plus parfaite égalité; l'extirpation du brigandage dans les provinces que j'ai parcourues; et, en définitive, les ordres péremptoires que j'ai donnés à tous les Gouverneurs de surveiller activement à l'exécution des instructions que je leur ai laissées, prescrivant nettement et clairement leurs devoirs, ne manqueront pas de produire un effet salutaire, malgré toutes les intrigues du dehors, car j'ai eu l'occasion de constater que toute la Roumélie est sillonnée des émissaires politiques à qui sont dues les informations qui ont donné lieu aux dernières récriminations contre le Gouvernement Impérial.

Aussi, par l'enquête que j'ai fait exécuter par les fonctionnaires Musulmans et Chrétiens de ma mission avec le concours de l'Evêque et des membres Chrétiens du Conseil de Nissa, il a été démontré que toutes ces récriminations, qui ont fait tant de bruit en Europe, sont dénuées de fondement.

Pendant ma tournée, ayant eu l'occasion de recueillir tous les renseignements nécessaires sur l'état des populations, leurs vœux légitimes, les défauts de l'administration, je m'appliquerai, sous les auspices de Sa Majesté Impériale, et avec le concours de mes collègues, à élaborer et à soumettre à la sanction Impériale les projets tendant à obvier aux abus et à suppléer aux défectuosités de l'administration, par la complète organisation des Conseils, la mise en vigueur du Code Civil avec sa procédure, l'abolition du système d'affermer les dîmes, et la formation de corps réguliers de gendarmes dans toutes les provinces de l'Empire.

Dans la prévision que le contre-coup des dernières affaires de l'Italie pourrait se faire sentir dans quelque province de l'Empire, par les intrigues étrangères, le Gouvernement Impérial a déjà pris les mesures convenables de précaution et de surveillance, convaincu qu'il est que le principe de non-intervention entre les Souverains et leurs peuples, faisant partie du droit public de l'Europe, sera également respecté à l'égard de l'Empire Ottoman contre les tentatives révolutionnaires qui ne font que détruire les meilleurs efforts des Gouvernements, et qui, notamment dans un pays, comme la Turquie, peuplé par des habitants de diverses races, de diverses croyances religieuses, ne peuvent qu'engendrer la haine et la discorde, qui tendent à rendre toute bonne administration impossible.

Je ne saurais dissimuler les regrets que la lenteur survenue dans l'exécution complète des réformes promises me fait éprouver. Mais, tout en admettant le fait que la Turquie a été, jusqu'à un certain point, arriérée dans l'exécution pratique des engagements que ses promesses lui ont imposés, le blâme cependant ne devrait point retomber sur elle seule ; et je suis convaincu que le caractère généreux des Ministres de Sa Majesté la Reine, et leur esprit de justice et d'équité, faisant la part des circonstances, voudront bien subordonner leur condamnation aux véritables motifs qui ont entravé la liberté d'action du Gouvernement Impérial. Au nombre de ces motifs on placerait en premier lieu l'ingérence intempestive étrangère exercée avec une ignorance complète des mœurs et des besoins du pays, laquelle, loin de venir en aide aux intentions paternelles de Sa Majesté Impériale pour tous ses sujets, et aux efforts de ses Ministres, ne fait que les paralyser par des exigences irréalisables, telle que l'exécution précipitée et comme par enchantement de toutes les réformes.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, fidèle à ses promesses émanant de la spontanéité souveraine, ne demande pour leur accomplissement graduel que du temps ; il en fait appel au jugement éclairé et bienveillant des Ministres du Cabinet Britannique, et il s'en rapporte aux nobles paroles solennellement prononcées par sa Seigneurie Lord Palmerston, qu'il faut laisser la Turquie s'organiser par elle-même.

Quoiqu'en puissent dire les dénigreurs de la Turquie pour décréditer la sincérité des intentions du Gouvernement Impérial, je maintiens que, malgré toutes les difficultés intérieures et extérieures, la Turquie, dans un court espace de temps, a fait de grands progrès, bien qu'il reste encore beaucoup à faire.

C'est avec satisfaction et orgueil que je puis ici citer comme une preuve des sentiments humanitaires de notre auguste Maître, l'asile que Sa Majesté Impériale a bien voulu accorder aux réfugiés politiques, à l'instar de l'Angleterre ; mais avec cette différence, que l'Angleterre puissante et riche pouvait toujours offrir cette généreuse hospitalité sans encourir les mêmes conséquences ruineuses que la Turquie. En effet, depuis plusieurs années, nous avons offert l'hospitalité aux Polonais, aux Hongrois, aux Italiens, aux Tartares de la Crimée, aux Circassiens, &c., et fourni à chacun d'eux de la nourriture, de l'emploi, et des terrains.

Je ne prétends point nier que l'administration en Turquie ne soit défectueuse, qu'il n'y ait des abus dans la perception des revenus du trésor qui pèsent également sur les Musulmans et les Chrétiens, et que la justice ne pèche souvent par le manque de régularité dans les Cours de Justice ; mais il faut avouer que la forme de son gouvernement offre une grande liberté d'action et de parole, et constater en même temps sa ferme résolution de ne reculer devant aucun obstacle pour mettre un terme à ces défectuosités.

Je ne dois point, cependant, omettre de constater aussi que les oppressions qui pèsent sur les Chrétiens de la Turquie proviennent en grande partie de leur propre clergé, sur lequel, par diverses causes, le Gouvernement ne peut exercer qu'un contrôle très faible et très incomplet, tandis que l'ingérence étrangère y joue un rôle très important. Rendre le clergé Chrétien de l'Orient plus respectable aux yeux des populations, et le soustraire aux exactions qu'il commet par système, en le soumettant à une nouvelle institution conformément à l'esprit et à la lettre du dernier Hatti-Houmayoun, c'est un des premiers objets de ma préoccupation ; et j'espère y parvenir sous les auspices de notre auguste maître, malgré les tiraillements entre les diverses nationalités Chrétiennes, et notamment entre la nation Grecque et la nation Bulgare, travaillées toutes les deux par l'influence étrangère.

Quant aux embarras financiers du Gouvernement Impérial, nous devons chercher les causes tout aussi bien dans le système vicieux des finances et la vénalité de quelques employés du Gouvernement, que dans le système commercial de l'Empire, qui, sans être matériellement très avantageux aux étrangers, devient très ruineux pour les entreprises indigènes et pèse très lourdement sur l'industrie du pays. Ce n'est nullement mon intention de vouloir relever l'industrie par des tarifs prohibitifs ;

mais je considère cependant un rajustement des droits d'exportation et d'importation comme aussi avantageux pour tous que le serait l'égalisation des impôts directs ; et je me flatte d'obtenir le concours amical de toutes les Puissances avec lesquelles nous avons des Traités de Commerce, pour la juste modification des Tarifs existants.

Nonobstant toutes les inquiétudes qui prévalent dans ce moment sur notre état financier j'ai la plus grande confiance dans les mesures que, sous les auspices de notre auguste maître, et avec le concours de mes collègues, je me propose d'adopter. L'Administration des Douanes nous présente une augmentation constante et rapide dans nos importations, et tous les autres revenus du trésor augmentent aussi sensiblement chaque année, quoique rien comparativement n'ait été encore fait pour développer proprement les vastes ressources de l'Empire. Je suis persuadé qu'une diminution immédiate dans les droits d'exportation, conjointement avec la rédistribution des impôts directs, ainsi que certaines modifications dans le mode de perception de ces impôts, contribueront puissamment à augmenter la production et à accroître les revenus de l'État.

Si je parviens, conformément aux ordres de notre auguste Maître, à détruire quelques erreurs que les étrangers, ainsi que leurs Gouvernements, ont conçues par rapport aux engagements réels de la Turquie, et à leur faire prendre en considération nos vastes ressources, et la facilité de leur développement et de leur exploitation, je suis convaincu que non-seulement le crédit du Gouvernement sera relevé, mais que les capitalistes Européens viendront avec empressement en aide à un pays qui, malgré tant de calamités et de tiraillements continuels, possède encore d'immenses ressources intactes prêtes à être développées et exploitées, et dont l'ensemble de la dette publique est inférieure à celle du plus petit royaume de l'Europe.

J'ai dit que les ressources de la Turquie sont presque inconnues. En effet, ses mines ne sont point encore proprement exploités, ses forêts à peine entamées, ses vastes pâturages et l'immense étendue de riches terrains propres à la culture de grains et même du coton restent presque improductifs. Toutes ces sources de richesse pourraient être rendues immédiatement en état de produire, ou du moins elles offrent des garanties solides aux capitalistes par l'emploi spécial d'une portion de leurs avances pour la construction de routes propres à améliorer et à faciliter les moyens des communications intérieures.

Par une extension du système actuel d'enregistrement et par la promulgation de quelques lois spéciales pour régler la possession de terrains par les étrangers et par des indigènes, nous attirerons sans doute des acquéreurs ; et par quelques ordonnances libérales faisant connaître les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement Impérial accorderait des concessions pour des chemins de fer, pour l'exploitation des mines et des forêts, pour la navigation des rivières, pour la culture des terrains en friche, et pour d'autres entreprises, nous engagerons le placement des capitaux étrangers et indigènes dans ces entreprises qui contribueront immensément au bien-être général du pays et à l'augmentation des revenus du Trésor.

J'accepterai, et j'apprécierai tout avis amical qui me serait donné par rapport à ce qui précède ; je le ferai avec d'autant plus d'empressement que le désir sincère du Gouvernement Impérial est de donner aux capitalistes de l'Europe tous les moyens de s'assurer que non-seulement leurs capitaux seraient en parfaite sureté, mais aussi que les revenus du Trésor seraient plus que suffisants pour payer les intérêts et l'amortissement sur leurs avances.

Avec les capitaux que nous obtiendrions, l'intention du Gouvernement Impérial est d'acquitter les arriérés dus sur le service civil et militaire, ainsi que les dettes à découvert échues et qui sont dues au commerce, et compléter aussi le retrait des caïmés qui restent encore en circulation ; consolider en même temps le reste de la dette intérieure, et former un fonds d'amortissement suffisant non-seulement pour le service de cette dette, mais aussi pour celui de la dette extérieure.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se propose aussi d'assigner une partie de ces capitaux à la construction de routes en rapport avec les chemins de fer que les compagnies particulières pourraient entreprendre ; et

pour les capitaux ainsi appropriés, les propriétés de l'Etat en seraient garanties.

Il est vrai qu'une vente immédiate des terrains de l'Etat pourrait même dès à présent nous fournir des fonds considérables ; mais le Gouvernement Impérial préférerait l'ajourner jusqu'à ce que les modifications projetées pour l'administration des finances et du fisc rendent ces terrains d'une valeur beaucoup plus grande.

Le Gouvernement Impérial s'estimerait heureux s'il parvenait à s'attirer la confiance et l'appui des Ministres du Cabinet Britannique et du public Anglais, par un attachement sérieux à améliorer radicalement l'administration générale du pays.

L'intention de notre auguste Maître est que le Gouvernement Impérial ne limite ni ses sympathies ni ses efforts exclusivement en faveur de l'élément Musulman, mais, au contraire, qu'il cherche à développer l'élément Chrétien autant que le Musulman, et à resserrer les liens d'une nationalité commune entre les Musulmans et les Chrétiens ; qu'il protège également tous les deux contre l'oppression, et par l'admission du Chrétien dans une proportion plus large dans les fonctions administratives et militaires de l'Etat ; qu'il tâche d'effacer graduellement le sentiment ignorant et égoïste du mépris d'une part, et celui de méfiance, d'ambition, et de crainte, de l'autre, en établissant une parfaite fusion et une généreuse émulation entre eux pour le bien-être de leur pays commun. Cette intention souveraine aura pour résultat de stimuler le Musulman à de bons efforts, tandis que le Chrétien, exempt de toute cause de restriction politique, mettra aussi toute son énergie et ses talents au service de son pays, et n'aura plus à chercher cette protection étrangère qui a plus d'une fois mis en danger l'Eglise Grecque, et qui a même miné la stabilité de l'Empire.

Telles sont sommairement les intentions et les vœux de notre auguste Maître et Souverain, et la marche positive que Sa Majesté Impériale a tracée à son Gouvernement, laquelle je suivrai fidèlement pendant tout le temps qu'il plaira à Sa Majesté Impériale de m'honorer de sa confiance.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MEHMED.

No. 44.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 649.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1860.

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me yesterday, and read to me the despatch from the Grand Vizier, of which I inclose a copy.*

He then asked me whether I was not satisfied, and whether I would not instruct you to postpone the meetings of the Representatives which I had announced to him.

I told him the promises of the Grand Vizier were very fair, but I could by no means postpone the meetings of which I had spoken. That in my view the abuses and defects of the Turkish Government were capable of remedy, but it must be a practical remedy. That the exercise of two qualities, namely, energy and integrity, would set all right ; but there was no time to lose. That in our inquiries respecting Syria we were informed that the old system was to appoint as Governor the Pasha who could pay the highest bribe at Constantinople. That his object, on arriving at Syria, was to repay himself and become rich. Hence the oppressions and robberies practised upon the people ; and when by these means a Pasha had become rich, the process was in two or three years repeated—fresh bribes at Constantinople, fresh oppression in Syria. That the time was come when such a system must be abandoned.

I send you other papers given me by M. Musurus.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 43.

No. 45.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 744.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 12, 1860.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 561 of October 18. The view which your Lordship takes with respect to the fact that it is not when a nation is in its most abject condition, but when it begins to rise from that condition, that the cry of discontent is heard, and the demand for reform is made, seems to me statesmanlike, just, and peculiarly applicable to the condition of Turkey at the present time. It may likewise be said that when a Government undertakes to satisfy a large class of its population which has been previously in an inferior condition to the rest, it is rarely wise to do so by halves ; and it is evident that the policy of the Porte is to do all that it can be called upon to do fairly and safely, to give the Christian population in the Empire a portion of that political power which has been hitherto pretty well a monopoly of the Turks ; indeed, it is quite clear that men who have all the means of giving their children the best education cannot but be discontented when they look forward and see that there are few or no roads in their own country to honour and distinction. Nevertheless, your Lordship is well acquainted with the fact that when a question of race has to be considered as part of the question of government, the points in dispute are not easy to be arranged, and that every effort on the part of the governing race will, for many years to come, and perhaps always, be received with distrust, and repaid by ingratitude. The position in which we ourselves stand in the Ionian Islands—possessions which owe so much to our guardianship of them—is sufficient to show that when even the Turks have done all that they have yet to do in the way of justice and equality, they will still leave the seeds of future dissatisfaction behind ; and that it is not merely by the complaints of the one race that the conduct of the other can be judged. Your Lordship, however, is perfectly right in considering that the main and principal evil of the Turkish Administration—one in which I am sorry to say the Christians bear an equal share with the Turks—is the corruption which generally pervades it, and which renders the taxation at once grinding to the people and insufficient for the exigencies of the State. This cancer lies so deeply in the core and heart of this society that it is exceedingly difficult to provide a remedy for it ; and the only difference I can trace between past and present times is, that dishonesty and peculation were formerly universally practised without being considered dishonesty and peculation ; whereas now, though they are equally universal, they are beginning to be known under their right names : this distinction brings at present no practical good, but it promises with respect to the future that some good will come of it. I also entirely agree with your Lordship that it will be for us Representatives to pay great attention to this class of abuses, and that it will be our duty also to suggest some remedies for them. These remedies may be easily laid down on paper ; there will, however, I fear, be much difficulty in carrying them into practice, because it will be difficult to find any men who can be employed in putting them down who are not already tainted by them. A new scale of salaries must, moreover, be at the same time instituted, for it is next to impossible at the present time for any subordinate functionary to live on the means which the State allots to him. Salary, in fact, is little considered except in the very highest places, and I have constantly seen men take places which have no salary attached to them, as far more lucrative, in point of fact, than others in which salaries are paid.

The legitimate emolument of a small Turkish functionary, and even of a large class of the superior ones, is regarded as nothing in comparison with the illegitimate means for making money which office in this country affords. After this state of things—and it ought to be altered immediately—and you alter naturally the basis of the present Budget, and the State will have to charge itself with a far greater expenditure as the only means by which it can possibly, though not certainly, procure a larger revenue. In short, the question is not one so easy to deal with as it may

at first appear; and I am convinced that if it is to be dealt with effectually, Europeans must be employed in the Financial Administration of Turkey, and given complete control both as to the persons they should employ, the salaries they should give, and the punishments they should inflict.

In this way, and by the adoption of a new system of perception with regard to the revenue, a new class of functionaries might be formed; whilst the honesty and regularity thus established in one branch of the Administration would introduce, eventually, a change in the others.

I need not add, that what your Lordship says as to the propriety of the different Representatives being impartial in their judgment on public functionaries entirely meets my views; but as, unfortunately, another system has long prevailed, and some of the Embassies seem to have entered into particular engagements with certain individuals, which they appear to think themselves bound in honour to keep, all questions concerning these individuals are taken up as questions between the Embassies; and this renders the position of an English Ambassador who, like myself, has avoided creating particular partisans, rather a difficult one.

With respect to the necessity of reforms in the Provinces, and especially of creating tribunals in which Christian evidence can be received, I shall have little difficulty in getting the assistance of my colleagues; but these reforms will, I am sure, not be carried out efficiently by the means of ordinary local Governors. What I said with respect to Syria long ago, I say with regard to all the Provinces. A body of special Commissioners must be formed to visit them, and the most capable and honest men selected.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions I have invited the Representatives to meet me and consider all these questions, and I inclose your Lordship the communication I addressed to them, transmitting two copies of the printed correspondence on the Christians in Turkey, according to your Lordship's instruction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 46.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 753.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 14, 1860.*

I INCLOSE to your Lordship the Budget, drawn up with amendments, which the Porte now proposes to adopt.

The previous deficit was, in reality, as it will be seen, higher than the 1,500,000*l.* which I supposed it to amount to. The proposed regulations leave, on the other hand, so small an excess that, with the slightest improvements, the expenditure and receipts will meet.

This, however, as I have constantly said, is an imaginary Budget, at least for the present year, since the current receipts are pretty nearly absorbed during the coming year by past deficits met by assignments of such receipts.

I have also here inclosed a statement of the debts of the Porte, but the statement does not seem to me quite clear. I see nothing charged for the various debts due on various reclamations not yet regulated, and which certainly amount to upwards of 1,000,000*l.* sterling. I see nothing put down for immense arrears to the army (unless these are included in the deficits of former years, which is not specified). There is also a further deficit caused by new loans on the revenue in the present year. The amount of caimés given, as now out, is, moreover, I have reason to think, much below the mark. On all these matters I will write more considerately when I have had time to consider a Memorandum drawn up by the Commissioners. But I think there is sufficient in the present prospectus, notwithstanding any errors or omissions, to show that the Turkish finances might be brought, without extraordinary difficulty, and this at no distant period, into a fair condition, if order, economy, and intelligence presided over the Finance Department.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 46.

BUDGET GENERAL des Recettes et des Dépenses Ordinaires de l'Année 1860 (1276 et 1277 de l'Egire).

RECETTES.

Chapitre du Budget des Recettes.	Articles du Budget des Recettes.	Désignation des Recettes.	Totaux par Articles.	Totaux par Chapitre.
			Bourses piast.	Bourses piast.
I.	..	Impôts Directs—		
	1	Verghi (impôt personnel)	551,929 071	
	2	Rachat militaire	119,218 119	
				671,147 190
II.	..	Impôts Indirects—		
	1	Dîmes	710,752 362	
	2	Droit sur les moutons	165,452 471	
	3	Idem sur les porcs	20,904 473	
	4	Douanes	352,645 203	
	5	Idem des tabacs, y compris le droit de vente	56,455 218	
	6	Droit des pêches	17,234 397	
	7	Produits des contrats .. .	4,701 424	
	8	Idem du timbre	6,227 120	
	9	Droits sur les spiritueux	74,381 374	
	10	Japon	28,849 408	
	11	Droits divers	203,662 476	
				1,641,370 026
III.	..	Etablissements Publics—		
	1	Postes	12,535 236	
	2	Imprimerie Impériale	1,832 286	
	3	Immeubles appartenant à l'Etat ..	6,916 355	
				21,284 377
IV.	..	Produits Domaniaux et Droits Regaliens—		
	1	Pêcheries	4,005 013	
	2	Forêts	1,317 472	
	3	Fermes Impériales	15,621 245	
	4	Salines	21,384 175	
	5	Mines	2,287 309	
	6	Ventes de propriétés immobilières ..	1,010 000	
				45,626 214
V.	..	Tributs—		
	1	Recettes fixes	93,574 000	93,574 000
		A ajouter	..	2,472,902 307
		Revenus Spéciaux du Ministère de la Marine	29,679 286	
		Idem du Commerce	1,554 62	
				31,233 348
		al Général des Recettes inscrites aux Budgets	..	2,504,136 155

RÉSUMÉ EN BOURSES.

	Bourses piast.
Recettes	2,504,136 155
Dépenses	2,570,066 455
Déficit	65,930 300

DÉPENSES.

Désignation des Budgets.	Désignation des Dépenses.	Totaux.
		Bourses.
Chap. 1 du Ministère des Finances	Dette Etrangère— Intérêts et amortissements des dettes contractées en Europe	184,461 135
Chap. 2, idem	Dette Intérieure— Eshami Djedidé, intérêts et amortissements	40,000 000
Chap. 3, idem	Intérêts des Sehims, des Hasnah Talvili, et des bons de 10 ans	93,675 490
Chap. 4, idem	Intérêts et annuités des Eshams, Mouetals, Tïmars, &c.	57,875 909
Chap. 5, idem	Intérêts dus comptant à la Caisse des Orphelins, et des dettes de la guerre transférées	32,381 158
Chap. 6, idem	Subventions religieuses Fondations de Hadgis, &c.	109,472 489
Chap. 7, idem	Yenitsi Sureé (Group) envoyés à la Mecque, &c. Liste Civile—	304,840 379
Chap. 8, idem	Liste Civile et autres allocations y relatives Pensions, &c.—	55,815 294
Budgetde l'Intérieur au 3, 4, et 4	Pensions et secours à des Fonctionnaires en retraite et à des nécessiteux Ministères sans portefeuille, Tanzimât et Conseil de Justice	25,998 419
	Services Généraux—	
Budget Spécial	Ministère de la Guerre	952,679 263
Idem	Intendance de l'Artillerie	64,167 000
Idem	Ministère de la Marine	196,510 000
Chap. 9 des Finances	Ministère de la Justice	21,311 000
Chap. 10, idem.	Allocations aux Vacoufs	37,063 466
Budget Spécial	Ministère de l'Intérieur	358,296 309
Idem	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères	62,487 979
Idem	Ministère du Commerce	14,449 832
Idem	Ministère de l'Instruction Publique	5,013 198
Idem	Ministère de Police	27,883 021
Idem	Ministère des Finances	211,901 094
Deven Caze du Budget des Finances	Crédit ouvert dans le Budget du Ministère de Finances et destiné à la retenue du Deshik et à la Subvention de l'Union Financière, &c.	65,334 000
	A déduire	2,939,189 455
	Déduction faite par la Liste Civile	85,716
	Les Réductions en masse inscrites au Conseil, &c.	277,707
	Il resterait en Dépenses Ordinaires	2,570,066 355

RÉSUMÉ EN FRANCS.

	Francs.
Recettes	260,187,007
Dépenses	268,721,909
Déficit	7,534,902

Inclosure 2 in No. 46.

TABLEAU des Dettes du Trésor Ottoman.

(1.) Nature des Dettes.	(2.) Consolidés.	(3.) A rembourser en Septembre 1863.	(4.) A rembourser le 1/13 Mars, 1861.	(5.) Consolidations de 4 et 5 Ans.	(6.) Sans Renseignements satisfaisants	(7.) Total Général.	Observations.
	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	
Emprunts faits à Londres en 1854 ..	660,000	..	..	..	..	660,000	Les intérêts et l'amortissement sont inscrits au Budget ordinaire.
„ „ en 1855 ..	1,100,000	..	..	..	..	1,100,000	Idem.
„ „ en 1858 ..	1,100,000	..	..	..	..	1,100,000	Idem.
Eshami Djedidé	500,000	..	..	..	..	500,000	Consolidation de dettes du Sultan. Emission pendant trois années à dater de Septembre 1859 de 1,000,000 de bourses en obligations amortissables en 24 années par des remboursements annuels. La moitié seulement des obligations est émise. Les intérêts 6 pour cent et l'amortissement sont inscrits au Budget.
Sehim ou Eshami Mumtazé ..	..	150,000	..	..	..	150,000	Obligations créées en 1857, remboursables en Septembre 1860. Le trésor n'ayant pu effectuer le remboursement, le délai a été prorogé de 3 ans. Les intérêts de 8 pour cent sont prévus au Budget ordinaire.
Hazne Talvili	..	..	500,000	..	..	500,000	Obligations créées en 1857, remboursables le 1/13 Mars, 1861. Intérêt, 6 pour cent, inscrit au Budget ordinaire.
Emprunts pour le rétrait du Caymé ..	..	..	..	..	251,000	251,000	La somme des Caimés encore en circulation indiquerait que cette somme n'a pas été entièrement affectée à sa destination.
Idem pour diverses causes	..	..	..	..	472,321	472,321	Aucun renseignement satisfaisant sur le mouvement de cette dette. Les revenus de cette année, et une partie de ceux de l'année prochaine, paraissent avoir été donnés en garantie aux prêteurs. Les emprunts qui se font encore sont-ils plus considérables que les remboursements aux prêteurs anciens? Nous l'ignorons. En un mot, nous n'avons aucun renseignement sur le mouvement de ces dettes.
Intérêts et Commissions des 2 Art. ..	..	..	..	..	104,864	104,864	
Déficit de 1858 (1274 de l'Hégire) ..	..	..	..	..	276,604	276,604	Aucune explication satisfaisante n'a encore été donnée sur ces chiffres que nous connaissions depuis plusieurs mois. Le Directeur des Finances qui les a produit, interrogé longuement au sein de la Commission, n'a pu expliquer clairement comment il les avait formés.
„ 1859 (1275 de l'Hégire)	..	..	..	..	447,083	447,083	
Bons de 10 ans	..	..	..	847,800	..	847,800	Ces bons ont été créés en 1859. Ils sont une conversion de Serghins de la Liste Civile. Pendant 5 ans les porteurs recevront un intérêt de 6 pour cent, et à compter de la cinquième année le capital devra être remboursé en 5 annuités. Les intérêts sont inscrits au Budget ordinaire.

Tableau des Dettes du Trésor Ottoman—*continued*.

(1.) Nature des Dettes.	(2.) Consolidés.	(3.) A rembourser en Septembre 1863.	(4.) A rembourser le 1er Mars, 1861.	(5.) Consolidations de 4 et 5 Ans.	(6.) Sans Renseignements satisfaisants.	(7.) Total Général.	Observations.
	bourse	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	bourses.	
Bons de la Guerre transférés au Trésor	..	.	.	190,000	..	190,000	Dettes très anciennes de la guerre qui doivent être amorti par un intérêt de 6 pour cent par an, et 2 pour cent par mois en quatre années à partir de 1860.
Dettes du Ministère des Finances (dans la capitale et les provinces)	..	..	..	..	351,988	351,988	Aucune explication satisfaisante sur la nature de ces dettes ni sur les conditions de remboursement. Cependant vers le mois de Mai, Fuad Pacha expliqua que 250,000 bourses qui doivent être comprises dans cette somme provenaient d'anticipations demandées en 1859 (1275) aux habitants des provinces sur le Verghi pour les dépenses des Rédifs. Cette somme devrait s'amortir par quart à partir de l'année 1860-61 (1277) sans doute par exonération du Verghi. Une somme de 165,494 bourses de même origine suivant la déclaration du même Pacha devait être payée de la même façon à la fin de 1277.
Bons de la Marine, transférés au Trésor	..	..	..	45,000	..	45,000	Remboursables comme les bons de la guerre transférés au Trésor.
Caimés en circulation	..	..	..	..	210,000	210,000	Il a été déclaré officiellement au Conseil du Trésor en Septembre dernier que la somme des Caimés en circulation pouvait être approximativement évaluée à ce chiffre.
	3,360,000	130,000	500,000	1,082,200	2,315,860	7,408,060	

RÉCAPITULATION.

Dettes Consolidés	3,360,000 bourses.	En francs à 175 paras le franc ..	..	384,000,000 francs
Idem, à courtes échéances (Col. 3, 4, et 5 du Tableau) . 1,732,800	4,048,660 ,,	,, ,,	198,034,285	462,704,000 ,,
Idem, sans renseignements satisfaisants 2,315,860			264,669,715	
	7,408,660 ,,	,, ,,	..	846,704,000 ,,

Observation Générale.—Il est à remarquer que par les remboursements que se font les prêteurs sur les revenus qui leur sont donnés en garantie, comme par les emprunts sur place que continue de faire le Gouvernement, cette situation se modifie sans cesse sans qu'il soit possible de le suivre, ainsi qu'il est expliqué dans la note sur les travaux du Conseil. Tels sont cependant les renseignements les plus probables recueillis à différentes époques et que nous ne donnons que sous toutes réserves attendu qu'aucun document officiel ne nous en a garanti l'exactitude.

Il résulte de ce Tableau que la somme de 462,704,000 francs reste à liquider soit par une prorogation de consolidation, soit par un accroissement de ressources intérieures soit par un emprunt. Il faudrait ainsi ajouter à ce Tableau l'indemnité de Djedda s'élevant à

No. 47.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 770.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November 16, 1860.*

WITH respect to your Lordship's despatch No. 571 of the 25th of October, regarding Turkish finances, the balance of receipt and expenditure is much what I have at different times stated to your Lordship, but you will have received by the present messenger a more detailed and accurate statement. It is perfectly clear, as I have repeatedly observed, that the revenue must be increased, and the expenses diminished, in order to produce a sound state of things; and it is also clear that this is not difficult: but that is only a part of the present question.

The Budget now drawn up is drawn up on the supposition that the revenue is coming in, and that the expenditure is going out of the Treasury; but I have endeavoured to explain to your Lordship at various times that this is an imaginary case. The revenues for a considerable time are handed over to creditors; the arrears have to be paid; the present expenses and those for some months to come have to be met, and there are no funds to meet them. The prospective increase and diminution of the Budget, without some remedy is applied to this urgent and pressing evil, is no practical or efficient remedy to it, because it is not the mere putting down upon paper an equal balance-sheet that will inspire credit; it must be actually seen that, during one or two years, the receipts and expenditure do meet, and the Government cannot go on for one or two years, or for many more months, with all its service unpaid.

The filling up the deficit I have pointed out is, then, the first necessity to form a basis for any future plan on a better system of organization. Everybody is now claiming money from the Treasury: no new taxes would meet these demands, for you cannot tell people pressing for payment, "You must pay yourselves by paying a new tax." Let creditors be paid, or some arrangement relative to their claims made; let the army and navy, on whom the Government have to look for support, and the Civil functionaries who carry on its ordinary affairs, be satisfied; and new regulations for the purpose of establishing a more regular order of things for the future would be cheerfully acquiesced in. All that is said that is not consistent with what I have here stated, seems to me, therefore, beside the mark, and either stated by persons imperfectly acquainted with the situation, or who do not really represent it fairly.

So in regard to inconvertible paper, about which I have heard a good deal said without the question being properly understood. There has been no question of inconvertible paper. My object, at least, has been to withdraw the inconvertible paper which is now out; but in order to do this—in order to deal with that deficit I have alluded to, and which must be dealt with—some plan must be devised. A loan was one means, but it was judged impossible; or, if possible, only on ruinous conditions.

What, in fact, are the terms of the new loan now in contemplation? A debt of 16,000,000*l.* is to be created, at 6 per cent., at a rate which could bring in little more than 8,000,000*l.* to the Turkish Government, thus doubling the 8,000,000*l.* of present debt, and borrowing the 8,000,000*l.* which are to be received, apparently at 12 per cent., but in reality at much more. For, first, the interest of the whole of the debt is to begin when the first instalment on the loan is made; and these different instalments, I understand, are to go over eighteen months. Consequently, the Government will be paying, for the first half-year, interest upon 8,000,000*l.* at 12 per cent., or on 16,000,000*l.* at 6 per cent. (which is the same thing); that is to say, during the first year it will furnish 1,000,000*l.* out of the 6,000,000*l.* it receives. Neither is this all. The whole of the commission on the first half-year's interest is to be taken out of the first instalment; so that the Turkish Government will receive in reality little more than 500,000*l.* at the present time. But I have said that it wants immediately 7,000,000*l.* for the next nine months to cover those urgent calls upon it which have to be settled before any revenue comes into it for acquitting

them, and the sum now borrowed only comes in by degrees during the next eighteen months. Consequently, the Turks will have to make a further loan, and in this way it may be fairly calculated that the Porte will really have to pay 1,000,000*l.* revenue in perpetuity for 6,000,000*l.*, which is all it will get clear. Yet, the terms of this loan, though ruinous to the Porte, are not more so than might have been expected if the Porte had recourse to foreign capitalists at this time. Seeing this, and in order at once to meet the existing exigency, which I knew would be met, and must be met, somehow, I should rather have advised, first, obtaining 1,000,000*l.*, or 1,500,000*l.*, at least, from the national property; secondly, another 1,500,000*l.* (which might have been got easily on loan) by an appeal from the Sultan to his Mussulman subjects. I would then have set by the 1,200,000*l.* a-year, which is now to be paid permanently for ten years, and upon that sum thus assigned I would have borrowed any small sum (say 2,000,000*l.*) immediately required, and issued new paper, recalling the caimés which are inconvertible, that should have been convertible at par, in certain proportions every six months. In this manner the surreptitious issue of further caimés would have been stopped; the new notes, a portion of which would have been convertible at par every six months, could not have lost much of their nominal value, and would, when it was seen they were taken up, have increased the national credit, and by the very revenue now assigned in perpetuity I would have in such manner annihilated, in less than ten years, the whole 8,000,000*l.*, which is now doubled to 16,000,000*l.*

The plan has objections, but I am inclined to think it was the soundest for the Ottoman Government to have adopted, and I rather believe that experience will prove the truth of what I say.

The information which your Lordship has received is from some one well acquainted with the financial affairs of this country, but I shall be rather surprised if he is not in some way also practically interested in them.

I should think, in fact, that the document referred to proceeds, directly or indirectly, from some party who has made, and is in the habit of making small loans of 200,000*l.* and so forth to the Turkish Government, which at high interest have been renewed.

It is therefore for his interest to say, "Patch up the present state of things; let the Turkish Government renew where it can the bills, now out, by new bills for three or four months to come, and wait for better times, when it may possibly be able to make a loan on better terms."

But what will be the state of Turkey, even if not threatened by foreign complications, if it goes on another year on this system of making and renewing small loans? How in such a state of things can it establish any permanent basis of expenditure or receipts? We should thus, I venture to think, be sapping our plan of reform at its very basis? Is it not better, on the contrary, for Turkey to take up and treat the whole of its financial difficulties manfully, and at once; filling up the deficit created by arrears and the anticipation of increasing revenue by some extraordinary expedient consolidating its other engagements; and thus standing square in face of the improved system of receipt and expenditure it has to introduce?

A foreign loan was one way of filling up the said deficit, and the most usual, but certainly the most expensive one. The other I have just named, if fairly carried out, was the least costly, and would have furnished the best return. Moreover, I repeat, by bringing the national property into circulation it would have added to the wealth of the country. By giving a proof of the loyalty of the Mussulman subjects of the Porte, it would have added to the Sultan's authority, and I will venture even to add, that by creating a paper money regularly convertible and converted into cash at par would, after the first few months, have steadily increased the Ottoman credit. Such at least are, I confess, my convictions; and I think if your Lordship will do me the honour to read through my somewhat wearisome statement, they will be shared in by your Lordship, and also by any financier acquainted with financial matters here, and who has no personal interest in them. But I have avoided pressing any notions of my own

which had not your formal approval on the Porte, and on the 7th, I communicated to the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha your Lordship's recent despatch on this important and interesting subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 48.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 771.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 16, 1860.*

I INCLOSE your Lordship a communication relative to the Grand Vizier's return, and the reforms he is preparing; and I beg at the same time to take notice of the various despatches which your Lordship has lately sent me relative to the state of this Empire, and the dangers menacing it.

These may indeed naturally fill your Lordship's mind with anxiety.

With reference to what I have myself already written on the subject, I may now say that I am more and more inclined to think that Russia, Prussia, and France have made up their minds as to the Ottoman Government's approaching downfall, and that Austria alone wavers as to the course she should pursue respecting it.

What I confess I am most afraid of is, this Empire slipping away, as it were, by degrees; the consequence of successive incidents, over the guidance of which we should have no control.

Already France appears pretty evidently to have her attention bent in a particular direction. Throughout Egypt and Syria she has extended an influence which no other European State can claim.

As to Russia, she menaces Turkey on every side, and has merely to select where her attack can be made with most convenience to her.

The views of Prussia are less to be understood, but looking at the conduct of the Prussian Agents I cannot doubt what they are.

It becomes, therefore, a grave matter of consideration to us what line of conduct we should ourselves pursue, and perhaps the time is come to look the question fairly in the face, and consider all its bearings.

The exercise of a joint protectorate by the Great Powers is an excellent expedient for preventing the impending catastrophe, if it has been established on a truth; that is, if all the Powers who guaranteed the existence of the Ottoman Empire really and honestly wish it to exist; but at the present moment, can it be said that this is the case? Or rather, is not the pretence a mere temporary mystification, to which every one affects to give credence, but which no one really believes; matters in the meantime being rendered more critical by the want of that resolution and that energy in the Turks themselves which afford the only valid guardianship to men in desperate situations. Nothing, indeed, can be more evident than the great and striking evils which corrode their society and their Government, and appear to conspire with fate against the continuance of their power; still nothing, if we look reasonably at the general history of human affairs, can be more unjust than the present violent and sudden clamour against them.

However desirable such transformations may be, there is no example of a country being within a few years thoroughly metamorphosed, and brought from a very bad into a good condition.

The two greatest reformers in modern times are Peter the Great, personified in an individual; and the National Assembly, representing the spirit of an age. Both these attempted suddenly, and with immense power and immense ability, the work of a complete new order of things. Peter the Great has been dead 135 years; and if a Mixed European Commission were sent into his dominions, I fear their report would be by no means satisfactory, even to the Emperor Alexander himself. The National Assembly passed away amidst scenes of blood and confusion; and although some of the seeds it sowed took root, others seem at this moment scattered to the winds.

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Much has been done, no doubt, in Russia since 1725; much in France since 1790: but both Empires have passed through various alternations, and the result they aimed at been, through many struggles and vicissitudes, but very partially achieved.

When, therefore, we expect in Turkey great and radical changes amidst the most difficult circumstances, and in the shortest period of time, we simply expect impossibilities.

The Hatti-Humayoun itself was merely valuable as a declaration of principles which might serve as a landmark for future legislation. It did nothing itself in the way of legislation, and I doubt much whether, by pointing too suddenly and extensively at an entire alteration in manners and feelings, it did not give rise to many of the evils which usually follow such experiments, and actually followed those of the same kind made in France in the eighteenth century. All attempts, in fact, to sweep away at once long-established customs and laws, tends invariably to doubt and confusion, now creating delays, now generating impracticable expedients; authority in the meanwhile falling into abeyance.

A more gradual and steady progress, each step of which had been marked by some clear and positive though moderate change—a change which could have mingled the new with what was old, and that yet existed around it—would, if I mistake not, have created a better situation at the present time, and given greater hopes of building up new improvements, by having laid a more solid foundation for them. Still it is impossible to deny that great progress in many directions has been made, and that the road to further progress is opened wide: were the Turks to return from the extreme of absolute impunity into which they were hurried when they abolished the opposite extreme of absolute tyranny. I do not think, therefore, that the critics of the Porte are just to the Porte: and yet the period has arrived when even the friends of the Turkish Government cannot merely be just; for the present abuses, which it may be fair to admit, are the consequences of preceding evils, must nevertheless be now either immediately removed, or greatly modified, as the only condition on which the sovereignty of the Sultan can be much longer exercised.

The position then in which we stand is this: the defence of Turkey is confided to the hands of a body, the greater portion of which is, perhaps, predisposed to destroy it, and its prolonged existence depends upon so great and so prompt a change in its internal condition as it requires no common degree of energy to produce, and no common stock of hopefulness to expect.

It is no wonder that, amid such circumstances, a great number of the most intellectual Turks abandon themselves almost carelessly to destiny, and, in the absence of any plan for exertion, fall into more than the usual apathy of their nation.

Over a bystander, this feeling at last creeps. His words, it is true, are respectfully listened to, and partially acquiesced in. "He cuts" (as a colleague said to me the other day, rather expressively than elegantly) "into butter;" but he produces no firm conviction, though he meets with no firm resistance; a result which ought hardly to surprise us, when we consider that we talk to people whose reason may possibly be with us, but whose long-established habits and early prejudices are against us.

Aware that it is impossible to return to the past, not exactly knowing where the future is leading them, they pause in distrustfulness at every step they are called upon to take in a strange path; and after a disinterested counsellor has repeated the same advice for months, until the time is past by for adopting it, the only satisfaction he reaps is a final expression of regret at not having acted at the proper season on it.

I will not deny that I am myself in no small degree discouraged by past experience. Nevertheless, I have endeavoured, as far as I could, to form some opinions as to what is yet to be essayed, and will here endeavour to express them.

I think, then, on seeing what can be done to maintain the existence of Turkey, we must begin by forming some clear idea in our minds as to what Turkey ought to be, and can be, if it is still to exist.

I myself consider it as a territory which it is not for the general

interests of the European Powers should fall into the European hands who would naturally, in any conquest or division, get possession of it. I think, moreover, that it is not for the interests of Europe or civilization that it should be cut up into small and semi-barbarous States, animated by traditional rivalries and opposing prejudices, without any intermediate link between themselves, or any constant and general connection between them and the great civilized States of the world. It has been said with justice that the existence of the Roman Empire, though for a time Pagan, was one of the main causes of the rapid spread of Christianity throughout the East. It may not be, perhaps, verging too far into theoretical speculation to pretend that in the same way the existence of the Turkish Empire, though for a time barbarous, may become the means of more rapidly spreading civilization through the same portion of the globe.

The course taken by social improvement generally is from the great towns and centres throughout the territory they are connected with. You have at Constantinople an immense city at a most central point in direct and daily intercourse with England, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. It is almost a matter of necessity that the influence of these countries should be felt at this city, and if this city is the seat of a great Empire it must gradually, and even not slowly, extend throughout that Empire generally.

But the doubt still arises, admitting all the advantages of the duration of the Ottoman Empire, as to whether it can really be maintained. Its principal element is a dominant race,—a race accustomed to hold the ponderating hand over a variety of races which no other one amongst them can pretend to rule.

That race is, in its masses, brave and warlike; it is also intelligent and obedient. The accusation of fanaticism, brought against it, is only just as it would be if brought against the Christians in the same countries, who, in fact, manifest, whenever they have the opportunity, a far greater degree of intolerance than does the Turk himself. A barbarous or semi-barbarous people—whether Moslem or Christian—is ever fanatical; but I think that proofs occur every day that an enlightened Moslem is not more swayed in public matters by his religion than an enlightened Christian would be: and the manner in which the code of the Koran is being gradually supplanted by codes taken from Christian Powers is a sufficient proof that fanaticism is not so strong in the Mahometans in authority, or even generally in the nation, as is sometimes stated.

The difference created here by race is, in fact, greater than that created by religion. The Turkish race, let it be Moslem or let it become Christian, has something in it difficult perhaps to define, but which, nevertheless, is easily perceptible on the spot, and which seems to mark it out as better fitted for government and command than are the races with which it is intermingled; and this race will, at least for some years to come, assert and maintain over them a certain political superiority. But, on the other hand, the Armenian with his plodding industry, and the Greek with his acute intelligence, and the Jew at once supple and indefatigable, are more fitted for commerce, mechanics, and ordinary professional pursuits, and are likewise in some branches of the administration better qualified to excel. It would appear, then, not so difficult to form out of these materials combined a great Empire, if its most destructive vices internally can be corrected, and its most formidable enemies from without kept in check.

With respect to the first, little good will come from vague declarations of rights, from unsystematized and frequently counteracting and inopportune efforts to push forward undigested reforms; from constant and irritating European interference in matters which are more properly subject to local experience; or from the vain attempt of the Turks themselves to undertake European practices and improvements without the aid and instruction of Europeans. I am also of opinion that we should, as much as possible, reduce what is shadowy and vague to something that is substantial and clear.

The Turkish Government is called independent, and its independence is constantly brought forward; and yet there is not the smallest Vice-Consul who does not pretend to control it, and in the simplest action of life

a foreign hand intervenes to prevent the national authority from maintaining order and administering justice according to its own usages and laws.

The letter of the old Capitulations, moreover, is invoked amidst a state of things to which it no longer applies, and the Ottoman Government is told that it is to take its place amongst the great Governments of Europe, to adopt their civilization, and to answer to the exigencies which that civilization demands; whilst it is frequently denied the ordinary attributes which the smallest Republic in South America, and even, if I am not mistaken, the King of the Sandwich Islands is allowed to possess.

In short, there is a general jumble of conflicting ideas and customs, of conflicting expressions and pretensions, out of which, without some more definite and precise understanding, it is impossible to create regularity, power, or security. It is idle, then, to ask or expect that a Government can exist under conditions by which any Government must necessarily be destroyed; and if we really wish sincerely for the continuance of the Ottoman Empire, we must rest its continuance on something like rational and solid foundations.

I will now endeavour to point out some of the principal causes which check or interfere with internal improvement, and I will then say a few words as to external protection.

The first and principal evil against which the Ottoman Empire has at this instant to contend is that which exists in the head of the State. The actual Sovereign has many qualities, but he has also defects, some of which spring from nature, others from education.

He wants both a continued energy and and a fixed will; but even these are of little advantage when the individual who possesses them does not clearly understand the purposes to which energy and will should be directed; and how can a man shut up in a palace, only spoken to by those who stand trembling before him, without any practical acquaintance with his own country or Europe, carry forward consistently a plan which is to combine what is peculiar in his own country with what is applicable to it in Europe? This, however, is an evil which cannot now be remedied, but they who wish well to Turkey should do their best to prevent its being perpetuated.

The heirs to the throne, though saved by the Sultan's humanity from the bowstring and the poisoned bowl, are kept immured from all society but that of women and eunuchs, and they are some day to be suddenly called from this ignominious solitude to the cares of administering a mighty Empire. If the two Princes next in immediate succession, the Sultan's brother and son, were allowed to travel, or at least to mix here with such persons as would be capable of giving them some instruction as to their future duties, one of the greatest impediments to Turkish progress would be, in some degree, removed.

The second evil, which has grown in some degree out of the former one, is the loss of all authority, and a complete chaos in the public administration.

I say that the cause of this is in some degree to be sought in the character and condition of the Sultan, because it is he alone who can give a strong and decided impulse to affairs. Were he able to see what should be done, and resolute enough to say it shall and must be done, all those minor obstacles over which his Ministers are constantly stumbling would be at once put out of the way. But this cause is not the only one.

The Ottoman Government, when it undertook to place the Empire on a new foundation, was neither entirely sincere in its professions, nor did it clearly understand what it was about.

It accepted the announcement of great, immense, and sudden reforms, less with a desire to reinvigorate Turkey than to gain Europe. It was less occupied with the laws it was to make than with the newspaper articles it would produce. It consequently undertook too much too suddenly, and got confused amidst the novelties it promulgated. An uncertainty between the old and the new everywhere prevailed, and still prevails. A Pasha said to me the other day, "What am I to do? I

govern a province, and the Grand Vizier sends me an order which is framed on the new ideas that we profess. The Sheikh-ul-Islam complains against me because I do not act upon the old laws, which with him are still sacred. I say the two things are incompatible; and I am told I must follow our old usages, but I must give them a new dress. I don't know what I am about."

The former Government was very simple in its forms. Great individual power was given; if a man was thought to exercise it well, he rose to wealth and power; if ill, his property was confiscated and his head went off. The object of late years has been to destroy this personal responsibility; and this project, as all functionaries have been interested in it, has succeeded.

The Pasha can throw the blame of his acts on the Medjlis of his province; the Minister of every Department can say that his measures bear the signatures of all his colleagues: add to this the endeavour to apply the complicated habits of European administration and the refinements of European codes through the medium of people altogether ignorant of both; an accumulation of business in each Department by the modern practice of immense and constant correspondence, with no classification; and officials over whom there is no practical control.

The reform most essential here, then, is a return to something like authority, and something like simplicity. Personal responsibility must be recreated, and an organisation established, which those who have to work out its details comprehend. Where reforms which Turks cannot comprehend are required, Europeans must be employed.

I say so much on these generalities because they concern Constantinople; if you do not have order there, at the centre, you can only have confusion at the extremities.

So with regard to the Provinces I should not, to be consistent with the whole of my argument, attempt too much at a time, but commence by a few simple and practical measures.

These measures must have their origin in the most essential wants; and in the mode adopted for carrying them out, something more decisive in its character than the ordinary, used-up, provincial administration must be created.

I would organize, therefore, a great Council for this essential purpose. It should be composed of twelve persons, four of these Rayahs; and this Council should be divided into two sections; one in movement, and the other stationary.

Its object should be to put down abuses, maintain law, and assist the ordinary principles of justice. It should establish an effective police; constitute Tribunals in which Christian evidence should be received; devise some plan for schools in which Christians and Turks should be taught promiscuously; consider the project of receiving Christians into the Ottoman army; find some substitutes for tithes—the great pressure on industry; and aid the Financial Department in preventing frauds on the revenue and impositions on the people.

As a Commissioner would be responsible for the conduct of all the Pashas in his district, a sufficient check upon the whole administration would thus be supplied; and responsibility being centred in a few persons, culpability would be more easily detected, and the severest punishment should follow delinquency.

Next, I would wish to see placed by the side of each Pasha where there was a large Rayah population, a Rayah of consideration (appointed also for five years, unless guilty of some fault), who should be under the orders of the Pasha, but whose report as to the state of the Christians should be laid before the Grand Council, at least every three months.

What may be called the Governmental part of the Provincial Administration would thus be given a salutary impulse, and placed on a rational foundation, to be more or less extended, as necessity or experience might suggest. Local customs and exigencies would be attended to; their peculiarities explained; and that part of the machinery of Government which had to deal with the general habits of the nation would be purely national. On the other hand, there is a portion of the Administration

which has to deal with a peculiar subject, in which all classes in every nation, and all nations, are alike interested, and which can only be practically dealt with by men accustomed to order and regularity in accounts, honest by education and character, and acquainted with certain rules as to taxation and expenditure, which are pretty well general in their application, and which cannot be acquired at once, nor carried out efficiently by men never used to order or regularity, and by habit, practice, and confirmed education, corrupt. I allude to the financial administration, which is simply the question as to how a Government is to acquire the most for its wants, and a people have to subscribe the least out of its necessities.

You will not—you cannot, I feel convinced—get a decent financial system established here, except by the employment of Europeans. Nor is it any use canvassing the evils or inconveniences and contingencies which may attend such a change; the change is one of absolute necessity, and nothing in this world can be done that is not subject to evils and inconveniences and contingencies.

I have thus traced out at some length, though imperfectly, a general system of internal reform.

I now come to the other question, namely, that of foreign protection. I have touched on the question of the present general protectorate. And here the first question which presents itself to my mind is, whether the present plan of a joint protectorate is a sound one. If it is, you must render it real and positive, and not imaginary and vague. The great Powers of Europe have not up to this time rested their protection of Turkey upon any common principle except the negative one to which I have already alluded, that the Empire had better not be destroyed.

But, passing by the fact that this, though commonly said is not commonly felt, I confess that it seems to me that if a certain number of States are to unite heartily in protecting another, they must see some common and positive advantage in so doing: the advantage that they avoid an evil is hardly sufficient for men to be long connected in any line of conduct; they must see as their object, not merely something to avoid, but something to gain.

If, then, there is to be a European confederacy for maintaining the Ottoman Empire, that confederacy must be plainly and openly founded on some general system, from which the whole Confederacy has advantages to acquire.

I see no other than that of the protecting States looking on the Ottoman territory as in some respects a common colony to them all, in which, with a common object, they would have many of the great and common advantages they would hold in a Colonial possession, though such country should be governed by a Turkish Sovereign, and in a manner compatible with the habits, wants, and peculiar composition of its national population.

Something of this kind exists, indeed, at the present time, but it exists vaguely and confusedly. On the one hand, Europeans exercise powers in Turkey which are inconsistent with practical government; on the other hand, they are debarred from rights which it would be advantageous to the Turkish Government that they possessed.

Having a clear object in view, I am for stating clearly what that object demands. There should be a fair and common Treaty of Commerce applicable to all nations. All foreigners should have a right of residence and of acquiring and holding property on the same terms as the natives; they should, moreover, be subjected to the same taxation as the natives, and, if they maintained a separate legislation from the native one, which I think they should not do, or only do for a time, they should have a common law and common tribunals for themselves. How can we, indeed, call upon the Turks to form laws for Turks, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Europeans, when the Europeans resident in this very country, and to which the Turks have to apply their legislation, cannot form any common laws or appoint any common tribunals.

I repeat what I have said in many previous despatches—here is the first step towards that result to which, if we aim at Turkey existing, and

existing with anything like vigour or independence, we must direct our attention.

If the Christian Powers had a common legislation in Turkey for themselves, who cannot see that this, ere long, would become the legislation of the Turks? And when the Turks and Europeans had common laws, the natural result would ere long be a facility for framing one legislation out of the two, and establishing a judicial system to which all who resided in the Ottoman Empire might be subject.

These, however, are grave and serious enterprises, and the question is, whether we are serious in our objects; if we are, they deserve the efforts necessary to carry them out; if we are not, all the time we talk about them is wasted.

The question, however, here presents itself as to what power other States which afford their guarantee to Turkey on conditions which, if accepted and carried out, they would be likely to consider a common benefit, should exercise over Turkish affairs.

I must say, for my own part, that I think there are only two ways of looking at this matter of foreign interference. Either there is no necessity for it and no advantage in it, and then it should not exist at all, in theory or practice; or there is a necessity for it, there is an advantage in it, and I would then have it clear and positive, and bounded precisely by the necessity and advantage alluded to.

A nation is not so humiliated by an interference, checked in degree, and defined in extent, and likely to be limited in duration, if it is proposed for a certain purpose—as it is by an unlimited, undefined interference, constantly exercised, and not tending to produce any specific result. It is only essential that the result aimed at by foreign interference should be profitable to the nation which submits to it.

The present Provincial Administration is perpetually in conflict with our Provincial Agents, or those of foreign Powers, as to the vices of that Administration.

We receive complaints, we make complaints; explanations are required from the parties complained of; a definite judgment can rarely be arrived at; and the Pasha who differs from a Consul either escapes with impunity, or is hunted down by the continued pursuit of the Dragomans of the Embassy to which the Consul is attached, rather than condemned by any deliberate conviction on the part of the Turkish Government that he deserved punishment or dismissal.

A far more simple and practical course would be to have the inquiry into the conduct of the accused Pasha before the Grand Council open to the different Embassies or Delegates they may send there, and even to give them, if united in considering him guilty, the right to protest against his acquittal.

But I confess I go further than this: let it be clearly set forth that the interference of Europe in Turkish affairs is to produce certain beneficial results, which results might be produced within a moderate period, after which it would be reasonable to expect that Turkey could exist on sound foundations, and I should hardly care how far that interference extended.

Any plan, for instance, of establishing a judicial system here, which would dispense with the constant and daily shock between the Turkish and foreign authorities, which brings, as I have said, this Government more into contempt than any well-defined authority for establishing proper tribunals would do; any interference which had for its object the organization of a proper financial Administration, and the total demolition of that overgrown weed of corruption which now overtops and destroys all the natural fruits of industry, would be in my eyes an evil which the Turks might for a time undergo, as less certain to be ultimately ruinous than the national system of abuses at present in vigour.

Your Lordship will thus perceive that I do not view foreign interference with such horror as some people, if the extent of foreign interference is marked out, and if its objects are for the benefit of Turkey; but what I think fatal is foreign interference the extent of which is not

marked out, and the result, if not the object, of which must be, to lay prostrate the Government which we affect to support.

I would rather see a clear authority assumed within prescribed limits, than a doubtful authority exercised without any limit at all. A perpetual system of duplicity is a bad system of reformation; and the time seems to me come, if we wish to maintain this Empire, to cease to attempt maintaining it amidst a series of delusions.

The necessity for foreign interference, however, might in a great degree be averted by the Turks themselves if they clearly saw their own interest.

They may wish to avoid it, but, in the position in which they stand, and even according to the plan which they have sketched out for themselves, the public spirit and the general notions of Europe must find their way into Turkey, and exercise an influence over it. Either that influence will come from without, and through other Governments, or it might be exercised within the Ottoman Government itself, and be blended with it.

Let the Sultan do as Peter the Great did, as even Mehemet Ali did: let him invite Europeans on honourable terms into his service; let him make use of them in honourable and responsible situations, and in a little time Turkey would be sufficiently Europeanized to look Europe fairly in the face, and treat as a really European Power with her. This, perhaps, after all, is one of the best and most practical reforms that Turkey could undergo; but, unfortunately, it depends solely upon the Sovereign, who could alone impose upon native functionaries the employment of foreign ones.

At present any attempt made in this direction is a sham. The foreigner (with one exception, Admiral Slade) is given his salary to oblige the Ambassador who recommends him, but is carefully kept from situations of trust, unless, indeed, he adopts Islamism, and then, though he may be actively employed, he is universally despised.

It may be urged, I know, that much that I have said is theoretical,—all difficult. This is true; but it is by resorting in a certain extent to theory, and dealing with difficulties, that Statesmen grapple with great events which, if left to run their course, get after a certain time beyond all control. What I see at the present time is that the current of affairs is drifting things insensibly, though not, perhaps, without some external agency, in a course which is opposite to the notions which we have long entertained; and we must either be prepared to arrest that course or be ready to accept the consequences to which it will inevitably lead.

As to the manner in which this Government must aid itself and aid its friends, by its own intrinsic energy and resolution, I am convinced that no desultory pressure from without will be sufficient to arouse such qualities. The work must either proceed from some startling cause, such as a last battle for existence, or be left to the gradual effects of time and its continual exigencies, and I now fear that the results of time will be too slow to contend against the swift pace of approaching dangers, or it must be put more actively into motion by clear and definite suggestions or demands, made either by the Five Powers, if they act together as a Protectorate, or by Great Britain alone, if she were willing to incur the responsibility of acting as an ally. But the real value and gist of such suggestions or demands must depend upon the policy with which they are embodied.

What I should wish, I confess, is to make the Ottoman Empire a reality of some sort, rather than a nondescript shadow of which it might be said with truth:—

"Dat sine mente sonum gressusque effingit euntis."

It is with this view that I would say a few words as to those provinces which, with an independent existence in themselves, still form nominally part of the integral Empire of Turkey. All that I think the Ottoman Government should now aim at concerning these provinces is, to have in them a frontier people, satisfied with the Ottoman Government, disposed rather to resist than aid any attacks upon it, and consenting to avow that allegiance which costs them nothing, as long as it can be proffered in a manner that does not wound the national sentiment.

It is this situation, which is based upon a common interest, that in my opinion the Porte should strengthen and fortify, because it is a real one; whereas any other is neither reasonable nor tenable, and only subjects the Ottoman Government to a series of concessions which degrade it because they are never made but with a bad grace and at the last moment.

I will now only beg to be excused if I have trespassed in this document upon general grounds on which I am not necessarily obliged to enter, and if I have also done so at no inconsiderable length: but the whole situation of Turkey is so involved in obscurity and uncertainty, and it is so difficult even for one on the spot to form or express any clear opinions upon it, that I have thought it worth while to make at least the attempt, and to throw myself, in regard to what I may have said too much, or may have omitted to say, on your Lordship's accustomed indulgence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Aali Pasha to Sir H. Bulwer.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Sublime Porte, le* 21 *Octobre*, 1860.

LE Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a communiqué en son temps à votre Excellence, en copie, le Hat Impérial qui conférait à son Altesse le Grand Vézir la haute mission d'inspection de quelques provinces de la Roumélie. Ayant accompli en grande partie la tâche à elle confiée par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, vu l'urgente nécessité de sa présence dans la capitale pour les affaires de l'Etat, vu aussi la saison avancée où, dans les contrées que son Altesse avait encore à parcourir, les communications deviennent sinon impossibles au moins excessivement difficiles, son Altesse a dû suspendre le reste de l'enquête et retourner à Constantinople.

La Sublime Porte, toujours désireuse de donner aux Puissances ses augustes alliées des preuves de l'égard et de la confiance qu'elle leur porte, ne tardera pas à mettre sous leurs yeux le résultat de cette importante mission. Je saisis cette occasion pour vous annoncer également, M. l'Ambassadeur, que le Sultan mon auguste Maître n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que le progrès et la prospérité de toutes les classes de ses sujets sans distinction aucune, son Gouvernement s'occupe des mesures d'amélioration qui, j'en ai la conviction, atteindront le but salutaire qu'on se propose.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

No. 49.

Identic Note upon the Labours of the Financial Commission, by the Marquis de Plœuc and M. Falconnet.

Constantinople, le 27 *Octobre*, 1860.

LA Commission Financière a été formée dans le courant de l'année dernière, mais c'est seulement au mois de Novembre, il y a bientôt une année, que tous ses membres se sont trouvés réunis.

Les procès-verbaux des quatre séances qui paraissent avoir été tenues avant cette époque ne se sont jamais retrouvés.

Le premier soin de la Commission devait être d'indiquer la voie qu'elle se proposait de suivre et de demander pour ses projets la sanction Impériale.

Dès le 16 Novembre elle prenait lecture du projet de ses attributions, le 24 il était discuté, et le 14 Décembre une lettre vizirielle lui apprenait que ses projets avaient été sanctionnés.

La Commission était instituée pour—

1. Examiner la situation financière de l'Empire.

2. Préparer une refonte des lois en matière d'impôt et d'administration financière.

3. Proposer, s'il y avait lieu, toute mesure propre à ramener l'ordre et la régularité dans l'administration.

Nous disions comment nous entendions que ce programme fût suivi:—

Nous nous réservions le droit d'examen dans toutes les branches de l'administration, le droit de convoquer les chefs de service, &c. D'autre part nous demandions à l'Administration de ne rien faire qui put modifier l'état des choses actuelles, lois, réglements, &c., sans prendre l'avis de la Commission.

A travers ce programme, qui comme tous les documents de ce genre devait être conçu en termes assez généraux pour pourvoir à l'imprévu, nous nous proposions de suivre l'exécution d'une idée plus précise, comprise cependant dans le programme de la Commission.

Nous voulions—

Former des Budgets;

En régler l'emploi;

Faire rendre des comptes;

Leur créer un contrôle administratif;

Chercher soit dans un des Grands Conseils actuels de l'Empire, soit dans un autre constitué avec autant d'éléments indépendants que possible, un contrôle en quelque sorte législatif.

Et enfin en obtenant le plus de publicité possible ajouter encore un frein aux actes de l'administration par le contrôle de tous.

Ce plan ne répondait pas peut-être aux impatiences ni aux nécessités de la crise qui approchait, mais il faut remarquer que nous parlons ici de l'année dernière. D'ailleurs il faudra toujours admettre que sans la réalisation de ce programme, qui ne renferme après tout que les formules élémentaires de l'ordre, aucun Gouvernement ne peut inspirer la confiance, qui est la base du crédit public; et que si ce Gouvernement par des garanties exceptionnelles vient à obtenir le secours des capitaux étrangers il se trouvera bientôt encore en face des mêmes nécessités.

De quelque façon qu'on s'y prenne sans ces conditions, que nous considérons comme absolues, mais dont on peut varier les formules, rien ne garantit ni l'efficacité ni la durée des mesures plus ou moins heureuses qui seraient conseillées à un Gouvernement.

Pour nous mettre en état d'examiner la situation financière d'un pays où aucune publicité n'est donnée aux actes de l'Administration, une voie nous semblait indiquée; c'était qu'un exposé nous en fût fait par le Ministre des Finances, et sa présence au sien de la Commission nous permettait d'y compter. Ce travail devait être le préambule de tous nos travaux et aurait dû être préparé avant même que la Commission se fût reunie si on s'était bien rendu compte des moyens d'utiliser une Commission composée en partie d'Européens, étrangers aux habitudes et aux formes d'administration de l'Empire Ottoman.

Nous ne doutons pas que ce ne soit là une tâche difficile en l'absence de Budgets et de compte-rendus, et avec un système de comptabilité qui ne comporte guères que des livres de détails, et là où l'Administration fait a tel point la publicité que la situation de la caisse centrale du trésor public n'est systématiquement connue que du Sultan à la fin de chaque mois, du Ministre des Finances, et du Caissier.

Cependant ce qui n'était peut-être pas possible alors devait l'être aujourd'hui, car bien qu'à différentes reprises on nous ait déclaré qu'il ne fallait pas songer à obtenir pour le passé des comptes, soit des comptables, soit des Ministres, nous ne l'admettons que si on nous concède que ceux qui ont en main le pouvoir ou n'ont pas d'autorité, ou ne savent pas ou ne veulent pas s'en servir. Toujours est-il que nous attendons encore ce premier élément de tout jugement à porter sur la situation.

Mais au moins se préoccupant de l'avenir le premier soin de la Commission devait-il être, et a-t-il été, de demander l'Administration de détailler et de résumer les ressources de l'Etat par eyalet, livas, cafas, c'est-à-dire, par divisions et subdivisions administratives, de résumer et de détailler les

charges de l'Etat par nature de services pour former les Budgets par Départements Ministériels et le Budget Général de l'Empire.

Sans ces documents aucun examen n'est possible, aucune vue d'ensemble ne saurait être prise, et l'Administration qui pour elle-même ne les établit pas reste nécessairement dans les ténèbres qu'enfantent le désordre et les dilapidations.

Jusqu'ici on ne s'est jamais préoccupé d'établir des prévisions détaillées de dépenses. Les Ministres conviennent en Conseil de leurs besoins en tirant ensuite sur la caisse du trésor public à défaut de leur revenus speciaux. Quand ces ressources leur manquent ils émettent sans limitation sous le titre de "serghis" (au moins les Ministres de la Marine, de la Guerre, et de la Liste Civile) des obligations de payer et ne rendent en définitive aucun compte de l'emploi qu'ils ont fait soit des deniers publics, soit de la faculté d'émettre des "serghis." Ce n'est pas que la loi n'ait prescrit qu'il en fût autrement.

Un Iradé du 18 Zeliadé, 1271 (Septembre 1855), rappelé dans le Hatti-Houmayoum (Article 20), prescrit la formation des budgets deux mois avant le commencement de l'année financière, et leur examen par un Conseil spécial avant qu'ils ne fussent soumis à la sanction du Sultan.

Tous nos efforts devaient donc se porter sur la formation des budgets, nous appuyant pour les obtenir sur cet Iradé dont on n'avait tenu jusque là aucun compte, et sur cette considération que rien n'est possible, aucune étude, aucun conseil, sans ce premier élément. Nous ne nous permettions pas par ces premiers essais assez de lumière pour mettre en relief tous les abus, mais les budgets devaient être, aussitôt que publiés, remaniés et refaits avec plus de clarté pour l'année suivante. Par cette première publication des ressources et des besoins de l'Empire nous accomplissions dans tous les cas le premier acte de nature à provoquer la confiance.

Nous ne nous sommes pas bornés à rappeler la loi inexécutée de 1855, et bien que nous nous trouvassions dans un singulier embarras puisqu'il fallait guider l'administration des finances et tous les Départements Ministériels dans la formation de leurs budgets sans connaître ni les recettes ni même les dénominations des dépenses, néanmoins nous leur avons tracé des specimens de budgets qui dès le 14 Janvier de cette année leur étaient tous remis.

Des efforts que nous ne méconnaissons point, ont, sous la pression des membres-Ministres de la Commission, été réellement faits par des administrations qui n'étaient pas préparées à cette demande, et ces budgets, incomplets sans nul doute, paraissaient avoir été terminés, la Commssion ayant été saisie des derniers le $\frac{1}{13}$ Mai passé.

Bien des fois depuis lors la Commission a réclamé qu'ils fussent complétés par des exposés de motifs faits par les différents Ministres, et qu'un rapport général du Ministère des Finances résumant les charges ordinaires et extraordinaires, et indiquant les moyens auxquels songeait le Gouvernement pour faire face au deficit présumé d'environ millions de francs fût également présenté. Nous attachions d'autant plus de prix à cette publication, quelque critiquable que fussent ces documents fournis et produits à la hâte, qu'à notre avis la première amélioration, celle qui peut en entrainer beaucoup d'autres, consiste dans la publicité des actes de l'Administration.

Les nations les mieux administrées ont cette garantie contre les abus qui peuvent être commis dans l'emploi de la fortune publique, même par des pouvoirs bien constitués. En Turquie, où de longtemps encore on ne saurait posséder une organisation assez puissante ni des traditions administratives un peu régulières, c'est, nous le répétons, en remettant le soin au public de juger les actes que l'on peut compter sur des améliorations.

Tous nos efforts jusqu'ici sont restés stériles.

Mais il ne suffisait pas de demander la formation des budgets et de suppléer pour cette année, attendu l'urgence, par des modèles et des explications verbales à l'absence des règles fixes; il fallait encore tracer des règles générales et définitives non seulement de leur formation, mais du mode d'emploi des crédits qui y sont ouverts et assurer l'exécution des

budgets qui ne sont que des prévisions par des comptes-rendus. Un réglement a été élaboré pour répondre à ces besoins; première lecture en a été fait le $\frac{2}{14}$ Mai, vingt-neuvième séance, et le projet a été modifié dans le sens de la discussion. A notre demande il devait être soumis à une seconde délibération en vue de l'adopter plus complètement encore aux nécessités du pays. Mais sur la proposition de son Excellence Kiani Pacha cette discussion a encore été ajournée. Si le procès-verbal mentionne que le Conseil a adopté cet ajournement et que nous n'avons pas insisté depuis c'est parceque aujourd'hui nous ne nous sentons plus la majorité dans le Conseil; d'ailleurs des réglements sans des organes pour les exécuter ne servent tout au plus qu'à tromper le public, et tant que ceux qui ont en main le pouvoir n'apprécient pas mieux qu'ils ne semblent le faire les conditions de l'ordre, les organes feront défaut.

Enfin un projet de réglementation d'une Cour des Comptes a été également déposé au Conseil des Trésors, et nous nous proposions d'en détenir les attributions au profit du Conseil.

En dehors de ces travaux la Commission avait été saisie d'urgence de questions importantes concernant l'administration des douanes.

Le produit de la douane de Constantinople étant affectée au payement des intérêts et l'amortissement du dernier emprunt contracté en Angleterre, ainsi qu'aux obligations consolidées émises et à émettre par le Gouvernement sous le nom de "Eshams Djedidés," il y avait urgence de régulariser l'acquittement des droits de douanes.

Le mode alors en vigueur consistait dans l'ouverture de comptes courants aux négociants presque sans distinction entre ceux qui étaient solvables et ceux qui ne l'étaient pas. Ces comptes étaient rarement clos, rarement acquittés, et des sommes considérables étaient dues depuis des années au trésor. Quant aux droits additionnels de 2 pour cent qui restaient en suspens aux termes, paraît-il, du Traité de 1838 après la livraison de la marchandise par la douane suivant une interprétation que nous croyons forcée, jusqu'à ce que le négociant eût déclaré qu'il l'avait vendue, ils étaient payés plus rarement encore et on peut dire sans exagération que les quatre-cinquièmes en étaient perdus pour le trésor.

C'était une difficulté réelle que de remédier à l'habitude la plus difficile de toutes à déraciner, celle de ne pas acquitter des droits dûs et en même temps, sans provoquer de nouvelles discussions sur l'interprétation du Traité de 1838, de sauvegarder les droits additionnels.

Il y a été cependant pourvu, à la suite des Conférences avec les principaux négociants et grâce à des concessions réciproques. Aujourd'hui les négociants qui offrent les garanties voulues par le réglement acquittent leurs comptes au moyen d'obligations qui comprennent les droits de douanes et les droits additionnels, et le trésor reçoit ces valeurs, qu'il peut immédiatement négocier.

Aussi ne doit-il plus exister d'arriérés à la douane de Constantinople; au moins devons-nous le penser, puisque la publicité étant complètement rayées des traditions administratives de ce pays nous devons nous en tenir aux déclarations du Grand Douanier à cet égard.

Un réglement général sur la douane a été élaboré aussi par une Sous-Commission et déposé le pour être traduit en Turc avant toute discussion: il n'en a plus été question.

Nous avons rappelé au commencement que nous avions demandé au Gouvernement de ne rien faire qui put modifier l'état des choses, lois, réglements, &c., sans prendre l'avis de la Commission; et cependant nous devons constater l'éloignement dans lequel elle a été tenue de certaines mesures importantes prises par l'Administration, et cela contrairement à l'Iradé Impérial qui la constituait.

Nous nous bornerons à en citer quelques unes:—

La suppression des Defterdars (Receveurs);

Les négociations relatives à la Banque de Turquie;

La création de l'union financière, sur laquelle plus tard et quand il n'en sera plus temps on consultera le Conseil des Trésors en lui donnant vingt-quatre heures pour délibérer;

L'assiette et la perception de la contribution imposée à Constantinople,

et dont le produit était destiné à achever le retrait du caimé; et on trouvera à cet égard dans le procès-verbal de la séance du $\frac{6}{18}$ Janvier, 1860, une interpellation qui fut adressée à la Commission à ce sujet et la réponse d'Aali Pacha, Président du Tanzimat, qui fut suivie d'une déclaration que la Commission déclinait toute responsabilité dans l'exécution de cette mesure;

Enfin ces emprunts contractés sur place à des banquiers de Galata, emprunts onéreux activant chaque jour la crise et restés inconnus, au moins officiellement.

En résumé cependant, en consacrant ses séances à l'enseignement de la formation des budgets de tous les Ministères, à la première délibération d'un réglement organique sur les budgets, leur emplois, les comptes et leurs contrôles, et incidemment aux difficultés existant dans la perception des droits des douanes, la Commission remplissait son mandat dans l'ordre logique de la situation qui lui était faite.

C'est alors que sous la pression des circonstances, vers la fin du mois de Juin, la Commission Financière a été transformée en un Conseil permanent du Gouvernement sous la dénomination de Conseil Suprême des Trésors, sous la présidence de son Altesse Mehmet Ruschdi Pacha, ancien Grand Vizir, par un Hatti Impérial du 5 Zilidgé, 1277.

Le Conseil était ainsi composé:—Son Altesse Mehmed Ruschdi Pacha, Président; son Excellence Ismail Pacha (nouveau membre et en même temps membre du Tanzimat); son Excellence Kiani Pacha (anciennement Grand Douanier); Ohannès Efendi (nouveau membre, banquier, Chrétien sujet de la Porte); Aghathan Efendi (nouveau membre, banquier, Chrétien sujet de la Porte); Ramsi Efendi (fonctionnaire Ottoman).

Européens:—Marquis de Plœuc (ancien membre, Inspecteur des Finances); M. de Lackenbacker (ancien membre, Conseiller Aulique de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche); M. de P. Falconnet (ancien membre, Directeur de la Banque Ottomane); M. Deveaux, Secrétaire Inspecteur de Finances; Nazim Bey (Chef des écritures Turques).

Nous perdions son Altesse Aali Pacha, Président du Tanzimat, son Excellence Fuad Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et le Ministre des Finances.

Substitué à une Commission d'Etudes le Conseil semblait devoir exercer une action plus étendue sur l'administration du pays. Il était installé avec une solennité inaccoûtumé en présence de tous les Ministres et des principaux fonctionnaires.

Un discours (Procès-verbal No. 1) adressé par le Président aux membres du Gouvernement semblait témoigner de la haute prépondérance qu'on voulait accorder au Conseil.

Pour mettre le Conseil en mesure d'apprécier les améliorations qu'il convenait d'apporter dans l'administration intérieure de chaque Ministère, le Président recommandait aux Ministres la formation de Commissions chargées de rendre compte au Conseil de l'organisation de leurs Départements respectifs. Si ces Commissions ont été formées nous l'ignorons.

En même temps une dépêche dont il sera parlé faisait connaître aux Cabinets étraugers les pouvoirs étendus que dans ce moment de crise on entendait accorder au Conseil.

Mais aux trois Ministres qui se retiraient de la Commission étaient substitués, et nous cédons à l'envie de la dire, comme correctifs de la dépêche, quatre sujets de la Porte, ce qui portait le nombre des membres Ottomans ou sujets Ottomans à six, quand celui des membres Européens restait le même. Enfin le Gouvernement se taisait aussi sur l'existence de la dépêche que nous venons de rappeler gardait un silence absolu sur les attributions du Conseil.

Maintes fois la promesse d'instructions définissant ces attributions a été réitérée par le Président aux membres Européens qui réclamaient avec insistance. Une lettre Vizirielle ci-jointe (No. 1) dont les termes généraux ne suffisent pas à dire quelle est la part d'autorité qui est faite au Conseil, est le seul document qui ait été obtenu de la Porte, et cette lettre n'a qu'une signification admissible, c'est que la Porte dès le début s'est promise de contester la prépondérance de ce Conseil, et n'a jamais eu la

pensée de ratifier à Constantinople la dépêche destinée aux Cabinets étrangers.

Nous n'avons jamais espéré parvenir à forcer le Gouvernement à s'expliquer et à mettre un terme à cette situation équivoque, mais nous avons cru de notre devoir de démasquer ces manœuvres en dénonçant l'existence de la dépêche du 27 Juin, 1860, que nous connaissons depuis longtemps.

Récherchée immédiatement dans les archives de la Porte, lecture en a été donnée dans la séance du , et unanimement les membres Européens ont demandé que des explications fussent réclamées du Gouvernement, et que les instructions qui nous étaient promises fussent demandées avec insistance. Le Président après nous avoir déclaré qu'il ignorait le contenu de cette dépêche s'est de nouveau engagé à solliciter de la Porte qu'elle voulût bien nous dire quelle part d'autorité nous était attribuée.

Cette dépêche, dont copie est ci-jointe (No. 2), est en quelque sorte la réproduction d'une note (No. 3) qui fut demandée à l'un de nous à l'époque de la transformation de la Commission, et qui précise dans les termes les plus clairs les pouvoirs du Conseil.

Nous devions donc encore attendre ; mais le Gouvernement n'en a pas moins gardé le silence, préférant sans doute se voir prêter la pensée de chercher à inspirer la confiance en Europe sans rien changer à ce qui se passe en Turquie.

Dans tous les cas nous savons à n'en plus douter les mesures d'autorité qui est départie au Président du Conseil, dont personne ne saurait d'ailleurs suspecter les intentions.

A cette incertitude sur la part d'autorité faite au Conseil, ajoutons que l'un des membres Ottomans dont le Président ne peut se passer parcequ'il lui sert au besoin d'interprète, nous a appris qu'il fallait aussi tenir compte de la pression exercée si facilement, paraît-il, sur les sujets Ottomans ou Rayahs de la Commission. Dans une discussion récente le membre dont il est ici question, après s'être entendu en Turc avec le Président du Conseil, a ramassé pour ainsi dire du jeste l'opinion des sujets Ottomans, et est ainsi parvenu à assurer la majorité à une résolution qui n'avait même pas encore été discutée par les Européens.

Peu de jours après dans une question de cadastre le rapporteur s'étant permis une critique aussi méritée que modérée d'une mesure prise par le Gouvernement, ce même membre, d'un ton qui impliquait une prépondérance inadmissible par un des membres qui siégeaient au même titre dans un Conseil, reprit ce sujet de la Porte, de ce que lui fonctionnaire faisait aussi la critique de son Gouvernement.

L'un de nous fit entendre une protestation très vive sur cette pression deux fois repétée dans un Conseil où tous les membres ont les mêmes droits et où tous ont le devoir de déclarer ce qu'ils trouvent mauvais, devoir plus étroit encore et qui doit être plus respecté quand il s'agit d'un rapporteur nommé à l'unanimité des membres d'un Conseil. L'impression qui est restée de cette séance, impression partagée, nous pouvons le dire, est que les membres sujets de la Porte se trouvent mal à l'aise devant les Pachas et que le Conseil manque ainsi de l'indépendance, qui est la première condition pour bien faire : c'est le résultat de la prépondérance de l'élément Turc sur l'élément Européen, et la certitude pour celui-ci que dans une question importante il succombera infailliblement.

Un peu plus que la Commission Financière, mais très incomplètement encore, le Conseil est entretenu des difficultés qui surgissent, mais c'est toujours à la dernière heure qu'il est consulté, sans informations suffisantes, quelquefois pas des informations inexactes, alors même qu'il y a commencement d'exécution et sur les questions les plus graves qui demanderaient et des documents certains et de longues et sérieuses études.

Ainsi point d'autorité par son chef ; des pouvoirs incertains chez chacun de ses membres ; une défiance qui paralyse toute initiative ; et la certitude que le Gouvernement n'entend se servir du Conseil qu'à son heure et pour lui faire partager la responsabilité de ses actes, qu'il ne voudra pas garder toute entière pour lui.

Ce n'est qu'en un mot la fiction d'un pouvoir qui ne peut rien d'utile par lui-même pour la crise qui se prépare et qui ne sert tout au plus qu'à induire le public en erreur, si même il n'a déjà perdu toute sa confiance.

Le Conseil espérant cependant que ces difficultés seraient aplanies par le temps n'a cessé de s'occuper, comme le témoignent ses procès-verbaux, des nombreuses affaires qui lui ont été soumises, mais dont presque pas une n'avait un rapport directe avec la crise qui préoccupe tous les esprits.

Nous avons dû poursuivre également la réalisation du programme que nous nous étions tracés et dont le premier terme était la formation des budgets et leur examen avant que leur sanction ne fût demandée au Sultan. Mais à qui incomberait l'examen des budgets formés par les Ministres ?

Sur cette question importante devait encore se manifester la pensée du Gouvernement à l'égard du Conseil et sa volonté de rester dans les voies ordinaires ; c'est-à-dire, de conserver aux Ministres le droit d'user sans contrôle les deniers publics.

La minorité des Conseils du Trésor (les membres Européens) invoquait pour cet examen la dépêche transmise en Europe, et elle demandait que les budgets fussent enfin terminés et précédés d'exposés des motifs qui permissent au moins d'en comprendre le sens ; mais sur cette question, qui impliquait nécessairement la prépondérance du Conseil, une lutte très significative dont les véritables motifs se dissimulaient mal de part et d'autre s'est établie. L'un des membres dont nous avons déjà parlé motivant son opinion sur le défaut d'instructions contestait que ce droit d'examen put être dans les attributions du Conseil, et il était assisté du silence des membres récemment introduits.

Nous demandions au moins l'exécution de l'Article 5 de l'Iradé du 18 Zilcadé, 1271 (1855), qui constitue une sorte de pouvoir délibérant sur les budgets des Ministres. Mais oubliant qu'antérieurement il avait lui-même réclamé l'exécution de cet Article 5, et que la Commission Financière avait décidé qu'on en recommanderait l'exécution au Gouvernement, ce même Pacha déclarait que cet Iradé était sans valeur.

Ainsi les budgets ont été renvoyés aux Ministres, qui sur les premières allocations qu'ils s'attribuaient ont opéré eux-mêmes des réductions s'élevant à environ 31,737,942 francs (277,707 bourses), ou plutôt le chiffre des réductions qu'ils se proposent de faire a été notifié en masse au Conseil, par Ministères, sans que les Ministres aient indiqué et se soient rendus compte, nous a-t-on dit, des chapitres et articles sur lesquels porteraient réellement ces réductions.

De quelque côté donc qu'on ait tenté des efforts pour constituer un contrôle supérieur de l'emploi de la fortune publique nous avons échoué, ce qui veut dire que le Gouvernement Ottoman ne ratifiant pas ce qu'il avait annoncé aux Chancelleries Européennes, et laissant même de côté l'Iradé Impérial visé dans le Hatt-Houmayoum (Article 20), entend conserver l'omnipotence en cette matière, comme par le passé, aux Ministres réunis en Conseil.

Ayant considéré cette création d'un pouvoir régulateur de l'emploi de la fortune publique comme la première conquête à faire sur l'ancienne organisation, et comme une mesure de nature à contribuer à raineur la confiance, cet échec est le plus considérable que nous ayons subi.

Nous avons encore tenté de réunir tous les éléments de recettes et de dépenses de tous les Ministères, nous proposant de former, au moyen de comptables intelligents cherchés sur place ou venant d'ailleurs, une comptabilité en Français, qui réproduite en langue Turque plus tard put servir de modèle, et se substituer peu-à-peu dans chaque Ministère aux méthodes actuelles qui ne permettaient, nous le craignons, à personne de savoir exactement ce qui s'y passe. A cet effet des tableaux mensuels devaient être envoyés au Conseil le 5me jour de chaque mois. Après bien des réclamations nous les avons obtenus pour le premier mois, mais il existe aujourd'hui tant de lenteurs dans la traduction de ces documents, tant d'inexactitude dans leur envoi, qu'il faut renoncer à cette pensée. On pouvait ainsi attirer au Conseil toutes les aspirations de recettes et de dépenses, et en cas d'une liquidation des dettes de l'Empire, soit par un emprunt, soit de tout autre manière, se trouver prêt à veiller à une scrupuleuse exécution. Peut-être encore, en élargissant chaque jour la sphère d'action du Conseil

pourrait-on absorber graduellement le Ministère des Finances, et se substituer à lui.

En résumé, nous avons poursuivi sans illusions, mais seulement avec le sentiment d'un devoir à remplir la pensée de faire entrer l'Administration Ottomane dans les voies de l'ordre :—

La formation des Budgets ;

Leur emploi régulier ;

La reddition des comptes, comme moyen, la comptabilité ;

Un contrôle supérieure à l'aide d'un pouvoir autre que celui des Ministres réunis en Conseil ; que ce fût le Conseil des Trésors, celui qu'indiquait l'Iradé Impérial précité, ou le Conseil des Trésors, le Tanzimat, le Conseil de Justice, et le Conseil d'Etats réunis en Assemblée Générale, ou tout autre.

Enfin nous avons tenté de faire prévaloir le principe de la publicité des actes comme étant le frein le plus à notre portée, et qui ne demandait que la bonne volonté du Gouvernement. Sur ce dernier point peut-être n'échouerons-nous pas complètement, le Conseil, malgré quelque dissentiment, nous paraissant avoir fait accepter par le Gouvernement la publication, qui se fait pourtant bien attendre, et du Budget Général et des Budgets particuliers de chaque Ministère.

Nous sommes donc arrêtés en chemin après avoir fait à peine le premier pas, parceque l'œuvre entreprise est au-dessus des forces d'un Conseil composé par les circonstances, et dont l'ombre seule suffit aux vues du Gouvernement parceque l'élément Européen a été écrasé dans ce Conseil sous la nombre, et que la lutte aujourd'hui serait sans utilité, parceque peut-être aussi les conditions de l'ordre que nous venons d'exposer n'ont pas pour le Gouvernement Turc le prix que nous y attachons, ou que pour être remplies elle demanderaient une persévérance et une fermété que nous ne voyons à personne.

Enfin encore, parceque l'illusion du Gouvernement Turc sur la possibilité de contracter un emprunt ne l'a jamais abandonné, et il est entretenu dans cette pensée par bien des motifs, et aussi pas de nombreux chercheurs de solutions financiers en dehors des conditions qui seront éternellement celles du crédit public.

Cependant la crise s'aggrave ; les fonctionnaires ne sont pas payés, l'armée et la marine pas davantage. Chaque jour l'Etat aliène ses revenus à venir, et bien que le Conseil n'ait encore pu obtenir un état de quelque certitude indiquant jusqu'à quel point ces derniers revenus sont engagés, nous devons croire qu'une grande partie de ceux de l'année prochaine ne sont déjà plus à la disposition du Trésor.

Dans cette situation si grave il ne nous a jamais été possible de savoir quelles étaient les dispositions que comptait prendre le Gouvernement dans l'hypothèse plus que possible mais non encore acceptée qu'un emprunt ne serait pas effectué.

Des ressources ordinaires d'environ 286,000,000 de francs, soit 11,500,000 livres sterling, reliquat de tout ce que le fermage et les malversations laissent au trésor et qui pourraient suffire à assurer les services publics si ces revenus appartenaient encore au trésor, puisque les dépenses inscrites aux budgets ordinaires comparées aux recettes ne font ressortir qu'un déficit d'environ 7,000,000 et quelques centaines de mille francs.

	Bourses.		Piastres.		Francs.
Recettes inscrites aux budgets ..	2,504,156	=	155	=	286,187,007
Dépenses	2,570,086	=	355	=	293,722,999
Excédant de dépenses ..	65,930	=	200	=	7,535,992

Et si nous supposons remplies les conditions d'ordre que nous avons énumérées on doit admettre que l'équilibre serait assuré entre les dépenses et les recettes ordinaires.

Maintenant, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, nous ne connaissons pas exactement l'importance des revenus aliénés aux prêteurs, pas plus que nous ne sommes admis à suivre les aliénations journalières qui s'effectuent et modifient sans cesse la situation ; mais nous croyons que si on reporte toutes les anticipations qui grèvent les revenus actuels et ceux de l'année

prochaine dans un budget extraordinaire, ainsi que les bons et effets publics remboursables, échus et à échoir, la dette flottante de la Turquie ne devra pas dépasser 462,000,000 de francs et sa dette générale 846,000,000 ; mais sa dette flottante à courtes échéances résultant d'emprunts usuraires contractés dans les mystères de l'administration sont toute la crise (voir le tableau des dettes du Trésor Ottoman, ci-joint).

Remarquons en passant que si on consulte les dates de la plupart de ces consolidations à courtes échéances, comme celles de ces emprunts, on arrive à reconnaître que la situation anormale du Trésor ne remonte pas au delà de cinq ou de six années.

Sous le titre de séhims, de hasné-tahvili, de bons de dix ans et de bons du Ministère de la Guerre transférés au Trésor, et de bons de la Marine qui sont et des effets publics et des consolidations à de courtes échéances créés pour régler des dettes du palais et d'ailleurs, on voit figurer dans le tableau ci-joint environ 198,000,000 de francs dont les échéances peuvent être prolongées sans surprise pour le public, soit par une consolidation définitive en rentes perpétuelles, soit en rentes amortissables pendant trente-six ans ou vingt-quatre années comme pour les eshami djedidés. Dans tous les cas il serait possible de les effacer des préoccupations actuelles.

Il resterait alors en dettes flottantes de toutes natures et dont nous ne connaissons pas les détails un passif d'environ 264,000,000 de francs avec ou sans garantie des révenus affirmés. C'est ainsi que nous apparaissait la situation vers le mois de Juillet : les diminutions dans les dépenses et les remboursements qui se sont faits les prêteurs sur les révenus qui leur ont étés donnés en garantie, ont-ils modifiés cette situation nous ne saurions le dire.

Qui doutera cependant en jetant les yeux sur les budgets qui, nous l'espérons, vont être enfin publiés, que la Turquie est bien loin de tirer parti même des seules ressources exploitées par son administration ?

Ainsi les droits sur le bétail inscrits aux budgets pour 22,000,000 de francs environ ne portent que sur les chèvres, les moutons, et les porcs. Il est vrai que sur ces derniers le droit a été perçu sans distinction d'âge, ce qui équivaut à la destruction de la race. Dans un pays voisin, en Grèce, le gros bétail, les ânes, les chevaux, les chameaux sont soumis à des droits, et rien ici ne justifie une exception.

Les forêts ne sont au budget que pour un produit d'environ 150,000 francs, ce qui indique qu'il n'en est tiré aucun parti, surtout quand on remarque que la Grèce peut faire figurer à son budget cette ressource en 1860 pour 270,000 francs environ, malgré tous les inconvénients d'une administration qui n'est ni rétribuée ni surveillée.

Les mines donnent au Trésor environ 260,000 francs provenant des Sandjaks de Seraï Travnik, Buké, Nische, Lamakau Carahissar, et du casa de Nulkalichin. La Grèce tire de ses mines environ 500,000 francs, et beaucoup lui reprochent de ne pas les exploiter ou de les mal exploiter.

Le droit de patente n'est pas inscrit au Budget.

Les pêcheries, qui en Grèce représentent près de 180,000 francs, sont ici d'un produit d'environ 400,000 francs.

Le papier timbré produisant en Grèce près de 1,400,000 francs ne donne ici qu'environ 700,000 francs.

Par cette comparaison faite à la hâte, entre un petit pays voisin d'une population de 1,000,000 d'habitants, qui laisse singulièrement à désirer sous le rapport de l'administration, et la Turquie, nous n'avons voulu montrer que d'une manière plus sensible à l'aide de quelques indications prises au hasard combien il eût été facile à la Turquie d'accroître ses ressources et de trouver même depuis une année les garanties d'un emprunt, soit pour faire vivre ses services publics, soit pour rembourser ou consolider ses dettes en libérant ses revenus.

Du nombre des améliorations on place encore la modification d'un Traité de Commerce qui épuise depuis vingt ans la Turquie en grêvant les produits de ce pays essentiellement agricole d'un droit d'exportation de 12 pour cent, auquel s'ajoute encore la dime quant à l'importation. Ces droits sont de 5 et le plus souvent de 3 pour cent.

Ce Traité a encore conservé l'abolition des monopoles pour mettre un

terme aux abus qu'ils avaient engendré, mais deux exceptions devraient être faites pour le tabac et le sel, qui pourraient produire dans des mains habiles des ressources considérables.

Nous n'avons pas parlé de ce privilège dont jouit la ville de Constantinople de ne point participer à l'impôt du verghi, qui est une sorte de "income tax," ou plutôt contingent réparti par les notables au pro rata du revenu présumé de chacun. La difficulté d'asseoir cet impôt dans une ville composée de nationalités si diverses rendrait préférable une contribution sur les loyers. En l'absence de toute donnée statistique il est impossible de préciser l'importance de cette ressource, mais on croit être au-dessus de la vérité en l'évaluant à 8,000,000 de francs.

La conversion en propriétés Mulkt des biens Vakoufs paraîtrait devoir être une des ressources du Trésor, mais toutes les fois que cette question a été traitée, tous les efforts possibles ont été faits pour démontrer que cette mesure ne donnerait que de faibles résultats, et à défaut de tous renseignements, que pourraient cependant donner le Ministère spécial de l'Evcaf, la discussion de notre part n'était pas possible.

La faculté laissée aux Ministres de la Guerre, de la Marine, de la Liste Civile, d'émettre des serghis, c'est-à-dire, des promesses de payer sans limitation, est ici l'un des plus grands dangers pour le Trésor, et devrait être au moins régularisée.

En tout pays qui porte ses dépenses au niveau de ses recettes, le Trésor ne peut pas faire face à ses engagements seulement avec ses revenus, puisque ses derniers ne se recouvrent pas dans la période de douze mois, et que les dépenses généralement de salaires, traitements, pensions, ou fournitures doivent être soldées dans l'année.

Les Gouvernements réguliers et habiles, sous une forme ou sous une autre, recourent au crédit, et assurent la régularité des services publics par une dette flottante, à courte échéance, mais qui se renouvelle sans cesse au fur et à mesure de leurs besoins, s'ils savent conserver la confiance publique. Mais les Gouvernements restés en arrière qui ont gardé les impôts en nature soumis à des fluctuations si diverses, ou dont l'Administration n'est ni vigilante ni probe, ne peuvent prétendre porter leurs dépenses au niveau de leurs recettes probables que par exception ; encore faut-il qu'une prévoyante Administration ait constitué antérieurement des réserves métalliques, ou que l'abaissement des dépenses vienne promptement après la crise rétablir l'équilibre. S'ils méconnaissent ces principes, et qu'ils portent leurs dépenses au niveau de leurs recettes probables, et au delà comme en Turquie, de graves déceptions leur sont réservées. Ils ne pourront combler cet écart entre les recettes et les dépenses qui est un fait général et nécessaire par le crédit public dont ils méconnaissent les conditions tout en voulant en user, mais ils devront recourir à ces promesses de payer (serghis) si onéreuses pour le Trésor puisque les prix payés en serghis sont d'autant plus élevés que leur remboursement est moins sûr ou moins prochain. La défiance des créanciers de l'Etat est d'ailleurs d'autant plus éveillée que rien ne dit au public dans quelle mesure l'avenir du Trésor se trouve engagé.

La faculté d'émettre des serghis devrait être retirée aux Ministres, et le Ministre des Finances, qui seul devrait avoir le droit d'engager le trésor dans la mesure déterminée par le Gouvernement, devrait émettre les serghis sur la production de pièces justificatives de dépenses produits par les Ministres.

La somme des serghis à émettre devrait être enfin fixée par la loi annuelle de finances, rendue publique en même temps que les budgets, &c.

Enfin les crédits ouverts au Sultan sur le trésor étant une cause de perturbation, non seulement parceque ces crédits paraissent être sans limite, mais aussi parcequ'ils permettent à une administration gérant sans publicité d'attribuer aux désordres du Palais ce qui pourrait être en partie son œuvre, on avait placé au nombre des réformes à poursuivre l'obtention d'un iradé Impérial consacrant le principe que les dettes de la Liste Civile ne doivent en aucun cas être confondues avec celles du Trésor Public.

Il serait sans doute facile de formuler en projets de lois et en réglements tout ce que nous venons d'indiquer ; mais pour faire appliquer,

pour tenter en un mot toutes ces entreprises, il faut mieux qu'un Conseil sans autorité dont les projets iraient rejoindre tant d'autres demeurés à l'état de lettre-morte.

(Dans les deux paragraphes qui suivent, la note cesse d'être commune.)

Parmi les expédients dont nous avons entendu parler se trouvent en effet celui d'une émission de nouveau papier monnaie. Contre une pareille mesure je dois pour ma part protester de toute ma force, non seulement en ma qualité de représentant des porteurs d'obligations de l'emprunt contracté à Londres en 1858, dont la principale condition est le retrait du Caïmé et l'engagement de ne plus en émettre à l'avenir, mais également comme convaincu du mal que pareil expédient produirait dans le pays. En économie politique il est reconnu qu'un papier monnaie sans base, sans équivalent, émis simplement sur des espérances dont la réalisation est plus qu'hypothétique, ne pourrait amener que le désordre et la ruine dans les finances d'un pays. Encore si le crédit, la bonne foi du Gouvernement n'avaient point été ébranlés par des actes blamables et surtout une imprévoyance sans exemple, une telle mesure pourrait s'excuser ; mais que l'on n'oublie pas que tant l'un que l'autre ont été anéantis par la mauvaise administration des deniers publics, par des promesses solennelles si souvent réitérées et jamais remplies qui ont jeté un tel découragement, une telle méfiance dans le public, que les facilités provisoires mais plus que douteuses que l'on pourrait attendre d'une émission de papier monnaie ne se réaliseraient point. L'effet sur le change serait incalculable, et les avantages momentanés et bien courts que l'on se serait procurés se perdraient dans la réduction effective du Budget, dont le tiers est destiné à des remises à l'étranger, en laissant le trésor dans l'impossibilité de pourvoir à ses besoins. Le moindre effort au contraire assurerait le retrait du Caïmé et détruirait la cause de ses fluctuations qui sont la mort du commerce. Consentir à l'émission du papier monnaie serait agir de connivance avec le Gouvernement Turc à la rupture d'un engagement solennel et répété, pris non seulement vis-à-vis des porteurs d'obligations de l'emprunt de 1858, mais aussi de l'union financière dernièrement instituée et du public

Des voies plus simples mais moins sures seront sans doute suivies. Je veux parler du papier monnaie. Que le Gouvernement démente les bruits qui ont couru qu'il songeait à une émission de nouveaux Caïmés, comme il le fait en ce moment, je le comprend, puisqu'il n'a pas perdu l'espoir d'un emprunt ; mais le jour où cette pensée n'aura plus d'aliment je cherche en vain la mesure à laquelle il devra recourir, puisque les réformes administratives ait eues jusqu'ici si peu de faveur. Il est cependant si regrettable après avoir contracté un emprunt de 5,000,000 de livres sterling il y a deux ans à peine, avoir imposé Constantinople pour le retrait du papier monnaie et jeté à tous les vents de la publicité la promesse de retirer le papier en circulation, de recourir encore à ce triste expédient qui peut reculer des embarras mais non les effacer, que j'ai dû m'abstenir de tout encouragement à cet égard. Si d'ailleurs rien ne se fait pour rendre l'administration plus regulière on peut prévoir que dans peu de temps encore le trésor Ottoman se trouvera au point où il en est aujourd'hui.

(Signé) DE PLŒUC.

en général à l'occasion de l'établissement de la caisse d'amortissement sans parler de la contribution que l'on a prélevée sous le prétexte de pourvoir à la destruction complète du Caimé. Je ne pourrais voir, donc, dans l'exécution de cette mesure que la ruine du pays; je dois donc m'y opposer à outrance et protester en mon nom et en celui de mes commettants contre toute émission de papier monnaie dont l'échange contre espèces d'or ou d'argent ne soit point assurée et en me réservant les droits les plus amplès en leur faveur pour réclamer les fortes indemnités qui leur seraient dues pour l'infraction de la condition la plus importante et la plus utile de leur emprunt.
(Signé) F. DE P. FALCONNET.

Note Commune.

De ce qui précède il nous semble résulter que ce n'est pas un Conseil à peine écouté qui pourra renverser les abus, introduire dans l'administration les améliorations nombreuses qu'elle réclame à tous les degrés, développer les ressources inexploitées du pays, organiser enfin les moyens d'ordre et de surveillance que nous avons indiqués et hors desquels nous n'avons pas de solution à produire.

Dans cette situation notre présence au Conseil des Trésors ne nous semble pas devoir être utile longtemps encore, et nous avons cru de notre devoir de le déclarer, en rendant compte après la période d'une année des efforts qui ont été tentés et des résultats obtenus.

(Signé) F. DE P. FALCONNET.

Constantinople, le 27 Octobre, 1860.

Inclosure in No. 49.

TABLEAU des Dettes présumées du Trésor Ottoman.

Dettes à l'Echéance de l'Année 1860 (*de l'Egire* 1276).

	Bourses.	
Sehims ou Eshamé Mouiajé	150,000	Capital à rembourser le 1/13 Septembre, 1860. Provenant de dettes de la Liste Civile converties en effets publics en 1857: intérêts 8 pour cent.
Hasné Tavili	500,000	Effets publics créés en 1858 à rembourser en Janvier 1861; intérêts 6 pour cent.
Emprunt pour retrait des Caimés ..	251,000	Les revenus de cette année ont été donnés, paraît-il, en garantie de ces emprunts.
Emprunt pour diverses causes	472,321	
Intérêts et commission des deux articles précédents	104,864	
	1,478,185	

Dettes à l'Echéance de l'Année 1860 *et des suivantes.*

(L'Administration n'est pas encore en mesure de les diviser par années.)

	Bourses.	
Déficit de l'Exercice 1858 (1274) ..	278,601	Aucune explication satisfaisante n'a encore été donnée sur ces chiffres. Le Directeur des Finances, qui les a produits, interrogé longuement au sein de la Commission, n'a pas pu expliquer de façon à être compris, comment il les avait formés.
" " 1859 (1275) ..	447,033	
Bons de 10 ans	847,800	Ces bons ont été créés en 1859; ils sont, je le crois, une conversion des dettes de la Liste Civile. Les porteurs ont droit pendant cinq ans à un intérêt de 6 pour cent et à compter de la cinquième année ce capital devra être remboursé en cinq annuités.
Bons de la guerre, transférés au Trésor ..	190,000	Dettes très anciennes, dit-on, du Ministère de la Guerre qui doivent être amorties en deux années à partir de Juin 1860 par 2 pour cent par mois, et un intérêt de 6 pour cent par an.
Dettes du Ministère des Finances dans les Provinces	551,988	Aucune explications atisfaisante, ou plutôt explications contradictoires sur la nature de ces dettes et sur les conditions de remboursement sans intérêts, paraît-il.
Bons de la Marine	45,000	
Total	2,360,475	
Report des dettes connues de 1860 ..	1,478,185	
	3,838,660	
A déduire: Eshamé Djedidé en caisse au Trésor .	350,000	
Il reste à la charge du Trésor ..	3,488,660	

La bourse pouvant être évaluée à 100 francs, 3,488,660 bourses représentent environ 348,866,000 francs.

Constantinople, le 9 Juillet, 1860.

No. 50.

Aali Pasha to M. Musurus.—(*Communicated to Lord J. Russell by M. Musurus, December .*)

Le 21 Novembre, 1860.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI l'honneur de vous transmettre, ci-annexé en traduction, le rapport à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de son Altesse le Grand Vézir sur sa mission d'inspection en Roumélie, ainsi que les dispositions provisoires établies par son Altesse dans les provinces qu'elle a visitées, et des instructions qu'elle a envoyées aux Gouverneurs de celles où il n'a pas eu le temps de se rendre en personne.

Ces pièces, jointes au rapport dont je vous ai déjà transmis une copie, concernant la Commission Mixte instituée par son Altesse pour faire une enquête sur les différents points contenus dans une note précédente du Cabinet de Russie, concernant une série d'actes d'oppression qui seraient commis en Bulgarie sur les Chrétiens, suffisent à donner une juste idée, et de l'accueil que méritent les rapports parvenus aux Puissances sur la condition des sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et de la persévérance avec laquelle le Gouvernement Ottoman s'applique à découvrir et à réprimer les abus, et à introduire et compléter les améliorations jugées nécessaires dans toutes les branches de l'Administration de l'Empire.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à faire de ces pièces l'usage qu'elle jugera convenable dans le but d'éclairer le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur la situation véritable des populations de l'Empire, et sur

les efforts incessants du Gouvernement Impérial d'en augmenter le bien-être.

Je vous, &c.
(Signé) AALI.

Inclosure 1 in No. 50.

Report of the Grand Vizier to the Sultan.

(Traduction.)

Sire,

DANS sa sollicitude constante pour le bien-être et la prospérité de toutes les classes de ses sujets, votre Majesté Impériale a daigné me confier l'importante mission de faire une enquête sur des plaintes formulées au nom des populations Chrétiennes de Roumélie, et de passer en inspection l'administration de certaines provinces de ses possessions Européennes.

Ces plaintes ont naturellement attiré l'attention de votre Majesté Impériale. En conséquence, je donne dans ce respectueux rapport la priorité à l'exposé de mes investigations à cet égard.

Pénétré des ordres que votre Majesté m'a donnés à mon départ, et appréciant l'immense importance pour l'Empire de connaître la vérité et de redresser, s'il y a lieu, les justes griefs de vos sujets, je n'ai rien négligé pour atteindre ce but. Je me suis fait une règle, partout où j'ai été, de convoquer en ma présence les habitants indistinctement, de les engager à me déclarer tout ce qu'ils pouvaient avoir à dire, avec les assurances les plus solennelles données au nom auguste de votre Majesté de les garantir contre toute sorte d'injustice qu'ils auraient pu redouter s'ils exposaient la vérité.

Arrivé au Pachalic de Niche, centre d'où la plupart des plaintes étaient parties, je me suis empressé de former un Tribunal Extraordinaire composé des fonctionnaires Musulmans et Chrétiens attachés à ma mission, du Conseil Provincial, ainsi que du Métropolitain Grec, afin d'examiner tous les faits dont la liste avait été communiquée à votre Gouvernement avant mon départ de Constantinople. J'ai l'honneur de mettre ci-joint sous les yeux de votre Majesté Impériale un résumé des travaux du dit Tribunal. Les nombreuses pièces justificatives qui s'y rapportent ont été déposées aux archives de la Sublime Porte.

Votre Majesté Impériale verra par le document soumis à sa haute appréciation, et je lui affirme de la manière la plus positive, que je n'ai trouvé aucun indice de tout ce prétendu système de persécution organisé par le fanatisme Musulman contre les Chrétiens. Les assassinats, les viols, les vols, les spoliations dont on a fait parvenir la liste jusqu'à des Cours amies et alliées, ont presque tous disparu devant l'examen consciencieux du tribunal. Chaque fait a été l'objet d'une enquête spéciale; aucun moyen légal n'a été omis.

Est-ce à dire que je n'ai pas eu à réprimer ou à punir aucun crime, aucun méfait? Non, Sire, ce serait méconnaître la nature humaine et soutenir une prétention ridicule que de nier l'existence des fléaux dont les Gouvernements les plus policés n'ont pu encore se débarasser. Ce que j'entends établir, et ce qui résulte de mes recherches, c'est qu'il est parfaitement inexact que vos sujets Chrétiens aient à se plaindre de la moindre persécution systématique de la part de leurs compatriotes Musulmans; que comme société humaine chaque communauté fournit son contingent de criminels contre lesquels la justice a à sévir, et que le contenu de la liste en question n'a existé que dans l'esprit de ceux qui cherchent à nous dénigrer auprès des Puissances. J'ai dû prolonger mon séjour à Niche pour avoir le temps de bien constater la vérité de ce que je prends la liberté d'avancer, et de pouvoir me faire une idée juste de ce dont les habitants ont besoin pour le progrès de leur prospérité.

Après avoir accompli le récit fidèle de cette partie de ma mission, je demande la permission à votre Majesté Impériale de lui exposer également les renseignements que j'ai recueillis sur l'ensemble de l'Administration

des Provinces que j'ai parcourues, des mesures provisoires que j'ai prises, et les branches de cette Administration qui exigent d'être améliorées promptement et sérieusement. Le mode de fermage des dîmes, l'organisation des zabtiés, l'état des voies de communication, donnent à tous les sujets, sans distinction de religion, de justes raisons de se plaindre. La création de quelques Cours Criminelles offrant aux justiciables toutes les garanties nécessaires est une des réformes qui répondraient aux vœux du pays et au désir paternel de votre Majesté Impériale. Les règlements qui établissent actuellement l'assiette de l'impôt foncier et la perception des impôts indirects (russoumat), exigent également d'être réformés.

Je prends la liberté de déposer au pied du trône de votre Majesté Impériale les dispositions provisoires que j'ai établies dans les Provinces que je viens de visiter, et que j'ai envoyées aux Gouverneurs des contrées où je n'ai pas pu me rendre personnellement, sur plusieurs de ces importantes matières.

Parmi les abus que j'ai constatés, je crois de mon devoir d'en signaler un qui demande aussi une répression prompte et efficace. Je veux parler de la conduite peu édifiante de quelques uns du haut clergé Grec en Roumélie. Tout en rendant justice à la respectabilité de la plupart des membres qui composent ce corps, je ne puis pas m'empêcher d'avancer qu'il y en a qui, méconnaissant la nature de leur mission religieuse, se livrent à des abus indignes à tous points du caractère dont ils sont révêtus. Je me réserve de soumettre sous peu à la sanction de votre Majesté Impériale le travail de la Commission Provisoire que votre Majesté a instituée au Patriarcat sur les conditions de l'éligibilité à l'Episcopat. Il est à espérer que l'exécution religieuse et fidèle de ce règlement mettra fin à cet état de choses qui nuit à la réputation du clergé, en même temps qu'il opprime les Chrétiens.

Le Gouvernement de votre Majesté Impériale, conformément à vos ordres, Sire, s'occupe activement et sérieusement de l'élaboration des projets de lois sur chacun des points en question, projets qui seront soumis sous peu à la haute décision de votre Majesté Impériale.

La Providence a confié, Sire, à votre Majesté Impériale la glorieuse mais difficile tâche de régénérer son grand Empire. Le pas qu'elle a fait faire dans cette voie est immense. Tout le monde reconnait que ce qui, sous vos auspices, a été fait chez nous en dix ans, a dû mettre ailleurs un temps infiniment plus long pour s'accomplir, et occasionner de graves et grandes perturbations. La Turquie doit à votre Majesté Impériale le bienfait d'avoir traversé sans aucune secousse violente la majeure partie de la voie de transition par laquelle elle est appelée à passer.

Certes, nous ne pouvons pas prétendre à la perfection. Notre Administration, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire plus haut, laisse encore à désirer; mais, pour bien juger du présent, c'est-à-dire, pour mieux constater le progrès déjà effectué, il faut se reporter au passé. C'est alors que la réalité et la grandeur de la différence devient frappante. Le cœur magnanime de votre Majesté Impériale doit être consolé toutes les fois qu'elle pensera que ce progrès est l'œuvre absolue de son règne et de son initiative.

J'ajoute ces quelques observations non pas dans le but de conseiller à votre Gouvernement de se contenter de ce qui a été fait et de rester stationnaire: loin de moi cette pensée; je crois, au contraire, que les réformes déjà accomplies doivent servir d'émulation aux Ministres de votre Majesté Impériale pour en introduire d'autres, afin d'atteindre ce degré de prospérité et de sécurité de vos sujets qui est l'objet constant de vos désirs.

J'ai, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 50.

Provisional Instructions issued by the Grand Vizier (in Turkish).

Inclosure 3 in No. 50.

Report of the Mixed Commission on Reported Oppression of Christians in the Province of Bulgaria.

(Traduction du Turc.)

CONFORMEMENT à l'ordre de votre Altesse, nous soussignés, réunis en Conseil-Général avec les membres du Conseil Administratif de la province de Nissa, pour procéder à l'examen et à la vérification des bruits ayant trait à des conversions forcées de quelques femmes Chrétiennes à l'Islamisme, et à des actes d'injustice et de vexation commis sur des Chrétiens de cette province, nous avons fait comparaître devant nous les individus dont la présence a été jugée nécessaire pour recueillir les informations et poursuivre l'instruction des affaires dont le jugement et l'examen nous a été confié.

Par conséquent, nous nous empressons de soumettre à votre Altesse notre rapport contenant le résultat de notre enquête, consigné dans les Articles suivants :—

Article 1. La nommée Bahtichah, femme de Sélim, habitant la commune de Bilanitza, dépendante de l'arrondissement de Vrania, comparue et interrogée sur son ancien nom, le pays de sa naissance, le nom de son père, a répondu qu'elle s'appelait autrefois Stéfana, et que son père, habitant du village Dirénoftza dépendant de la commune susmentionnée, s'appelle Mito. Interrogée aussi sur l'époque de sa conversion et de son mariage avec Sélim, elle a déclaré avoir embrassé l'Islamisme neuf ans auparavant et épousé Sélim deux ans après sa conversion, soit depuis sept ans; à la demande qui lui a été adressée si c'était par force ou bien de son propre mouvement qu'elle fut convertie à l'Islamisme, elle a répondu très catégoriquement que sa conversion avait eu lieu de son propre gré sans la moindre contrainte ni instigation de la part de personne.

Art. 2. La nommée Fatma, épouse de Chaban, habitant du village Polianitza, connu aussi sous le nom de Sékéria, dépendant de l'arrondissement de Leskoftza, interrogée sur les mêmes questions que la précédente, a dit que son ancien nom était Kita, celui de son père Pavlo de Sékéria, qu'elle s'était faite Musulmane il y a douze ans, et qu'elle s'est mariée à Shaban un an et demi après sa conversion, ce qui eut lieu sans la moindre force et de son propre mouvement.

La nommée Cadindjik, belle-fille du dit Pavlo, et actuellement femme de Hussein, originaire de Sékéria et habitant du village Verbéra, pendant l'interrogatoire qu'elle a subi a déclaré qu'elle s'appelait Istoyanka, son père Georgi de Sékéria, que s'étant faite Musulmane il y a seize ans elle épousa Hussein un an après sa conversion, savoir, depuis quinze ans. A la demande qui lui a été adressée si elle fut convertie par force, elle a répondu qu'il n'était donné à personne de lui faire changer de religion, et que c'est de son propre penchant pour l'Islamisme qu'elle l'avait embrassé.

Art. 3. De même la nommée Naziffé, femme de Chérif, habitant du village de Sekéria, interrogée dans le même ordre de questions, a déclaré que son ancien nom était Kita, celui de son père Stéphan de Sekéria, qu'elle s'était faite Musulmane dix ans auparavant et que quatre ans après elle avait épousé Chérif de son propre mouvement sans avoir subi aucune influence dans sa conversion.

Art. 4. Le nommé Bislim Sekéria, mandé par devant notre Conseil, a déclaré qu'il avait épousé sept mois auparavant une nouvelle convertie et vécu avec elle pendant six mois; qu'elle s'est enfuie pendant son absence de sa maison il y a déjà un mois et a disparu depuis; que quoiqu'il eut donné sur le champ avis aux autorités, il lui fut impossible de savoir où elle se trouvait. Cependant cette dernière ayant comparue le lendemain spontanément devant le Conseil, elle s'est plainte de ce que Bislim l'avait convertie et épousée par force; à la suite de cette plainte Bislim a été arrêté et l'examen de l'affaire renvoyé devant le Tribunal Criminel. Par l'interrogatoire que les parties ont subi avant le dit tribunal, il a été constaté que la dite fille s'appelle Stanka, son père Yovo de Serékia, que s'étant rendue de son propre mouvement à Leskoftza elle s'était faite

Musulmane et avait épousé Bislim, dont s'étant ennuyée elle s'est décidée à l'abandonner et à revenir à sa première religion. Quant à son allégation d'avoir été convertie à l'Islamisme par force, il a été prouvé par les témoignages des membres Chrétiens et Musulmans du Conseil de Lescoftza, du prêtre Mito, représentant de l'Evêque, et d'autres individus compétents mandés à cet effet à Nissa, que la dite Stanka s'étant présentée de son propre gré devant le Conseil de Lescoftza pour se faire Musulmane, elle n'y fut admise qu'après avoir subi l'interrogatoire d'usage à l'égard de tous ceux qui désirent embrasser l'Islamisme, formalité qui est remplie dans le Conseil par les membres Chrétiens du Conseil et d'un prêtre; qu'après avoir été constaté que toute espèce de pression avait été étrangère à son désir de se faire Musulmane, elle fut convertie et que un ou deux mois après sa conversion elle épousa Bislim.

Le dit prêtre Mito a déclaré aussi que toutes les autres filles Chrétiennes qui jusqu'à présent s'étaient faites Musulmanes avaient été converties à l'instar de Stanka, de leur propre mouvement, et qu'il n'avait ni vu ni entendu que les autorités locales ou les habitants Musulmans les eussent forcées à changer de religion. Durant la confrontation qui a eu lieu, Stanka n'ayant pas pu persister dans ses dénégations, elle a fini par déclarer que c'est de son propre gré qu'elle s'était faite Musulmane, mais que s'étant repentie plus tard elle désire revenir à la religion de ses pères et y rester jusqu'à sa mort. Le Conseil a décidé de la laisser libre, en même temps qu'il a prononcé l'acquittement de Bislim.

Art. 5. La nommée Fatma, femme de Chérif, habitant de Vrania, interrogée dans le même ordre de questions a répondu que son premier nom était Posso, celui de son père Stocho, habitant du village d'Oucheftza, que s'étant faite Musulmane six ans auparavant elle avait épousé Chérif un an après sa conversion, savoir, depuis cinq ans, et que sa conversion avait eu lieu de son plein gré, sans aucune pression étrangère.

Art. 6. La nommé Djévahir, femme de Destan, habitant du village Dévétan, arrondissement de Vrania, dans l'interrogation qu'elle a subi, déclare que son ancien nom était Tchana, celui de son père Stéphan, habitant du village d'Islovitza, que s'étant faite Musulmane il y a cinq ans, un an après elle avait épousé Destan, et que tant pour sa conversion que pour son mariage elle avait agi en toute liberté de conviction et sans avoir été contrainte par personne.

Art. 7. La nommée Tchélébi, femme d'Abdul, habitant de Lescoftza, ayant été interrogée, a déclaré que son ancien nom était Kouja, celui de son père Yovo, habitant du village de Golémo-Sélo; que s'étant faite Musulmane il y a vingt-huit mois, elle s'était mariée avec Abdul quatre mois après, c'est-à-dire, deux ans auparavant; et après avoir dit que sa conversion avait eu lieu dans toute sa plénitude de sa liberté de conviction, elle s'est adressée aux membres du Conseil et a prononcé les paroles suivantes: "Nous nous sommes faites Musulmanes de notre propre gré. Qui oserait forcer quelqu'un à changer de religion? Vous troublez notre repos." Vu l'état de sa grossesse telle avancée qui a dû ajouter aux fatigues de la route, la dite Tchélébi a été considérée comme excusable dans ses dernières expressions.

Art. 8. La nommée Rabié, femme d'Ayète, habitant du village de Dragocochta, arrondissement de Lescoftza, interrogée dans le même ordre de questions, a déclaré que son nom primitif était Striânka, celui de son père Melissan, habitant du village de Golémo-Sélo, et que ayant embrassé l'Islamisme il y a six ans de son propre gré, trois ans après elle avait epousé Ayète.

Art. 9. La nommée Aïché, femme de Numanagha, connu sous le nom de Limon, habitant du village de Débrayoboschta et décédé en dernier lieu dans la prison de Nissa, a déclaré pendant son interrogatoire que son ancien nom était Gaitana, celui de son père Sova, habitant du village Rébnissa (arrondissement de Vrania); que s'étant faite Musulmane de son propre mouvement, il y a cinq ans, deux ans après elle s'était mariée à Numanagha, et que à cause de sa conversion et de son mariage avec un Musulman le nommé Péiko; voisin de son père, qui n'était pas même de ses parents, a voulu se venger d'elle dans la personne de son mari en accusant ce dernier d'avoir brûlé sa maison, accusation qui a amené la mort du dit

Numan vers la fin du premier mois de son emprisonnement. Elle a terminé en ajoutant, les larmes aux yeux, que son mari était parfaitement innocent, et que c'est à cause d'elle qu'il avait trouvé la mort par suite de la calomnie dont il fut frappé.

Art. 10. La nommée Zahra, femme d'Emin, habitant du village de Carivarza, arrondissement de Lescoftza, étant interrogée, a déclaré que son premier nom était Stoyanu, celui de son père Dimitar, habitant du village de Golémo-Sélo, qu'elle avait, il y a un an, embrassé l'Islamisme, et que cinq mois après sa conversion elle avait épousé Emin de son propre gré, n'ayant subi la moindre pression ni pour sa conversion ni pour son mariage.

Art. 11. La nommée Mersine, femme de l'artilleur Moustafa, habitant de Lescoftza, connu sous le nom de Cara-Bey, a déclaré dans son interrogatoire que son ancien nom était Militza, celui de son père Stoïko, habitant du village de Rabachnitza, et que douze ans auparavant ayant embrassé l'Islamisme de son propre gré, elle avait épousé Moustafa douze ans après cette époque.

Art. 12. La nommée Djemilé, femme de Redjeb, habitant du village de Dobroyantza, arrondissement de Lescoftza, interrogée a déclaré que son premier nom était Stoyana, celui de son père Pavlo, du village de Sekéria, et que s'étant faite Musulmane l'année dernière par sa libre conviction, elle s'était mariée à Redjeb de son propre gré sans aucune pression.

Art. 13. Les femmes susnommées ont de même été interrogés à part et en l'absence de leurs maris et parents, après avoir reçu les assurances nécessaires pour faire leurs déclarations en toute liberté. Pendant ce dernier interrogatoire elles ont déclaré, itérativement et d'une manière catégorique, avoir embrassé l'Islamisme de leur propre gré, en ajoutant ces mots, " Qui serait capable de contraindre qui que ce soit à échanger de religion ?" Les déclarations ont été jugées de nature à dissiper le moindre doute sur l'existence de pression dans ces cas de conversion.

D'un autre côté sur la déclaration de quelques membres du Conseil administratif de n'avoir jamais entendu parler des cas de conversion forcée dans cette province, l'Israélite Echsor Effendi, le plus âgé des membres assistants, a ajouté qu'il ne se rappelait pas avoir vu ou entendu parler jusqu'à ce jour de pareils cas dans la province ; son témoignage a été confirmé à l'unanimité par tous les autres membres présents.

Art. 14. Sur le bruit répandu que dans le village de Golémo-Sélo les Albanais avaient déterré le corps de la nommée Stanka et qu'après l'avoir dépouillé ils l'avaient laissé tout nu sur la place, le Conseil s'est occupé de la vérification du fait et a chargé le Tribunal Criminel de procéder à l'interrogatoire et au jugement du jeune Albanais nommé Békir, auteur de ce méfait et qui, arrêté depuis peu, était incarcéré dans les prisons de Nissa.

Ainsi qu'il appert du rapport circonstancié que le Conseil a dressé à ce sujet sur la sentence rendue par le susdit Tribunal Criminel, le prévenu Bekir a lui-même avoué qu'après que la susdite Stanka avait été enterrée, son cousin Melenko lui avait dit qu'elle était déposée dans le tombeau avec des habits assez précieux, en lui proposant d'aller ouvrir son tombeau pour la dépouiller ; sur quoi ils tombèrent d'accord ; que le soir, Békir s'était rendu au tombeau, et après avoir attendu jusqu'après minuit Melenko, qui ne parut pas, il l'avait ouvert tout seul, et ayant volé les habits de la morte, il l'avait à demi enterrée et s'en était allé. Cet aveu ayant été confirmé par la déclaration de Stéphan, beau-père de la défunte, Békir a été condamné à cinq ans de travaux forcés ; en même temps le nommé Khadji Ali, Kistchaouch ou brigadier de gendarmerie de la localité, convaincu d'avoir non seulement fermé les yeux sur le crime, mais encore forcé Hussein, père de Békir, à lui donner de l'argent, tandis qu'aussitôt qu'il avait eu connaissance de l'événement il avait dû selon ses devoirs arrêter le criminel et le remettre à l'autorité, a été condamné à cinq ans de détention.

Art. 15. Il a été dit qu'un certain Bey Sipahi se rendit avec sa famille, dès le printemps, au village de Billek, et s'étant installé dans une maison dont il avait chassé le propriétaire ainsi que sa famille, il y resta jusqu'à

l'hiver en obligeant les villageois à lui envoyer tous les jours deux jeunes femmes pour servir dans sa cuisine, et qu'il ne laissait jamais partir ces femmes sans avoir assouvi sur elles sa passion brutale, le Conseil ayant fait des recherches pour éclaircir cette affaire, est parvenu à apprendre qu'il se trouve parmi les habitants de Nissa deux frères nommés Rachid Aga et Salih Aga, lesquels possèdent dans le susdit village une ferme où ils avaient chacun leurs tours et leurs maisons qu'ils occupaient toutes les fois qu'ils s'y rendaient ; que la maison de Salih Aga ayant été brûlée il y a longtemps par une bande de voleurs sortie de la Servie et ses moyens ne lui ayant pas permis de la rebâtir jusqu'à présent il est obligé de se loger chaque fois qu'il se rend à la ferme, dans la maison de son frère.

D'un autre côté le dit Salih ainsi que son frère Rachid sont, d'après les informations prises, des gens âgés et honnêtes.

De même les renseignements pris sur les lieux ont démontré qu'aucune plainte n'a jamais été portée contre ces hommes, et que les villageois n'ont jamais été inquiétés ni par ceux-ci ni par aucune autre personne appelée Bey Sipahi ou portant tout autre nom.

Le Conseil a conclu que cette nouvelle était tout-à-fait dénuée de fondement, d'autant plus qu'il est difficile de supposer qu'un homme qui se rend à la campagne accompagné de sa femme et de sa famille puisse s'y livrer à de pareils actes.

Art. 16. On a avancé que le nommé Sipahi Kiudji Alioglou Hadji, s'étant rendu du village de Tchokote, y avait déshonoré le nommé Dimitri, beau garçon renommé pour son adresse au maniement du djerid (espèce de javelot), et qu'après s'être rendu chez le père de Dimitri et diverti avec la fille de la maison, il avait fini ses exploits en injuriant et en maltraitant les habitants du village.

Le Conseil est allé aux informations et ayant appris que le nommé Kindji-oglou Ali Aga et ses frères possédaient une ferme dans le susdit village, il a fait comparaître le susdit Ali Aga et le jeune Dimitri avec sa sœur Kouja et leur mère Tzevéta.

Dimitri n'est qu'un enfant de 11 à 12 ans sur lequel il est impossible de supposer qu'on eût exercé les violences qui ont été alléguées ; aussi le Conseil a-t-il interrogé la mère Tzevéta et la fille Kouja si elles n'avaient rien à exposer et à se plaindre de quelqu'un et surtout des propriétaires de la ferme, pour ce qui touche à leur honneur ou à leurs biens.

Tzevéta a exposé que veuve depuis dix ans et privée de demeure, vu que sa maison avait été brûlée, elle habitait avec ses enfants la maison qu'Ali Aga possède dans le village ; qu'elles étaient contentes sous tous les rapports d'Ali Aga ; qu'elles n'avaient aucune plainte contre personne ni pour leur honneur ni pour leurs biens, mais que le frère d'Ali Aga nommé Molta Edhem leur ayant pris un champ de chauvre qu'elles cultivaient de tout temps et l'ayant réuni à son jardin, elles en demandent la restitution.

Ali Aga interrogé à son tour, répondu que bien qu'effectivement le champ en question leur eut été pris, cela ne s'était pas passé sans leur volonté, attendu qu'elles avaient reçu en échange un autre bien meilleur. Tzevéta et sa fille ont nié le fait d'un tel échange. Comme d'après le règlement concernant les fermes de Nissa promulgué dans l'année 1275, il est défendu aux propriétaires des fermes d'enlever aux paysans la moindre partie des terres qu'ils auraient de tout temps cultivées, le Conseil a engagé Ali Aga à restituer le champ en question à ces femmes et à les dédommager en même temps, moyennant de l'argent, de la perte du produit à une année, ce à quoi Ali Aga a promis de se conformer complètement.

Ce différend ainsi arrangé, le Conseil a demandé de nouveau aux femmes si elles n'avaient pas d'autres plaintes contre Ali Aga ou son frère. Tzevéta a répété qu'elle était contente d'Ali Aga et a déclaré n'avoir pas non plus de plaintes contre son frère Edhem.

Mais sa fille Kouja a formulé une nouvelle plainte contre Edhem, en ce qu'il avait construit il y a quatre ans sa maison sur le terrain de la cour de leur maison incendiée, et elle a demandé qu'il enlève de là la dite construction et leur rende leur terrain. Comme ce fait avait eu lieu avant la promulgation du susdit réglement, et qu'il serait très préjudiciable au

propriétaire d' abattre aujourd'hui la maison pour rendre le terrain aux réclamants, le Conseil a proposé qu'on leur donne en compensation un autre terrain dans un autre endroit. Mais la fille Kouja a déclaré ne point accepter cette proposition, vu qu'elle ne pouvait pas s'éloigner de sa demeure habituelle, et elle a ajouté que comme elles restaient, ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, dans la maison que le propriétaire avait fait bâtir pour lui-même, il n'y aurait pas d'inconvénient pour elle si le propriétaire y venait demeurer avec sa famille; qu'il n'en serait pas de même des domestiques d'Edhem s'ils venaient encore demeurer dans la maison attenante qu'il y a fait expressement bâtir pour ses gens; qu'enfin elles seraient complètement satisfaites si le corps de logis pour les domestiques était supprimé et si elles continuaient à demeurer dans la maison du propriétaire.

Pour arranger ce point, le Conseil a envoyé au dit village deux membres du Grand Conseil, Hadji Hassan Aga et Hadji Pécho, lesquels à leur retour ont rapporté qu'ils avaient fait restituer aux villageoises leur champ; et que ayant au terrain de la maison, le propriétaire leur avait donné, en dédommagement et à la satisfaction des parties, la maison que Molla Edhem avait construite pour ses domestiques. Les deux membres du Conseil ont ajouté qu'ayant aussi interrogé les autres habitants du village sur le compte des propriétaires de la ferme, ceux-ci avaient déclaré qu'ils n'avaient aucun grief ou plainte contre eux.

Ces messieurs ont donné au Conseil un rapport signé par eux concernant leur mission. De plus tous les membres du Conseil Administratif ont donné des assurances positives sur l'honnêteté d'Ali Aga, qui a toujours fait preuve d'une conduite irréprochable.

Art. 17. On a avancé qu'Abbas Bey, propriétaire du village Malouchta, se rendait à Malochichta, entrait chez Dedé Youvan, faisait asseoir celui-ci à côté de lui et se faisait servir de l'eau de vie par sa fille; qu'il avait emmené une fois cette fille au village de Mekteb, et après l'avoir retenu auprès de lui pendant trois nuits il l'avait renvoyée chez son père et avait fait venir ensuite chez lui la fille d'un certain Marian, laquelle il avait également gardée dans sa maison pendant quelques jours; que le dit Abbas Bey prenait de chaque village une jeune fille qu'il déshonorait.

Comme le susdit Youvan a présenté aussi une pétition contre Abbas Bey, le Conseil a dû mander les parties et procéder à l'instruction de l'affaire. Comme une partie de la ferme appartient à l'un des négociants de Nissa, nommé Sotiraki, et que l'autre se trouve être la propriété, en commun, d'Abbas Bey, de son frère, et de ses neveux, comme enfin les paysans avaient présenté dans une pétition des plaintes contre Abbas Bey et contre Sotiraki, il a fallu appeler également ce dernier.

Le jugement de cette affaire est consigné en détail dans deux rapports séparés.

D'après ces rapports, il est constaté qu'Abbas Bey n'était pas coupable des actes de la nature énoncée ci-dessus, et que les plaintes portées contre lui par Dedé Youvan ne consistaient qu'en des prétentions non fondées sur la possession d'un petit terrain et d'une partie de forêt.

Toutefois le Conseil a mandé en sa présence tous les deux et a démandé de nouveau à Dedé Youvan s'il avait ou non d'autres plaintes ou griefs contre Abbas Bey. Dedé Youvan a déclaré que ses réclamations n'étaient relatives qu'au terrain et au bois en question, et qu'il n'avait aucun autre grief contre Abbas Bey. Comme en vertu du jugement rendu, Dedé Youvan a été déclaré non fondé dans ses prétentions relatives au terrain et au bois, le Conseil a donné une ordonnance de non lieu. Le Conseil est allé ensuite aux informations au sujet des bruits qui avaient couru sur la fille de Marian; mais il lui a été rapporté qu'il n'y avait pas dans cette contrée de village de nom de Mekteb.

Pourtant le Conseil ayant appris qu'il existait dans le village de Mekich, sis dans l'arrondissement d'Urkub, deux hommes nommés Marian, et trois autres portant le même nom dans le village de Malochtina, de l'arrondissement de Nissa, il n'a pas manqué de faire venir les cinq individus ci-dessus.

Des trois Marians de Malochtina, deux se sont trouvées être des enfants, et le troisième un jeune homme de vingt-cinq ans marié depuis deux ans. Quant aux deux autres homonymes venus du village de Mekich, l'un n'était de même qu'un jeune berger, et l'autre un homme âgé et père de famille.

Interrogé celui-ci a déclaré qu'il n'a aucune plainte contre personne, qu'il n'avait été inquiété de qui que ce soit, et que ses trois filles étaient déjà depuis dix, quinze et vingt ans mariées et demeuraient dans d'autres villages. Sur l'interpellation qui lui a été ensuite adressée, s'il connaissait Abbas Bey et si ce dernier fréquentait ou non sa maison; si enfin lui Marian ou ses co-villageois avaient eu à se plaindre de la conduite d'Abbas Bey, Marian répond qu'il connait très bien Abbas Bey, que deux ou trois ans auparavant il était allé chez lui, mais que ni lui Marian ni les autres villageois n'avaient jamais eu à se plaindre de sa conduite. C'est la main sur le cœur qu'il atteste la probité d'Abbas Bey.

Ainsi par le témoignage de cet homme également, il a été prouvé que les imputations à l'adresse d'Abbas Bey étaient entièrement sans fondement.

Art. 18. Sur le bruit répandu que le nommé Mousli Sipahi ayant voulu séduire la femme de Zovanka, habitant du village de Fosadje, et ce dernier s'étant opposé à ses poursuites, il avait assommé le mari avec une cruche d'eau et attenté à l'honneur de sa femme, les informations nécessaires ont été prises, par suite desquelles il a été constaté que personne dans cette localité n'avait connaissance de la perpétration d'un pareil crime, et que l'individu connu sous le nom de Mousli Sipahi demeurait à Urkub et non point dans le village précité.

Le dit individu, mandé et interrogé par devant le Conseil a déclaré qu'il avait été antérieurement propriétaire d'une ferme qu'il avait vendue il y a plus de dix années; qu'à l'heure qu'il est, il sert comme simple soldat dans la gendarmerie à cheval d'Urkub, et qu'enfin il n'existe jusqu'à ce jour aucune personne de sa connaissance du nom de Zovanka. Aucune plainte ni réclamation n'ayant été adressée contre le dit zaptieh, il n'y avait plus lieu de l'interroger; en conséquence la permission lui a été accordée d'en retourner à Urkub.

Comme à la suite des recherches faites dans le village susnommé et aux environs, il ne s'est pas trouvé d'individu du nom de Zovanka, il a été reconnu que la relation ci-dessus était sans fondement.

Art. 19. Le bruit avait couru que le nommé Hadji Ali, l'un des hommes de la suite du Pacha Gouverneur, se rendant au village de Chébète avait voulu attenter à l'honneur de la fille et de la bru d'un vieillard sexagénaire nommé Stamenko, que celui-ci parvint à dérober les femmes à ses exigences, et que là dessus le dit Hadji Ali fit saisir le vieillard par ses camarades et consomma sur sa personne l'acte de sodomie. Stamenko ayant adressé une pétition concernant ses plaintes contre Hadji Ali, ils ont été tous les deux mandés et interrogés par devant notre Conseil.

Bien que les bruits ci-dessus ne soient pas tout-à-fait dénués de fondement, cependant les détails diffèrent de l'ensemble des déclarations de Stamenko, en ce sens, que selon les propres aveux du plaignant, celui-ci a, il est vrai, deux filles parvenues à un âge mur, mais elles sont mariées et habitent un autre village que le sien; que ses deux autres filles qui restent auprès de lui sont encore petites, et que ses deux garçons âgés de quatorze et quinze ans n'étant pas encore mariés, il n'a point de brus; qu'enfin Hadji Ali n'avait jamais mis les pieds dans sa maison.

Néanmoins il se plaint que n'ayant pu payer au dit Hadji Ali la somme de 100 piastres qu'il lui devait pour droit d'affermages, son créancier s'était rendu au village de Chébète, et avait envoyé chez lui son employé Sélim dans le but de recouvrir son argent; que là dessus lui-même s'étant enfui au village de Kirtop, le dit Hadji Ali s'était rendu à Ofsinscha et l'ayant fait venir auprès de lui par l'entremise du dit Sélim, envoyé par lui à Kirtop, il avait commis sur sa personne l'acte de sodomie et perçu l'argent en question. Hadji Ali interrogé sur ces faits déclare qu'il n'avait même pas vu ce jour là la figure de Stamenko, qu'il n'avait jamais commis de pareils actes infâmes, et qu'il en est innocent.

Bien que en considérant l'âge de cinquante et cinquante-cinq ans de Stamenko il ne pourrait entrer dans la pensée de personne qu'il put avoir été victime d'un pareil outrage; que d'ailleurs, outre que les témoignages

recueillis indiquent que le prévenu n'a pas un caractère si pervers, la conscience aussi des personnes qui seraient dans le cas d'examiner les figures des parties et de suivre les phases du procès attesterait que la perpétration d'un pareil crime sur le plaignant serait par soi-même impossible, néanmoins, pour acquit de conscience, l'affaire a été référée à l'examen minutieux des Juges d'Instruction.

La Cour Criminelle, après avoir procédé à l'interrogatoire des parties et aux investigations nécessaires, a dressé les pièces d'interrogatoire suivies d'un appendice ou forme de conclusion, desquelles il ressort que la nature des griefs de Stamenko est une sorte de calomnie; que d'un autre côté Hadji Ali ne dit pas la vérité en affirmant que Stamenko n'était jamais venu à Ofsinteha; qu'il paraîtrait enfin que ce jour là il aurait battu le plaignant, et que ce dernier, irrité de cette manière d'agir d'Ali Aga, a intenté son procès sous cette forme.

Le plaignant et le prévenu ont été mandés et interrogés de nouveau par devant notre Conseil, et quoiqu'ils aient persisté dans leurs déclarations précédentes, tous les membres ont émis unanimement l'opinion que Hadji Ali a dû avoir maltraité Stamenko, soit en lui portant des coups soit en l'intimidant avec des injures; et que le dit Stamenko, afin d'aggraver la culpabilité du prévenu, lui a imputé un acte qui ne pourrait entrer dans la pensée de personne.

Suivant le rapport dressé à ce sujet par notre Conseil, le dit Hadji Ali a été condamné à un mois d'emprisonnement.

Art. 20. Etant parvenu à notre connaissance que les fils de Tossoun Aga, après avoir séduit les deux filles d'un habitant du village de Stoikofteha, les avaient entraînées avec eux et forcées à embrasser l'Islamisme, les informations nécessaires ont été prises.

Il en résulte que le dit Tossoun Aga a eu trois fils nommés Hadji Yachar, Moustapha, et Mehmet; que les deux derniers, Mehmet et Moustapha, sont morts, et que Hadji Yachar vit encore. Celui-ci mandé et interrogé, déclare qu'effectivement ils étaient trois frères dont l'un Mehmet est mort, il y a cinq ans, à l'âge de dix-huit ans, et l'autre Moustapha depuis trois ans et demi, à l'âge de vingt-huit ans; que lui-même après avoir servi pendant treize ans dans l'armée d'Arabie est venu à Nissa, il y a deux ans; qu'il s'était marié avant son incorporation dans l'armée; que ses frères, mariés bien avant leur mort, s'étaient tous unis à des Musulmans, et qu'aucun d'eux n'avait eu des épouses converties.

Comme le dit Hadji Yachar est un homme âgé et honorable, et que depuis longtemps il ne s'était pas trouvé dans cette ville, comme enfin ses frères sont morts, et que par suite des renseignements recueillis aucun fait de ce genre n'avait eu lieu dans la localité mentionnée plus haut, le Conseil a reconnu qu'il n'y avait pas lieu à adresser d'autres questions au susdit Yachar.

Art. 21. Ayant ouï dire que le nommé Serdar Popota après avoir enlevé de force un jeune garçon âgé de quatre ans, fils du nommé Tzévéta, habitant du village de Kotlètre, l'avait converti à l'Islamisme, le Conseil manda du village précité le dit Tzévéta.

Interrogé s'il a ou non des griefs contre quelqu'un, le dit Tzévéta a exposé ce qui suit. L'année dernière un individu ayant frappé son neveu avec une pierre, celui-ci mourut le lendemain; et bien qu'il ait porté le fait à la connaissance de l'autorité, son procès n'a point été examiné jusqu'à ce jour.

Il en demande en conséquence le jugement. Après avoir référé au Tribunal Criminel l'interrogatoire et le jugement de Hussein, inculpé dans cette circonstance, le Conseil demande à Tzévéta s'il a un grief ou procès contre quelque autre individu. Sur sa réponse négative la question suivante lui est posée:—"Il paraît que vous avez un fils de quatre ans; il a été emmené par force à Nissa, et fait Musulman: c'est ainsi que nous avons entendu dire." "Non," repond-il, "cela n'est pas exact; mes enfants demeurent jusqu'aujourd'hui avec moi. Ainsi que je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, mon défont neveu avant laissée un enfant de quatre ans, je l'avais effectivement conduit à cette époque à Nissa, mais je ne l'avais pas emmené pour qu'il devienne Mahométan; c'était pour le présenter aux autorités, comme quoi son père ayant été tué, l'enfant était resté orphelin. A mon retour, je l'ai

laissé comme enfant adoptif dans la maison d'un Chrétien, attendu qu'il n'avait personne pour le soigner."

D'après les renseignements fournis par des personnes compétentes, le Serdar Popota est un vieillard infirme de 95 ans, connu sous le nom de Popota, demeurant à Nissa. Il n'y a eu aucune nécessité de le questionner, aussi ne l'a-t-on point mandé.

Quant au procès de meurtre susmentionné, l'autorité locale, aussitôt qu'elle en avait été alors informée, avait fait venir le plaignant et le nommé Hussein sous le coup d'accusation d'assassinat dans cette circonstance; ce dernier déclaré innocent avait été mis en liberté. Cette fois de même, à la suite de la réclamation de Tzévéta, la Cour Criminelle, après avoir mis en état d'arrestation et jugé Hussein, a rendu une sentence confirmée par le Grand Conseil de la province.

Par le rapport ci-annexé, basé sur la dite sentence, et émané de notre Conseil, on pourra se convaincre que cette fois encore l'innocence du dit Hussein a été prouvée.

Art. 22. Sur le bruit que Abbas Bey et Malik Bey auraient fait démolir les maisons solidement bâties des nommés Svetko et Marco, et qu'ils auraient blasphémé leur religion, ont été mandés avec le dit Abbas Bey, les dits Svetko et Marco, le premier du village de Sausarinovtza, et le second du village de Garika, de l'arrondissement de Urkub.

Svetko interrogé en premier lieu a répondu qu'il n'a aucun procès pour maisons contre personne, mais qu'il en a deux contre Hadji Moustapha Aga, notable du pays, savoir:—

1. Quatre ans auparavant le dit Aga ayant affermé les dîmes du village de Sausarinoftza, il avait à l'époque du dépiéage des grains, porté des coups à son frère.

2. L'employé de l'Aga s'étant rendu à son village, et ayant voulu faire transporter le maïs provenant de la perception des dîmes du même produit vendu par lui à raison de 80 piastres le kilo à un autre village, il s'était convenu avec l'employé d'acheter le maïs en question pour son propre compte au même prix, et au moment où il allait en effectuer le payement au dit employé, celui-ci s'était refusé à recevoir l'argent, engageant le dit Svetko à le remettre plus tard entre les mains de l'Aga; qu'à la suite de cette condition acceptée de part et d'autre, il avait emmagasiné le maïs, et lorsqu'il s'était rendu auprès du dit Hadji Moustapha Aga pour lui remettre l'argent, ce dernier n'avait rien voulu recevoir à moins qu'il ne lui payât à raison de 100 piastres le kilo; or, comme il avait mêlé déjà le maïs acheté par lui avec les produits lui appartenant, il avait été obligé de souscrire à la dite demande d'augmentation. Il réclame par conséquent la restitution de l'excédant.

Tout d'abord le Conseil a procédé à l'enquête des coups, ainsi qu'à l'audition séparément des témoins emmenés par Svetko.

Les attestations ont été contradictoires les unes avec les autres, et après la confrontation, les témoins eux-mêmes s'étant aperçus de leurs contradictions, l'un deux s'adressant aux autres leur a dit à la face qu'ils ne s'étaient pas trouvés ce jour là sur les lieux.

En présence de cette déclaration tous sont restés confus, et de cette manière la question des coups portés n'a pu être démontrée. En ce qui concerne l'autre procès, celui-ci entrant dans la catégorie des droits civils, un arrangement à l'amiable s'est opéré, par payement d'une certaine somme; le procès a donc été résolu.

Puis le dit Marco, interrogé par nous, a fait les déclarations ci-après. Né au village de Garika il s'est établi et marié depuis dix ans à Urkub; il n'a eu et n'a à l'heure qu'il est aucune plainte ou réclamation contre personne tant à Garika qu'à Urkub.

A la question de savoir au juste si la maison avait été démolie par quelqu'un ainsi que le bruit en avait couru, il a répondu qu'il n'avait subi aucune vexation de ce genre ni à Urkub, ni antérieurement à Garika; qu'il demeurerait jusqu'aujourd'hui dans sa maison et que sa seule réclamation consistait en la demande d'autorisation de retourner dans son pays pour vaquer à ses affaires. Cette autorisation lui a été immédiatement accordée.

Ainsi ces bruits ont été reconnus comme n'ayant absolument aucun

fondement, et il n'y a plus eu lieu de questionner davantage Abbas Bey et Malik Bey.

Nonobstant cela, Malik Bey a été mandé séparément, et à la question à lui faite s'il avait ou non connaissance d'une pareille démolition, n'importe dans quelle localité, il a répliqué qu'il n'avait été ni vu ni entendu un pareil évènement.

Tel est le résultat exposé succinctement de nos recherches et de notre procédure à l'égard des vingt-deux points dont l'examen nous avait été confié par votre Altesse.

Nissa, le 17 *Safer,* 1277 (4 *Septembre,* 1860).

(Signé) AFIF, *Chancellier du Divan Impérial.*
BESSIM, *Membre du Grand Conseil de Justice.*
DJEVDET, *Membre du Haut Conseil du Tanzimat.*
P. MUSURUS.
PHOTIADI.
GABRIEL.
ARTIN DADIAN.

Appendice écrit par le Grand Conseil de la Province de Nissa.

La Commission Spéciale chargée de l'examen des faits ci-dessus nous ayant appelés dans son sein, nous avons assisté aux examens depuis le commencement jusqu'à leur fin, qui ont eu lieu exactement de la manière ci-dessus décrite, ce que nous confirmons par cet appendice en y apposant nos signatures et nos sceaux.

Nissa, le 18 *Safer,* 1277 (5 *Septembre,* 1860).

Gouverneur-Général,
(Signé) OSMAN PASHA.
Mouhassebedji *ad interim,*
TAKOUB.
HAKIM, *Membre du Conseil.*
MUFTI, *Membre du Conseil.*
Métropolitain,
CALLINIQUE.
MOUSTAPHA, *Membre du Conseil.*
HADJI HASSAN, *Membre du Conseil.*
SELAM, *Membre du Conseil.*
HADJI MOUSTAPHA, *Membre du Conseil.*
Membre Chrétien,
HADJI PECHO,
Présent dans toutes les séances du Conseil, mais absent pour affaires lors de signature.
Membre Chrétien,
HADJI MITO.
Membre Israélite,
ESHTER.

No. 51.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 706.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1860.

I HAVE received from M. Musurus, the Ambassador of the Sublime Porte, a copy of the report made by his Highness the Grand Vizier to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to perceive that the mode of farming the dimes, the Courts of Criminal Justice, and the police, are pointed out as subjects upon which the reforms of existing abuses are required.

The Sultan's Government may rest assured that public opinion in this country will not support the Ottoman Porte, except on the condition that

those reforms are undertaken and carried into effect in practice as well as in name.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 52.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 810.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1860.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 638 of the 15th November. I quite agree with M. Thouvenel that if the Local Councils are maintained, their bases should be reformed, and that a larger opening should be made for the Christian element. But it is most important that the attributes of these Councils should in such case be clearly defined and properly restricted.

My opinion is that the worst evil that can possibly occur to Turkey is to give these bodies any power that is not strictly confined to local affairs. It is just the creation of such Councils throughout the Empire which has unhorsed authority, and rendered responsibility a shadow.

The great thing is to establish, for a time at least, personal responsibility, to have some one who, when matters go wrong, can be punished. Local Councils having any action in general affairs will either be chosen against the Governor and systematically oppose him, further increasing one of the great evils at the present time, viz., administrative weakness; or they will be chosen under his influence and systematically support him, thus becoming the excuse for his misdeeds, and sheltering the other vice of the time, corruption.

This will, in some degree, depend upon whether the Governor flatters the local prejudices or not.

Now, the only chance of introducing good government into Turkey is, for a time, from the centre; because, there alone the influence of enlightened Europe is felt.

The plan to pursue, is to make the Government of the Porte responsible for its agents; to make agents responsible for their conduct to the Porte; and, as I have said, by individualizing as much as possible responsibility, keeping things clearly in a particular direction.

Later, a larger system may be adopted. But to create Local Councils with large powers, and on an electoral basis at this time, is to establish in each province, not only a state of confusion, destructive of all government, but to develope as the element of government precisely that ignorant passion and prejudice which is most alive in the provinces, and which, if the different classes of the Empire have to be amalgamated, must be gradually destroyed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 53.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 814.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1860.

I TRANSMITTED to Aali Pasha a French translation of your Lordship's despatch No. 619 of the 9th November, relative to the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856, drawing his serious attention to the inquiries made by your Lordship, and requesting to be favoured with an early reply thereto, and his Highness informed me that he would send me an answer in writing in a few days.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 54.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 817.)

Constantinople, December 5, 1860.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and read the report of Lord Cowley's conversation with M. de Thouvenel as to the finances of Turkey, and your Lordship's reply thereto.

I venture to confess that I am not myself entirely of the opinion held by M. de Thouvenel as to the irretrievable position of the Turkish exchequer, but, on the other hand, I do think it in the most critical position.

Your Lordship, on turning to my various communications, will see that I have constantly held before you the fact that the budget of annual receipt and expenditure gives but an illusory idea of the situation, unless you couple it with the fact that few or none of the receipts in this budget are available for a year to come, and that all the expenses, aggravated by arrears, are going on.

I have said often, and repeat now, that it is impossible to get the Turkish finances into anything like order without starting fair—by consolidating or paying pressing debts, and then leaving the State to commence and continue its service on a fixed and regular basis.

The various plans I suggested had all reference to this necessity, and the only question that could arise was as to the most safe and least expensive mode of meeting it.

The new loan has two disadvantages; it is contracted on the most disastrous terms, and is insufficient for what it is intended.

The least that the Turkish Government requires in order to set itself right is 10,000,000*l.* These 10,000,000*l.*, procured without the payment of any extraordinary interest, would give the Porte a fair chance of pursuing a new system.

Less than this would be a mere temporary expedient, and still leave behind it the old method of short loans at usurious interest.

If the Governments of France and England could have got this 10,000,000*l.* for Turkey on reasonable conditions, and with such obligations on the part of Turkey as to their application as would have made it certain that they were not misapplied, this would have been the best as well as the simplest mode of proceeding.

That being impossible, I am still convinced that the wise thing for Turkey was to have endeavoured to raise the sum she must, if she is to begin a career of order, obtain, as much as possible out of her own resources; and amongst the most efficacious and least expensive means she could have resorted to, was a paper money founded on adequate security for its convertibility, and which in fact, with the sole security of the income she now pledges, would have got her the amount without interest, which she is now obtaining on the most usurious conditions.

What course it may at this moment be wise to adopt, I will not pretend to point out; but my opinion is that if the Turkish Government can now finally deal with and settle its irregular encumbrances, and organize a proper financial administration, it may in two or three years be in a prosperous financial condition. On the other hand, if it does not put itself in an entirely new position in regard to past debts and obligations, and if it does not also thoroughly reorganize its financial administration, its financial ruin is certain, and will only be rendered more complete by the recent contract.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 55.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 819.)

Constantinople, December 5, 1860.

My Lord,

I SHOULD mention to your Lordship that notwithstanding my invitation to the Representatives to meet and privately discuss amongst ourselves the measures of reform which it might be most advisable to suggest to the Porte, no meeting has taken place: the French and Russian Representatives requiring instructions; the Russian rather objecting to the introduction of the Sardinian Minister into the project; and the Internuncio considering that as the Porte promises reforms, it would be better to leave it the initiative.

Under these circumstances there has been nothing for me to do but to urge the Porte to adopt such measures at once as will satisfy any reasonable expectations, and thereby prevent the necessity for that advice which it appears unwilling to receive.

The measure, I confess, to which I should attach the most practical importance, is that of sending Commissioners with sufficient powers into the provinces, and charging them with the task of introducing the few simple and necessary measures required, and which are mentioned in my note to my colleagues. The appointment of such Commissioners, with adequate instructions, and the communication of such instructions to the Representatives, is, however, I think, the least that can suffice.

I shall write more on this subject by the next messenger; at the same time it is satisfactory to think that Her Majesty's Government has so clearly shown that whilst it is desirous to maintain the Ottoman Empire, it is equally anxious to see its administration improved and strengthened.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 56.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 726.)

Foreign Office, December 20, 1860.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches Nos. 810, 814, and 819, of the 5th instant.

In the first of these despatches your Excellency combats the opinion expressed by M. Thouvenel, that it would be expedient to extend the constitution and sphere of action of Local Councils, and you maintain, on the contrary, that the attention of such Councils should be restricted to local matters, and that no measure should at present be adopted which would relieve the Porte from direct responsibility for the acts of those agents, or those agents from their responsibility to the Porte. In the last of these despatches, you state that circumstances having prevented the Representatives from meeting together for the discussion of measures of reform to be submitted to the Porte, you had urged the Porte to adopt spontaneously such measures of reform as would satisfy any reasonable expectations, and render it unnecessary for the Representatives to offer to the Porte any advice on the subject.

I have to state to you, in reply, that I agree generally in the opinion which you express in the first despatch.

It is, nevertheless, to be observed, that if Christians are to be admitted to take part in the administration of affairs in Turkey, they can only be so admitted as far as Local Councils are concerned. It is scarcely to be supposed that any Christian would be allowed to hold one of the great offices at Constantinople.

With regard to the question of reforms, you will state to Aali Pasha that the friends of Turkey wish to see reforms effectively introduced and vigorously prosecuted; while the enemies of Turkey desire them to be

postponed or refused, in order that a ground may thereby be laid for the dissolution of the Empire.

The worst vice of the old system is that the Governor of a Province bribed the Ministers for his appointment; the officials of the Province bribed the Pasha for liberty to oppress; and the tax collectors bribed the officials for license to rob. That the Empire has been governed by what a great Irish orator called, in reference to his own country in former times, "a subordination of vultures."

Unless this vicious system is totally abandoned, no instructions or edicts will do any good.

You will state this to the Grand Vizier in the clearest terms which are compatible with courtesy towards the Minister of a friendly Power.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 57.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 727.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1860.

WITH reference to the statement in your despatch No. 817 of the 5th instant, that if the Governments of France and England could have got 10,000,000*l.* for Turkey on reasonable conditions it would have been the best and simplest mode of proceeding, I have to inform you that it was unreasonable to expect that England and France should obtain 10,000,000*l.* upon their own credit for Turkey without having the entire management of Turkish finances. France refused to undertake this management, and Aali Pasha refused to grant it, and so the project fell to the ground.

I should wish to be informed whether, in your opinion, it would be of any use now to send an English Commissioner to Constantinople, not to serve as a financial screen, but to ascertain the truth.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 58.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 794.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 28, 1860.

I INCLOSE the report of the French and English Commissioners with respect to the state of Turkish finances and the manner in which they have themselves been employed, and deem they ought to have been employed in reference thereto.

M. de Plœuc, the French Commissioner, is here especially for the sole purpose of attending to the Commission, of which he is a member, and consequently he gives up all his time to the object, and keeps his Ambassador constantly informed on it.

Mr. Falconnet, although he is perfectly willing to give such information from time to time when asked for it, is Director of the Ottoman Bank, and generally engaged in business as well as Financial Commissioner, and cannot, therefore, amidst his various other occupations, attend to this especial one so systematically or assiduously as his colleague.

With respect to the inclosed report, for instance, M. de Lavalette had it on the Monday or Friday—mine did not get to my hands till the Wednesday following; and as the post was going off there was neither time to read nor to copy it, and still less to make those observations on it which it might require.

I shall have some further remarks to make on this subject on a future occasion.

But what I say now is not in the nature of a complaint against

Mr. Falconnet's unwillingness to do what he can to assist me, but rather in explanation of the fact that he cannot, from the nature of things, do so much for me as M. de Plœuc can do for the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 59.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 797.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, November* 28, 1860.

THE first section of the Report inclosed in my despatch No. 794 of this date explains the conditions on which the European Commission was originally instituted, the changes it underwent, the privileges it was invested with, and the imperfect manner in which it was allowed the practical exercise of those privileges.

The second section refers to the budget and its results. The fact respecting these affairs is simply this:—I obtained the appointment of the European Commission; it then consisted of six members, three Europeans, three Turks; the functions of the Commission were to aid the Ottoman Government in all questions of financial administration, and organize a system of financial reform.

The Commission had already been employed for some time on these subjects, the Government not making the use it might of the able persons placed at its disposal, but these still advancing in their labours, when the question of an European loan came upon the tapis.

The Ottoman Government at once wished to do something that would attract European attention, and be considered by Europe as a certain guarantee for the money it wanted to borrow. It reconstituted, consequently, the existing Commission, invested it nominally with more privileges, and placed Rushdi Pasha with some pomp and ceremony at its head.

I was myself for extending the functions of the Commission by a definition as to what those functions should be, and of making a portion of those functions obligatory.

I was against extending the number of the Commission from six to nine, which was now done, I rather believe at the French Ambassador's suggestion, on the plea that the members should be three Rayahs, three Turks, and three Europeans, an arrangement which overpowered the European element; I approved of the choice of Rushdi Pasha as President, but I thought a great deal of the fuss made on the occasion might have been spared.

All that was necessary, in fact, was to maintain the former Commission; define clearly what powers it might be called upon to exercise, and what powers it was absolutely obliged to exercise; and give it a President who could devote his efforts exclusively to the subjects with which the Commission would be engaged.

The rest struck me as clap-trap, and so it more or less turned out. The new Commission has, in point of fact, little more authority than the old one, and has, in fact, been merely useful in carrying out the formation of the Budget in which the first Commission had been occupied.

The European Commissioners were in both instances the same; but difficulties now constantly arose between the Commissioners and the Porte, on account of that want of distinctness for which I had contended with respect to the things which the Commission might do, and those which it was bound to do; and for various reasons easy to divine, the Turks had some reluctance as to reposing an entire confidence in a foreign body.

With respect to the Budget now given, I do not think that the principal facts seem quite sufficiently clear, although they are alluded to, and even stated.

The Budget is, as I have said before, partly imaginary; for about a

million and a-half are taken off as future reductions, without any statement or knowledge as to how these reductions are to be effected. The Budget, moreover, is wholly a prospective one, since several months', if not a year's, revenue is, as I have frequently observed, made over by anticipation as security for various loans raised and spent.

Nothing, as far as I can see, is taken into account for claims not yet decided, and which will amount to a considerable sum; nor does it seem to me made sufficiently conspicuous that the deficit which the Commissioners say presses upon the Treasury, is the sum of debts I have so often spoken of as assigned to Galata merchants.

I am likewise by no means sure that the arrears due to the troops are included; sufficient, however, appears to show—

1st. That the sum now borrowed is insufficient to meet the urgent demands of the Porte.

2ndly. That the Porte has added nearly 1,500,000*l.* sterling to the side of its expenditure on a balance-sheet which only reduces itself to a tolerable equality between receipt and expenditure by 1,500,000*l.* of unspecified reduction.

3rdly. That notwithstanding this very unsatisfactory state of things, nothing would be so easy as for the Turkish Government to restore its finances by skilful and prudent management.

The examples which M. de Plœuc, who was employed on the Greek finances, draws from Greece, testify to this conclusively. But, on the other hand, I think it equally clear that without such skilful and prudent management, this new loan will be a further gigantic step towards that bankruptcy with which the State is threatened.

What appears to me not improbable, indeed, is, that the Porte, finding what it has now to receive, will not meet what it has to pay; will again revert to credit at Galata, for a moment re-established by this present supply; and be at the end of another year in precisely the same situation as at present, with the increased interest of the new loan.

To prevent this some means must still be resorted to for supplying the hiatus between what is instantaneously wanted and what will be instantaneously received.

At the conclusion of the document, is an exposition of views as to paper-money. Mr. Falconnet's opinions are clear; M. de Plœuc's are not so. What M. de Plœuc means to state, he tells me, is that neither a loan nor paper-money of any sort would be of present use, without economy and management in the future; but he considers that a paper-money of some sort may yet be necessary, and that the plan of a paper-money which would have been made convertible at par in certain proportions periodically out of the revenue now allotted for the interest of the loan, might have been of the two plans a preferable one.

It is possible that the Turks may object to the only mode by which they can reconstitute their finances on an European model, viz., the employment of Europeans.

But without this in two years at latest will certainly arrive the following crisis: either the Turkish Government will not be able to pay its ordinary expenses as a Government, and must then lose the breath, so to speak, which keeps a Government alive, or it will not be able to pay its European creditors.

These, then, will step in and demand the control over and management of at least those revenues which are assigned to them as a security, and in this way the hand of Europe will be laid upon the Porte far more heavily than it would be at present by its adopting sufficiently early that European aid in the way of talent and intelligence which is now at its command, and might be used in subservience to its orders and as an aid to its authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 60.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 30.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1861.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your Excellency's despatches Nos. 794 and 797 of the 28th of November, respecting the report of the British and French Members of the Financial Commission.

Her Majesty's Government agree in the views expressed in your Excellency's despatch No. 797, and I accordingly transmit to you for presentation to Aali Pasha, together with an abstract of the reforms recommended by the Commissioners, a formal note containing the substance of your Excellency's views, and stating the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the steps which the Porte must adopt in order to reorganize its financial system.

Your Excellency will perceive that if the Sultan is willing to appoint a Financial Commission of the nature recommended by Her Majesty's Government, they have undertaken to select a competent person to be a member of such a Commission.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Draft of Note to be addressed by Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

THE Undersigned, &c., has the honour to state to Aali Pasha, &c., that he has been directed by his Government to call the serious attention of the Porte to the present state of the Turkish finances.

The means which the loan recently contracted in Europe has placed at the disposal of the Porte for extricating itself from the most urgent claims upon the Turkish Treasury, present a favourable opportunity for taking measures of a decisive nature to place its finances on a secure and satisfactory basis; while the Report lately presented by the British and French Members of the Mixed Commission is extremely valuable, as containing suggestions made after mature consideration by persons well qualified to form opinions on the subject.

It is almost unnecessary for the Undersigned to point out to Aali Pasha, in the first place, that the establishment of a Mixed Commission of some kind is essential for any reorganization of the Turkish finances; and the same reason which would thus call such a Commission into action, would equally point out the necessity of the European element of that Commission being so constituted that the voice of the European should not be overpowered by the adverse opinions of the Turkish members; in other words, the number of the Turkish and European members of such Mixed Commission should be equal.

In the next place, it is of great importance that the duties of the Commission should be clearly defined, and this should be done not only with regard to the duties which the Commission might be called upon to perform, but also with regard to the powers which it should be absolutely required to exercise. And, moreover, a person should be selected for the office of President who could devote his time exclusively to the subjects with which the Commission would be engaged. Distinct orders should also be given that the different public offices should furnish punctually all the documents which the Commission may require. In no other manner could it exercise its functions with advantage, for unless the measures which the Commissioners might recommend were founded on accurate data, they might be prejudicial, instead of beneficial, to the State.

The Undersigned is further directed by his Government to inclose to Aali Pasha an abstract of the reforms recommended in the Report of the British and French Commissioners, and, in doing so, begs to call the

attention of the Porte to these recommendations, and most earnestly to urge their adoption.

The Undersigned has further the honour to state to Aali Pasha, with regard to the present Budget, that the principal facts connected with it do not appear to be stated with sufficient clearness, and the manner in which the proposed reduction of a million and a half in the expenditure is to be effected, is not stated at all. No allowance has been made for claims not yet decided upon, which will amount to a considerable sum, nor is it clear whether the arrears of pay due to the army are included in the statement of the expenditure to be made.

The Budget is, moreover, altogether a fallacious one, as far as the statement of income is concerned, inasmuch as the revenue for several months, if not for a whole year, is made over by anticipation as security for various loans raised and already spent. It appears therefore—

1st. That the sum now borrowed is insufficient to meet the urgent demands of the Porte.

2ndly. That the Porte has added nearly 1,500,000*l.* sterling to the expenditure side of the account on a balance sheet which only brings out a tolerable equality between receipt and expenditure by the statement of 1,500,000*l.* of unspecified reductions. And,

3rdly. That, notwithstanding this very unsatisfactory state of things, nothing would be so easy as far as the Turkish Government to restore its finances by skilful and prudent management.

The observations which M. de Plœuc makes with regard to the finances of Greece, and the inferences which he draws from his experience in that country, confirm this opinion.

But without such good and improved management this new loan will only be a further step towards that bankruptcy with which the Turkish State is threatened; and it is, therefore, to be feared that at the end of another year the Porte may be not merely in the same pecuniary embarrassment as at present, but will have the further difficulty of having to furnish the amount required for the interest of this new loan.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in directing the Undersigned to press strongly on the notice of the Sublime Porte the absolute necessity of introducing better management into its financial system, is actuated solely by the desire which it has so constantly evinced to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Empire of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to warn the Porte strongly of the disastrous consequences which must inevitably follow a perseverance in the improvident system of financial administration which has led the Turkish Government into its present difficulties.

The Undersigned is, therefore, directed to state that no amount of loan would be of any permanent benefit to the Porte, unless a system of economy and of regularity is introduced into the various Departments of the State. That experience of the past has proved to demonstration that such improvements will not, and cannot be introduced by those Turkish Agents who have been the cause of the present deplorable financial condition of the Porte; and that if the Sultan wishes to save his Throne and his Empire from the catastrophe towards which they are rapidly approaching, he will authorize a Commission of experienced and trustworthy Europeans to devise and carry into immediate execution those improvements and reforms which may seem to them to be necessary.

The Undersigned is accordingly empowered by his Government to state formally to Aali Pasha that, if His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is willing to agree to such an arrangement, Her Majesty's Government will co-operate by selecting a competent person to be a member of such a Commission.

No. 61.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 39.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1861.

Sir,

THE Russian Minister has read me a despatch from Prince Gortchakoff, expressing regret that the meeting of Representatives at Constantinople which I had proposed should be postponed.

These regrets come rather late, as I understood from you that the Russian Ambassador when you spoke to him of the proposed Conference said he had no instructions from his Court to attend it.

The Ottoman Ambassador called upon me at the Foreign Office yesterday, and said he supposed that at the end of three months Her Majesty's Government would ask at Constantinople for an account of what the Grand Vizier intended to do. I said an account not of what he intended to do, but of what he had done. The time is past when mere vague promises, little known at Constantinople, and neither known nor regarded in the provinces, can satisfy the European Powers.

You will take care constantly to impress this view upon the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha. Her Majesty's Government wish to see not theories of amendment, but practical reforms.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 62.

Statement of the Financial Agent of the Porte at Paris.

DETTE INTERIEURE.

	Piastres.
Essams Djedidés (Dette Consolidée) portant 6 pour cent d'intérêt par an, remboursables au pair par amortissement annuel en 24 ans ..	250,000,000
Hazinés Tavollis (Bons du Trésor) 6 pour cent d'intérêt par an, remboursables en 14 ans	280,000,000
Serghis (Obligations du Trésor) portant 6 pour cent d'intérêt exigibles par cinquième et par année à partir de 1865	430,000,000
Essams Mumtazis (Rentes viagères converties en Dettes remboursables) portant 8 pour cent d'intérêt remboursables en 3 ans	75,000,000
	1,035,000,000
Créances dites de Galata: elles se composent des emprunts locaux faits à divers taux d'intérêt avec ou sans hypothèque, sur des revenus spéciaux, remboursables dans le courant de 18 mois, environ	634,000,000
	1,669,000,000
Montant de la Dette portant intérêt	
Kaimés (solde du papier-monnaie) 70,341,000	
Dette Flottante, représentée par des Serghis (Obligations) des différents Ministères, les uns sans échéance fixe et les autres remboursables par quotité mensuelle de 2 et 3 pour cent, environ 550,000,000	
	620,341,000
Total de la Dette Intérieure	2,289,341,000
	£
En calculant au change moyen de 125 piastres par livre sterling, ce capital de 2,289,000,000 piastres représente	18,312,000

DETTE EXTERIEURE.

	£	£
Emprunt de 1854, à 6 pour cent	3,000,000	
Emprunt de 1855, garanti par la France et l'Angleterre à 4 pour cent	5,000,000	
Emprunt de 1858, à 6 pour cent	5,000,000	
Emprunt de 1860, Français (Mirès), à 6 pour cent ..	2,037,220	
	15,037,220	
Amortissement opéré sur les trois premiers emprunts, environ	500,000	
Reste dû		14,537,220
Total de tous les Dettes, Intérieures et Extérieures, de l'Empire Ottoman		32,849,220
		£33,000,000
En chiffres ronds		fr. 825,000,000
Ou		

Le Budget des recettes de la Turquie varie de 280,000,000 to 300,000,000 de francs par an.

Les intérêts de la dette tant intérieure qu'extérieure et l'amortissement constituent une charge annuelle pour le trésor Ottoman de 16 pour cent environ par rapport à ses revenus.

Jusqu'en 1856 les revenus et les dépenses de l'Etat ont toujours été en équilibre.

Les années 1857, 1858, et 1859, ont présenté des déficits, qui étant englobés peuvent être évalués à 750,000 livres sterlings.

A l'heure qu'il est, voici le cours des divers titres représentant la dette Ottomane:—

1. Les Essams Djedidés à 38.
2. Des Haznés-tahvilis à 48.
3. Les Serghis de dix ans, à 25.
4. Les Essams Mumtazis à 43.
5. Les Créances de Galata avec hypothèque, au pair.
6. Les Kaimés, comparativement à la monnaie d'or Turc, au même titre que le souverain Anglais, perd 50 pour cent de sa valeur nominale.
7. Les Serghis des différents Ministères se cotent de 25 à 50 pour cent suivant les conditions de leur remboursabilité.

Toutes les valeurs qui précèdent n'ont cours qu'à Constantinople.

L'emprunt de 1854 avec hypothèque sur le tribut d'Egypte, se cote à Londres à 74.

Celui de 1855, garanti par la France et l'Angleterre, à 100.

Celui de 1858, à 56.

De toutes ses dettes, la plus embarrassante pour la Turquie c'est celle qui constitue les créances dites de Galata, s'élevant à 634,000,000 piastres, ou environ 5,000,000*l*.

Les banquiers de Galata sont les créditeurs de cette somme, mais comme celle-ci a été dès le principe procurée moyennant une circulation sans cesse renouvelée entre la Turquie et l'Europe, circulation qui se continue forcément à l'heure qu'il est, les véritables créanciers de cette dette sont, en définitive, la Banque de France pour environ 40,000,000 de francs, je crois, et divers banquiers de Londres pour le reste.

De deux choses l'une: ou il faut accepter le papier du Lévant jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement Ottoman puisse se libérer de cette dette, ce qui ne peut guère avoir lieu dans l'état actuel des choses, sans un emprunt spécial avant trois ou quatre ans; ou refuser ce papier, et, en ce cas, amener la faillite immédiate immanquable des maisons du Lévant, qui, dans leur chûte, entraîneront les maisons intermédiaires de France et d'Angleterre, et laisseront leur découvert à la charge de la Banque de France et des banquiers de Londres engagés dans ces opérations.

Cette dernière hypothèse, il ne faut pas le dissimuler, amènerait une perturbation tellement grave, en augmentant la détresse du Trésor Ottoman, détresse déjà si grande, que la question d'Orient, qu'on espère reculer, pourrait comme conséquence fatale, et comme solution finale de cette catastrophe financière, être posée immédiatement.

Cet état de choses désastreux pourrait cependant être évité, si, avec un concours moral prêté à la Turquie, dont le Gouvernement est animé du désir sincère d'introduire des réformes les plus sérieuses dans le mécanisme Gouvernemental, on l'aidait à mener à bonne fin son emprunt, et à liquider entièrement la circulation existante, cause unique de la crise qui menace des plus grands malheurs le commerce du Lévant, les intérêts Français et Anglais y adhérant, et, ce qui est plus grave, l'avenir peut-être dans l'ordre politique.

No. 63.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 8, 1861.

I HAVE read Earl Cowley's despatch giving an account of a conversation with M. Thouvenel on the subject of the meeting of the Representatives to discuss the measures of reform it might be advisable to suggest to the Porte, and I have read Mr. Lowther's respecting a conversation with Baron Schleinitz on the same subject.

I confess I have been at a loss from the first to understand the sort of opposition this step has met with from the French Embassy, nor do I see any reason for the opinion which Baron Schleinitz says has been expressed by the Russian Government on this subject.

In regard to the Representatives meeting to exchange the opinions which they might have been enabled, through the information of their Agents, to form as to the state of the provinces, and discuss the measures best adapted to supply the most striking defects in Turkish administration, the course is one so simple, so natural, so clearly connected with the duties of the Representatives at Constantinople, and the constant observations of the French and Russian Governments as to the necessity of reforms, that I cannot imagine any surprise at or objection to it.

In fact, if the five Representatives are to act together in support of any measures of reform I can hardly see any other way in which they are to commence such a course of action. With respect to the reforms I propose being more sweeping than any which the Russian Cabinet ever suggested, Her Majesty's Government has never objected to necessary reforms, however sweeping, nor have I, as Her Majesty's Ambassador, opposed any. But reforms are intended to consolidate the Empire.

What I did object to was a measure which in reality proposed no reforms at all, but which would have been disorganizing, and not consolidating the Empire. I mean a promenade throughout it of foreign Agents who would have collected round them every element of disaffection, and by creating an exaggerated state of despair on one side, and expectation on the other, rendered all temperate and practical efforts at improvement subsequently impossible.

It appears to me, I confess, that a certain soreness has been created by the lead on this occasion having been taken by Her Majesty's Government: but this was, in my opinion, essential; since it behoved Her Majesty's Government to show that its support of Turkey was not a support of its abuses, which it was as anxious as any Government to see amended; and I say this, because they who have criticized our policy as to the Ottoman Empire have generally endeavoured to degrade our advocacy by representing us as indifferent to the causes for dissatisfaction which the state of this Empire no doubt presents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 64.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 8, 1861.

YOUR Lordship says in your despatch No. 726 of December 1860, that in agreeing with my general observations, it is still to be considered that if "Christians are to be admitted to take part in the administration of affairs in Turkey, they can only be so admitted as far as local Councils are concerned, since it is not to be supposed that any Christian would be allowed to hold one of the great offices at Constantinople."

It is difficult to express all one's ideas on rather a difficult subject without running into tediousness—a fault which I fear I have not always avoided; but whilst I am against giving great powers to local communities in the present state of society and civilization in Turkey, because I am against giving great powers to ignorant, violent, and prejudiced men, hostile to each other, and whose discussions, while they disorganize the existing authority, can lead to the establishment of no authority in its place,—I am for placing Rayahs as the Representatives of the central authority in responsible situations in the Provinces: these would in the end discipline their own race, and at the same time, by the very functions

they held as the representatives of that race, teach by degrees the dominant one to respect it.

Animated by a feeling of nationality on the one side, and linked by position and interest with the ruling Government on the other, they would finally become a constituted and moderating power.

The Fanariotes, in fact, in a less enlightened age, were in some degree this; and there can be no doubt that the Greeks, since this class (which disappeared after the Greek revolution) passed away, have lost the political consideration they formerly enjoyed, and which in no small degree, though in an indirect manner, benefited their nation.

It is, moreover, in this way that much of the power now exercised by the Greek clergy, who are the greatest scourge of the Greek people, would pass to persons more amenable to the ordinary laws and the ordinary ideas of civil society.

It is, however, no easy matter to obtain the reform on which I lay such stress, from the Turks. The reason is evident to me on the spot, though it will not so instantly strike one less practically acquainted with its peculiarities. We are apt in Europe to imagine that Turkey is a nation composed of various races, which should each see the benefit of being united. But to an inhabitant of Turkey the Turkish Empire is as nothing. His nation is the particular portion of the Empire to which he belongs The Greek looks to his nation as his race; the Armenian the same; the Turk the same. To tell the latter—I speak generally—he is to make a great State by giving up a portion of the power which the Turks, as Turks, possess in that State, is much the same as to tell the English they would become a greater State if they took the French into their bosom, and made M. de Morny Lord Mayor of London! The patriotic feeling is not with the land—it is with the class on the land with which each individual is connected.

Nevertheless, the object to accomplish, though difficult, is in no wise impossible. Many yet remember the time when Rayahs held high office, and are willing to acknowledge they fulfilled the duties of their posts with zeal and ability; and there is rising up a feeling amongst the official classes of the Turks that the employment of Rayahs in many political positions would be advantageous.

What has alarmed them has been the theory that the Rayah and the Turk are equal, and the deduction drawn from it that consequently the Rayahs, being most numerous in many places, would, were such a theory acted upon, be ere long the masters, in which case the Moslem knows well he would not long enjoy the toleration he would have practised.

The best course, in my opinion, is at the present time to insist less on principles, and more on facts—endeavouring to obtain, in the way and in the degree that is practical, a positive advantage. The new state of things thus brought about might end in nullifying or mitigating the feeling of nationalities by absorbing it in the feeling of government. Let Rayahs be seen in official situations fulfilling their duties to the advantage of the Government, invested with power, which in the East is prestige, and little by little they will insensibly work their way into the privileged or ruling body.

Such, at all events, is the plan I would follow, and think the best to advise.

Those Greek islands whereon not a Turk is to be found should be governed by a Greek. In the larger islands and provinces where a large Greek population exists, the Greeks should hold second-rate situations, but situations nevertheless of authority and trust. As a part of the governing power they may, and probably will, become attached to it. Indeed, I must say my experience proves this, for I know few more zealous servants of the Porte than the few Rayahs who have gained the confidence of the Porte; and men are, indeed, generally satisfied without rising above those who were born above them, if they merely rise above those who were born on a level with them.

I do not like to pursue this subject here further; but what I have said will show the direction of my mind.

The reforms proposed should not tend still further to weaken and

confuse an already weak and distracted Government, nor to bring violent differences into contentious presence. They should tend, on the contrary, to combine all classes in some system of order (which is strength), and gradually to soften, by blending, the distinctions between the conquering and the conquered population—a work which must be the effect of time, accomplished by degrees, but which should be *bonâ fide* commenced, and systematically carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 65.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 44.)
Foreign Office, January 22, 1861.

Sir,

I AGREE very much in the observation made in your Excellency's No. 10 of the 8th instant, respecting a meeting of the Representatives at Constantinople.

The French and Russian Governments are always complaining that nothing in the way of reform is done by Turkey, and as constantly objecting to any step proposed with a view to expedite the progress of amendment.

I long ago informed Lord Cowley that, as M. Thouvenel had had so much experience at Constantinople, and his ability was so generally recognised, Her Majesty's Government would be glad to learn his views respecting reforms in Turkey. Nothing has come of this step but renewed complaints that nothing is done.

In order to disarm jealousy, and prevent discord, it will be desirable, should the Representatives ever meet, as I hope they will, that you should withdraw your note, which may seem to forestall the examination of the facts, and the conclusions to be derived from them.

The Russian Minister complains that you summoned the Sardinian Minister. If this was really done, it should not be repeated, as the admission of the Sardinian Minister might prevent the attendance of the Internuncio.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 66.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 49.)
Foreign Office, January 23, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I concur in your views, as expressed in your despatch No. 16 of the 8th instant, on the subject of the admission of the Christian subjects of the Porte to offices of trust.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 67.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 49.)
Constantinople, January 18, 1861.

My Lord,

IN reperusing my remarks on Aali Pasha's observations as to the operation of the Hatti-Humayoun, I fear that, being written hastily, and as the messenger was starting, they may not have clearly expressed my ideas, and leave an impression that less has been done towards the civili-

zation of Turkey than I am inclined in justice to give the Porte credit for.

Now, I have always been hitherto of opinion that though all that might be desirable has not been done in the way of change, there is not on record a country in which so much has been changed, notwithstanding great difficulties, as in Turkey during the last twenty years; and my conviction in this respect is still what it was.

But, although the abolition of the arbitrary confiscation of property and of the arbitrary infliction of death are positive measures, and, no doubt, are the foundations of that amelioration in the condition of all classes of the Sultan's subjects, especially the Christians, which is so remarkable, the chief progress, nevertheless, has been a social one, and appears less the result of new laws than of the tacit suppression of old customs. In short, speaking generally, the alteration that has been brought about has been rather the effect of a laxity on the part of the Government than of any action on the part of the same; and thus authority has been losing ground very much in the same proportion that improvement has been taking place.

It is this defect, indeed, which it is now so important to remedy.

The Porte should reinstate itself as a Government, and at the same time, as a Government, make institutions and laws corresponding with the advance which has taken place in manners—a principle which has to be carried out no less in the distribution of favours and appointments than in that of punishments.

Thus the Commissioners whom I am for sending into the Provinces should restore the Governmental power, and plant and enforce the two or three practical reforms which are most wanted in the tribunals, police, and taxation.

The mere patronage of the Porte could do the rest. What was difficult formerly is easy now, and is more imperative now for that very reason: for as your Lordship justly says, it is the improved condition of a people which creates in them the desire for an improved system of legislation and administration.

In a few words, the first change has been one of social organization and political disorganization. The second should combine the progress of society with a similar progress in government, and a strengthening of that authority which has in no small degree been lost in abolishing old usages without adequately framing or enforcing new institutions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 68.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1861.*

I HAVE communicated in writing both to the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha the substance of your Lordship's instruction to me, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government are glad to perceive from the Grand Vizier's report to the Sultan that the mode of farming the tithes, the establishment of Courts of Criminal Justice, and the remodelling of the police, are pointed out as subjects upon which the reforms of existing abuses are required, and authorizing me to insist strongly upon the reforms undertaken being carried into effect, in practice as well as in name.

Both those Ministers have renewed to me, in reply, the assurance that the Porte was seriously engaged in preparing the reforms in question, but that before they were promulgated, some little time was required in framing the laws by which they were to be enforced: the Government was constantly and seriously occupied in this work.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 69.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 66. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1861.*

I HAVE alluded in my despatch No. 819 of the 5th ultimo to the difficulties which, after some experience, I am obliged to confess prevail with respect to a joint action of the five Representatives on Turkish affairs. The fact of it is that at the present time three Powers at least are nearly always found acting together, and in hostility, more or less apparent, to the Turkish Government—Russia, Prussia, and France; whilst the influence of Austria is little excited, and in a great degree annihilated: so that in fact the joint action of five comes, more or less, in coalition of three against one, and as this coalition does not seem to originate here in the individuals who represent the Governments in question, but rather to be the consequence of instructions more or less direct from those Governments, it is difficult for me to prevent it by any individual exertions on my part; the most I can do being to moderate its effects.

With respect to reforms, for instance, the more I think we analyze the conduct of the different parties, the more we shall find that whilst what we propose is meant sincerely for the good of Turkey, what the other Governments who speak of reforms propose is with a view to the extension of their own influence; and that with respect to the Christian population they are more anxious to appear in the vanguard as their protectors than really to do them any essential service: this alone prevents a measure proposed by me from obtaining that support, from a great part of my colleagues, which it deserves. Whilst with the Turks themselves, they being aware that no counsel I might give them will have a practical effect unless it obtains the concurrence which they foresee is hardly to be expected, my isolated recommendations necessarily lose a part of their authority. Nor is this all: if any measure I suggested did obtain the adhesion of Russia and those Powers who act with her, it would immediately become suspicious in the eyes of the Porte. I am, therefore, of opinion that the best position we could stand in as to Turkey would, if possible, be that of taking a separate and distinct line with her, by saying clearly, We will support you against such and such contingencies, providing you do such and such things: making it evident to the Turks that they must do what we tell them to do, and assuring them that if they do, they may then rely upon us.

I say this now, not because I think the course I suggest may at this time be possible or advisable, but because a time may come in which we shall have to consider whether an isolated or a joint position with other Powers is the best for Turkey or ourselves, and my present opinion certainly inclines me to think we should have far more influence on the Porte if we acted alone in the manner I have pointed out than we can have by acting in common with others, and as our influence will always be beneficially influenced towards Turkey, so the greater that influence is the more Turkey will benefit by it. It is true that, on the other side, we thus avoid direct antagonism, and can neutralize many hostile measures; but as the condition of Turkey is one in which to be stationary is to await destruction, and that action is imperatively wanted, all that prevents action or thwarts good action tends necessarily to a decline, more or less gradual, and therefore only differs from the effects of violent hostility in the time and manner by which the same result is brought about.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 70.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 22, 1861.*

AS it appeared from the language held by Prince Gortchakoff to Sir J. Crampton, communicated to your Lordship in his despatch No. 64 of December 24, that he considered the meetings of the Representatives on the question of reforms to be taking place here, I think it better to state that Prince Labanow having stated to me at the time he should ask instructions on the subject, has never since informed me that he had received instructions, and consequently it is difficult for me to understand how Prince Gortchakoff could ever have imagined that we were entering upon the discussion of the subject referred to, and which his Representative had never said he had the power to discuss.

The recent proposal of Prince Gortchakoff to the Porte, namely, that the Porte should invite the Representatives to meet, shows, indeed, that he could not have thought meetings were taking place; and at the same time, I think, it also shows the feeling which prevented my propositions from being at the time accepted by the Russian Representative.

The Russian Government, as it would appear, did not like the question of reforms to be initiated by Her Majesty's Representative; first, because it contradicted the general assertion of the Russian Agents that England was opposed to all reforms in Turkey; and, secondly, because it did not leave the lead in this question to Russia.

The desire of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh seems, therefore, to bring up this subject again by some proposal of its own, and the recent proposal having failed another will, probably, ere long be made. The difficulty, indeed, of getting the five Representatives to act cordially and frankly together in Turkish affairs forces itself, of late, constantly upon me, and though the necessity of this united action may prevent some mischief, it doubtless prevents much good.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 71.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1861.*

I TRANSMIT, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to the Russian Ambassador at this Court, inclosing a Memorandum of observations upon the Grand Vizier's Report of his proceedings in the Turkish provinces; and I have to instruct you to state to the Porte that this Memorandum should, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be answered by the Government of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 72.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 4, 1861.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 30 of the 17th ultimo, I have addressed to Aali Pasha a formal note, copy of which is herewith inclosed, in regard to the steps which the Porte ought, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, to adopt in order to reorganize its financial system.

As soon as a translation can be made of this document, it will be laid before the Grand Vizier, and I am assured by Aali Pasha that he will lose no time in acquainting me with the views entertained by the Turkish Government in regard to the proposed reform.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 72.

Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, January 29, 1861.

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Sublime Porte, has the honour to state to his Highness Aali Pasha, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he has been directed by his Government to call the serious attention of the Porte to the present state of the Turkish finances. The means which the loan recently contracted in Europe has placed at the disposal of the Porte for extricating itself from the most urgent claims upon the Turkish Treasury, present a favourable opportunity for taking measures of a decisive nature to place its finances on a secure and satisfactory basis; while the report lately presented by the British and French members of the Mixed Commission is extremely valuable, as containing suggestions made, after mature consideration, by persons well qualified to form opinions on the subject.

It is almost unnecessary for the Undersigned to point out to his Highness Aali Pasha, in the first place, that the establishment of a Mixed Commission of some kind is essential for any reorganization of the Turkish finances; and the same reason which would thus call such a Commission into action would equally point out the necessity of the European element of that Commission being so constituted that the voice of the Europeans should not be overpowered by the adverse opinions of the Turkish members; in other words, the number of the Turkish and European members of such Mixed Commission should be equal.

In the next place it is of great importance that the duties of the Commission should be clearly defined, and this should be done, not only with regard to the duties which the Commission might be called upon to perform, but also with regard to the powers which it should be absolutely required to exercise; and moreover, a person should be selected for the office of President who could devote his time exclusively to the subjects with which the Commission would be engaged. Distinct orders should also be given that the different public offices should furnish punctually all the documents which the Commission may require. In no other manner could it exercise its functions with advantage, for unless the measures which the Commissioners might recommend were founded on accurate data, they might be prejudicial instead of beneficial to the State.

The Undersigned is further directed by his Government to inclose to his Highness Aali Pasha an abstract of the reforms recommended in the Report of the British and French Commissioner, and in doing so begs to call the attention of the Porte to these recommendations, and most earnestly to urge their adoption.

The Undersigned has further the honour to state to Aali Pasha with regard to the present Budget, that the principal facts connected with it do not appear to be stated with sufficient clearness, and the manner in which the proposed reductions of 1,500,000 piastres in the expenditure are to be effected is not stated at all. No allowance has been made for claims not yet decided upon, which will amount to a considerable sum, nor is it clear whether the arrears of pay due to the army are included in the statement of the expenditure to be made.

The Budget is, moreover, altogether a fallacious one as far as the statement of income is concerned, inasmuch as the revenue for several

months, if not for a whole year, is made over by anticipation as security for various loans raised and already spent.

It appears, therefore—

1. That the sum now borrowed is insufficient to meet the urgent demands of the Porte.

2. That the Porte has added nearly 1,500,000*l.* to the expenditure side of the account, on a balance-sheet which only brings out a tolerable equality between receipt and expenditure by the statement of 1,500,000*l.* of unspecified reductions; and

3. That notwithstanding this very unsatisfactory state of things, nothing would be so easy as for the Turkish Government to restore its finances by skilful and prudent management.

The observations which M. de Plœuc makes with regard to the finances of Greece, and the inferences which he draws from his experience in that country, confirm this opinion. But without such good and improved arrangements this new loan will only be a further step towards that bankruptcy with which the Turkish State is threatened, and it is therefore to be feared that, at the end of another year, the Porte may be, not merely in the same pecuniary embarrassment as at present, but will have the further difficulty of having to furnish the amount required for the interest of this new loan.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in directing the Undersigned to press strongly on the notice of the Sublime Porte the absolute necessity of introducing better management into its financial system, is actuated solely by the desire which it has so constantly evinced to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Empire of the Sultan. Her Majesty's Government feel it to be their duty to warn the Porte strongly of the disastrous consequences which must inevitably follow a perseverance in the improvident system of financial administration which has led the Turkish Government into its present difficulties. The Undersigned is therefore directed to state that no amount of loan would be of any permanent benefit to the Porte, unless a system of economy and of regularity is introduced into the various Departments of the State; that experience of the past has proved to demonstration that such improvements will not, and cannot, be introduced by those Turkish Agents who have been the cause of the present deplorable financial condition of the Porte; and that, if the Sultan wishes to save his Throne and his Empire from the catastrophe towards which they are rapidly approaching, he will authorize a Commission of experienced and trustworthy Europeans to devise and carry into immediate execution those improvements and reforms which may seem to them to be necessary.

The Undersigned is accordingly empowered by his Government to state formally to Aali Pasha that, if His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is willing to agree to such arrangement, Her Majesty's Government will co-operate by selecting a competent person to be a member of such a Commission.

The Undersigned, &c. (Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 72.

Abstract of Report of the English and French Commissioners with respect to the State of Turkish Finances, and Measures and Reforms recommended by them.

THE duties of the Commission were to examine into the financial condition of the Empire; to remodel the laws in the matter of taxes and financial administration; and to restore order and regularity in the Government. With these ends in view, they proposed—

To form Budgets;

To regulate the employment of them;

To insist upon accounts being given up;

And strongly urged that publicity should be given to the acts of the Administration.

The Turkish Members of the Commission strongly opposed nearly all the measures brought forward by the other members, and it was very evident that the Porte intended to keep entire control in the employment of the Budgets.

The English and French Commissioners urged that the General Budgets should be made public, and also the particular Budget of each Minister; and that regulative power in the employment of the public money was absolutely indispensable.

With regard to the Customs, the practice of keeping up running debts with merchants was denounced, and it was recommended that the practice should be forthwith abolished.

It appears from this Report that the Army and Navy remain unpaid, and every day the debt and obligations of the Porte are increasing, and that the revenues of the following year are in a great measure, if not wholly, swallowed up.

It is evident, however, that the natural wealth and resources of Turkey are not turned to the best advantage. The forests bring in but 150,000 francs, whereas in Greece the forests produce 270,000 francs.

The mines are badly worked, or not worked at all, and bring in but little to the revenue.

The duty on beasts, such as sheep, goats, &c., produces 20,000,000 francs, whereas horses, camels, donkeys, &c., are not taxed at all; and nothing can justify this exception.

Stamped paper and patents have little or no duty on them.

Monopolies have been abolished, and an end put to many and gross abuses arising from them, but exceptions should be made for salt and tobacco, which in able hands should produce a very considerable income.

It would be easy for Turkey, by thus increasing her revenue, to give security for a loan to carry on public business.

The town of Constantinople, which enjoys at the present time the privilege of exemption from income tax, should be made to pay it, as other towns in the Turkish dominions.

One of the chief losses of the Treasury arises from the faculty possessed by certain Ministers of issuing "serghis"—that is, promises of payment—without limit. A Government which cannot command credit must provide reserves of metal, or must reduce its expenditure immediately after a crisis. The Finance Minister alone should have the power to issue "serghis," and only then on proof that the expenses have been incurred by the other Ministers, and the amount of "serghis" to be issued should be fixed.

The French and English Commissioners protested strongly against the further issue of paper money, which they said would be the ruin of the country.

No. 73.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received February* 16.)

(No. 95.)

Constantinople, February 6, 1861.

My Lord,

SOME little time since M. de Labanow requested Aali Pasha to convene the Representatives and consult with them as to the reforms which the Turkish Empire required, laying before them at the same time those the Porte had prepared. Aali Pasha declining this proposal, Prince Labanow made a suggestion to me which I thought practicable, and might prove advantageous.

It was this: that the Porte should before publishing the reforms it has now in hand, communicate them to the Representatives; so that if they had any remarks to make upon them, they might do so previous to their becoming law.

This plan I had already myself spoken of, and I have advocated it with Aali Pasha; but the real difficulty arises from the prejudiced manner in which the Government of Russia seems determined to view and

represent every effort of the Turks towards improvement. It is not only that the memoir I have just been reading as to the Grand Vizier's tour is unfair, but the very tone, spirit, and ingenuity it displays, makes one feel that it is the production of an enemy whom nothing can conciliate, and this not unnaturally indisposes the Porte to take such an enemy into its councils.

It may indeed be anticipated as possible that the Russian Envoy's design is to discredit beforehand the reforms of the Porte, and not to aid in making them palateable.

I am rather, however, for not taking this into account, more especially as the Russian Government may be merely desirous to have it appear that no reforms are granted without her interference, and also because if the reforms proposed are really at all adequate to the occasion the support of some at least of the other Representatives would counterbalance the unjust disapprobation of that of Russia.

What, however, I think probable is, that the Porte, instead of giving us a copy of the projects of law to which I refer, will write us a memorandum upon them, which is a very different thing.

Aali Pasha, however, will, I think, as far as I am personnally concerned, allow me to compare that memorandum with the documents themselves on which it is based; and in this manner I shall be able better to judge of the effect which such documents would produce on my collegues, and advise or act accordingly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 74.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 102.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 6, 1861.*

AS the Seraskier, who is presumed to have great influence with the Sultan, has been lately expressing himself very anxious to assist in promoting the reforms I am anxious to effect in the administration of the Empire, and particularly in the financial part of it, I have thought it advisable to give him a précis of the note which I recently addressed, by your Lordship's desire, to Aali Pasha with respect to the Turkish finances; and I think it worth while to inclose to your Lordship the answer I have received—the intrinsic value of which will be ascertained by what eventually takes place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Riza Pasha to Sir H. Bulwer.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, ce 4 Février*, 1861.

JE m'estime bien heureux en recevant le memorandum inclus dans la lettre confidentielle que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 27 Janvier. Je l'ai lu avec un vif intérêt, et je l'apprécie parfaitement d'autant plus que tous les conseils que votre Excellence nous donne sont conformes à mon opinion personnelle et aux circonstances actuelles.

Je me ferai un devoir de faire connaître à votre Excellence la résolution qui sera prise à ce sujet.

Je saisis, &c.
Le Seraskier,
(Signé) RIZA.

No. 75.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 16, 1861.*

I HAVE to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your Excellency's course of conduct regarding Turkish administrative reforms, as reported in your despatch No. 96 of the 6th instant; and I have to instruct you to ask to see the reforms before they are promulgated, and to send them home for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 76.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 25, 1861.*

HER Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles has transmitted to me a copy of his despatch to your Excellency No. 5 of the 30th ultimo, respecting a new system for collecting the tithes on agricultural produce in Turkey which the Porte intends to adopt; and I have to call your attention to the information given by Mr. Calvert, and to his observations on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 77.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 130.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February 18, 1861.*

I HAVE been informed by the Grand Vizier that the projected reorganization of the general system of police throughout the Ottoman Empire was submitted to the Sultan a short time back, and, having received the assent of His Imperial Majesty, orders were given to the Seraskier Pasha to carry the same into immediate execution.

The reforms to be effected in the mode of levying the tithes have likewise been agreed upon in the Council of Ministers, and were laid before the Sultan for his sanction on the 7th instant. Having applied to Aali Pasha to know whether it was the intention of the Porte to communicate any detailed account of these reforms to the Representatives of the Great Powers before they were promulgated, his Highness stated to me that as the two measures concerning the tithes and police related exclusively to the interior government of the Empire, he was indisposed to make any preliminary communication as to those measures to the Representatives of foreign Powers, though simultaneously with their promulgation they would undoubtedly be submitted to the Representatives of the Great Powers for their information.

He added, however, that with respect to the reform that was likewise to be made in the tribunals, for admitting Christian evidence, he should not feel the same objection to communicate the project relative to this subject to the said Representatives previous to its being made public, since foreign Governments were directly or indirectly more immediately concerned in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 78.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 145.)

Constantinople, February 27, 1861.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 100 of the 6th instant, I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a copy of the memorandum drawn up by the Turkish Government in answer to the strictures passed by the Government of Russia on the Grand Vizier's proceedings during his late tour of inspection in Roumelia.

Some alterations having subsequently been made in that paper, I herewith inclose a lithographed copy of the Memorandum in the shape in which it was actually communicated to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Memorandum.

NOUS avons sous les yeux un Mémoire volumineux émané récemment du Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères de Russie. Le but que l'auteur de cet écrit se propose nous semble être celui de présenter les sujets Chrétiens de Sa Majesté le Sultan comme continuellement en butte à l'oppression et aux violences des Musulmans. Il s'efforce en outre à prouver que la tournée de son Altesse le Grand Vézir, précédée de moyens d'intimidation que les autorités Musulmanes auraient employés pour imposer la silence aux Chrétiens, et effectuée avec une grande rapidité, ne put répondre au but qu'elle se proposait.

Pour mettre en évidence l'exactitude de ses allégations, l'auteur du Mémoire cite des renseignements à l'appui, qui lui seraient parvenus des sources apocryphes, vu l'absence d'agents Russes dans la plupart des contrées inspectées par son Altesse.

Nous jugeons inutile et presque oiseux d'entrer dans les détails des renseignements ne portant pas, de l'aveu même de l'auteur, le moindre caractère authentique, et par conséquent nous nous bornerons à lui répondre sommairement.

Nous faisons cela avec d'autant plus de plaisir que nous croyons éclairer le jugement de l'auteur, qui s'est laissé entraîner par une grande crédulité, pour des renseignements qui, d'ailleurs, manquant des garanties suffisantes de vérité, n'auraient pas dû lui inspirer toute la confiance qu'il semble leur prêter.

Et d'abord nous demanderons quelles sont les preuves convaincantes pour l'emploi des moyens d'intimidation dont les autorités Musulmanes se seraient servi pour faire taire les sujets Chrétiens et les empêcher d'exposer au Grand Vézir leurs plaintes. Comme à l'endroit de cette inculpation dirigée contre les dites autorités, le Mémoire, au lieu de citer quelques preuves, se retranche dans des arguments déduits d'une présomption qui, quoique applicable, au dire de l'auteur du Mémoire, à l'égard de toutes les autorités qui se trouveraient dans le cas de voir leurs administrés libres d'exposer leurs plaintes, est réservée, nous ne savons pas pourquoi, à peser exclusivement sur les autorités Musulmanes, nous sommes en droit de considérer cette inculpation comme purement conjecturable.

Mais en admettant même que quelques autorités auraient eu recours à de pareils expédients, les paroles que son Altesse eut soin de prononcer dans chaque endroit où il s'arrêtait pour encourager les habitants à s'approcher de lui et à lui exposer, soit publiquement soit en secret, tout grief qu'ils auraient contre qui que ce soit; l'autorisation accordée à chacun des fonctionnaires Chrétiens de sa suite de recueillir des renseignements, écouter les plaignants à part, et les introduire auprès de son Altesse directement; la présence même de ces fonctionnaires parlant la langue des populations Chrétiennes avec lesquelles ils communiquaient en

toute liberté,—tous ces faits, disons-nous, n'étaient-ils pas suffisants pour relever le courage des populations et détruire ainsi l'effet de l'intimidation exercée par les autorités locales?

Nous pouvons déclarer en toute conscience et sans crainte d'offenser aucun sentiment d'humanité que toute espèce de plainte a été exposée et écoutée, et nous citerons à l'appui de ce que nous avançons celles mêmes formulées contre les autorites, savoir, les Kirs Serdars de différentes localités, les Préfets de Rasgrade, de Bercoftza, et de Chéhir Keuy, le Contrôleur-Général, le Gouverneur, et autres autorités de la Province de Nissa, les fermiers des dîmes exerçant jadis sur les populations une grande autorité, et tant d'autres qui ont été punis chacun d'après sa culpabilité. Ces punitions exemplaires n'étaient-elles pas de nature à stimuler le courage de ceux qui avaient à se plaindre?

Mais était-il humainement possible, dit l'auteur du Mémoire, d'apprendre la vérité et de redresser les griefs de la population avec cette rapidité qui a permis au Grand Vézir de parcourir en quatre mois la distance de Varna à Salonique? L'auteur du Mémoire sait mieux que personne le but de la tournée de son Altesse: c'était l'audition des plaintes pour y remédier, soit par des mesures expéditives prises sur le champ, soit par celles réservées au retour de son Altesse et qui pour répondre avec succès aux légitimes exigences des populations, ne devaient se réaliser qu'après mur examen et une étude approfondie.

La tournée de son Altesse se proposait aussi en particulier l'examen et le redressement prompt des griefs qui provenaient en grande partie des habitants de la Province de Nissa. L'auteur du Mémoire le sait aussi bien que nous autres.

En commençant son itinéraire de Varna, son Altesse après avoir exhorté les habitants de cette ville à exposer leurs plaintes franchement et sans réserve, et fait faire toutes les investigations necessaires, il a acquis la conviction que sauf quelques réclamations en diminution de l'impôt sur le vin et les bestiaux, le reste des griefs avaient trait à des cas judiciaires de la compétence ordinaire des tribunaux. Le cahier des pétitions et des adresses y présentées en fait foi. Par conséquent, son Altesse qui, ainsi que l'auteur même du Mémoire le reconnaît, ne devait point se constituer en Juge de Paix ni en Préfet de Police, ayant donné à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour l'expédition de ces affaires, avec injonction formelle de lui faire part des résolutions qui seraient prises à l'égard de chacun des pétitionnaires, et pris note des réclamations portant sur l'impôt comme étant destinées à être étudiées pour en faire l'objet d'une loi générale, son Altesse a cru ne devoir plus s'arrêter, mais bien se diriger vers Schoumla et Roussdjouk. Son séjour dans ces dernières résidences fut employé avec les mêmes procédés, et dans le même but—écouter les plaintes, en redresser sur les lieux mêmes celles dont le redressement devait se faire immédiatement, et recueillir des informations sur celles qui étaient destinées à faire l'objet d'une loi générale.

Le Grand Vézir, nous le répétons, n'a dû prolonger son séjour dans les différentes localités, au delà du temps commandé par la nature des plaintes et par les exigences des circonstances. Il aurait sans doute manqué au but de sa mission s'il abrégeait son séjour dans chaque endroit, au préjudice des plaignants. C'est précisément sur ce dernier point que nous devons insister et prier l'auteur du Mémoire de nous en citer un seul exemple.

Il en fut de même pour le reste de la tournée du Grand Vézir; s'arrêtant là où les circonstances l'exigeaient et aussi longtemps que le devoir le commandait. C'est ainsi que son séjour prolongé dans la province de Nissa n'a été motivé que par la multiplicité des plaintes qui lui furent présentées, auxquelles son Altesse s'est empressée de faire justice. N'a-t-on pas vu Zéinel Pacha, le Contrôleur-Général, quelques membres de Conseil, le Mudir de l'Évenf (intendant des legs pieux), le Préfet et l'Évêque Grec de Chehir-Keuy, les fermiers des dîmes et tant d'autres convaincus de crimes, subir chacun toutes les conséquences de la pénalité qu'ils avaient encourues? N'a-t-on pas vu avec quelle exactitude minutieuse chaque plainte fut examinée? N'a-t-on pas observé avec quels soins son Altesse s'est appliqué à entourer de plus de garanties

possibles, la libre expression des plaintes, en changeant partout où les habitants l'ont demandé les membres Musulmans et Chrétiens du Conseil, soit leurs représentants, les faire remplacer par d'autres choisis sur un système représentatif, exhorter les nouveaux élus à exprimer leur opinion consciencieusement et en toute liberté, et leur faire prêter serment à cet effet ?

L'auteur du Mémoire passe en révue quelques Articles des instructions données par son Altesse sous forme de Réglement aux Gouverneurs des Provinces de Roussdjouk et de Vidin, en vue d'attirer leur attention sur les abus et les crimes qui pourraient être commis dans la circonférence de leur juridiction respective, et de les rendre responsables de toute indifférence qu'ils auraient montrée dans la punition de ces abus et crimes.

Ces instructions écrites les premiers jours de la tournée de son Altesse ne pouvaient certainement répondre en tout aux exigences de la situation. C'est pourquoi son Altesse en recommande l'application à l'étude spéciale des dits Gouverneurs, se réservant de les compléter plus tard, ainsi qu'il l'a fait. Elles ne devaient non plus servir de base d'opération à l'auteur du Mémoire dans sa tactique par laquelle il s'efforce de conclure de quelques termes contenus dans l'Article 12, l'aveu de son Altesse pour la perpétration des crimes tels que viols et conversions forcées à l'Islamisme des filles Chrétiennes, crimes signalés dans le temps par les rapports des Agents Russes.

L'auteur du Mémoire sait mieux que personne les motifs qui ont provoqué la tournée de son Altesse ; il sait parfaitement bien que son Altesse a dû avoir dans son portefeuille la liste des chefs d'accusation dirigés contre les autorités Musulmanes par les Agents du Gouvernement Russe dont il a cru devoir prévenir les dites autorités en y appelant toute leur attention. Ces instructions donc n'étaient destinées qu'à avoir un caractère purement préventif.

La preuve que les crimes de viols et de conversions forcées ne furent qu'imaginaires se trouve dans le rapport dressé par la Commission instituée *ad hoc* par son Altesse à Nissa, à l'effet d'examiner et de juger les vingt-deux chefs d'accusation consignés dans la dite liste. Cette Commission était composée de fonctionnaires Musulmans et Chrétiens de la suite de son Altesse, de l'Evêque de Nissa, et des membres Musulmans et Chrétiens du Conseil de la province nouvellement choisis, et non pas des anciens membres inculpés de différents méfaits, ainsi que l'auteur du Mémoire confirme. Ces anciens membres du Conseil qui, d'après lui, auraient pris part à l'enquête avaient été condamnés à la réclusion avant même l'institution du Tribunal *ad hoc*.

Aussi sommes-nous en droit d'exiger que le rapport en question dressé par une autorité composée de personnes honorables, offre plus de garanties d'exactitude, et par conséquent qu'il soit plus digne de foi, que les renseignements particuliers et apocryphes parvenus à la connaissance de l'auteur du Mémoire.

Pour revenir au sujet des instructions auxquelles l'auteur du Mémoire a voulu s'attacher avec beaucoup d'insistance pour en faire ressortir l'inutilité, dans les Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, et 6, nous nous bornerons à dire que la garantie mutuelle recommandée dans les Articles 1 et 2 fut motivée sur la demande expresse des habitants de Choumla et de Roussdjouk, comme un remède contre les villageois qui se servaient de recéleurs.

L'arbitrage des tchorbadjis membres du Conseil, pour l'arrangement entre les fermiers des dîmes et les paysans sur le prix de transport, recommandé dans l'Article 3, fut jugé convenable par la simple raison que les membres du Conseil étant, contrairement à ce que l'auteur du Mémoire pense, défendus de prendre part aux opérations du fermage des impôts, ils se présentent par cela même, comme les seuls compétents à régler cet arrangement d'une manière avantageuse pour les paysans.

Il est vrai que le Hatti-Houmayoun ordonne la traduction dans les diverses langues du pays de toutes les lois en vigueur. Son Altesse en recommandant dans l'Article 4, la stricte exécution de cette disposition, il n'entendait point proposer une chose nouvelle ; mais bien y appeler l'attention des autorités pour quelques lois nouvellement promulguées.

En analysant l'Article 5, l'auteur du Mémoire s'attache à prouver que

la défense faite aux paysans de donner de la nourriture gratis aux collecteurs et aux fermiers des impôts sous peine de transgresser la loi, retombe sur les paysans, vu, dit-il, qu'il n'y est pas question des collecteurs et des Multéjims pour les cas où ils exigeraient des vivres gratis. L'auteur du Mémoire doit apprendre que le Code Pénal en vigueur dans tout l'Empire prévoyant ces cas dans l'Article , son Altesse a cru inutile d'en parler dans ses instructions comme d'une chose connue. D'ailleurs, l'intention réelle du Grand Vézir, en défendant aux paysans de donner des nourritures gratis, n'a été autre que celle de fournir à ces derniers une arme de plus pour résister à de pareilles demandes.

Il en est de même de l'Article 6. Comme différents cas où des voleurs seraient présentés dans de villages sous le nom de zaptiés, ont été parvenus à la connaissance du Grand Vézir, son Altesse pour prémunir les paysans contre un pareil abus de leur bonne foi, a cru convenable de donner aux zaptiés quelques marques distinctives, avec l'obligation de porter des certificats attestant leur profession. Nous nous flattons de croire que l'auteur du Mémoire modifiera son opinion par rapport à cette mesure, en apprenant que ces certificats traduits en Bulgare n'étaient point destinés à être présentés aux paysans, mais aux Mukhtars (maires) des villages.

Nous le répétons encore une fois, que ces instructions adressées aux Gouverneurs de Roussdjouk et de Vidin reçurent plus tard des compléments qui les rendirent propres à mieux répondre aux exigences et aux besoins que l'étude et l'expérience ont signalés.

L'auteur du Mémoire en reconnaissant dans le rapport du tribunal *ad hoc* de Nissa quelques faits cités dans le Mémoire étendu qui a paru en Mai 1860 sur la foi des renseignements parvenus alors à la connaissance du Gouvernement Russe—faits dont l'inexactitude fut prouvée, il s'étonne comment le dit tribunal s'est saisi de ces quelques faits en évitant d'examiner ceux-là précisément que le Gouvernement Russe rapportait dans le même Mémoire comme plus récents, et que nous voyons reproduits dans le Mémoire qui nous occupe.

Nous croyons pouvoir donner à l'auteur du Mémoire l'assurance formelle que le tribunal ne s'est appliqué qu'à examiner les faits qui ont été parvenus à sa portée par les habitants. Si les faits récents dont le Mémoire parle ne figurent pas dans le rapport du tribunal d'enquête, il ne faut pas s'en prendre au tribunal, mais bien à ceux qui n'ont pas voulu les signaler et obtenir justice en recourant à l'autorité instituée *ad hoc*. Mais l'auteur du Mémoire nous objecterait peut-être que c'est l'intimidation des autorités Musulmanes qui les en a empêché. Il est facile d'y répondre, le rapport à la main, qu'il y a autant de réclamants qui ont exposé librement leurs plaintes. Par conséquent le silence de ceux-là ne nous autoriserait-il pas à supposer de deux choses l'une—ou que les faits en question seraient imaginaires, ou bien qu'ils seraient inexacts.

Dans le Mémoire que nous avons sous les yeux nous trouvons des pages tout entières consacrées à la relation de quelques faits enveloppés de détails erronés. Nous croyons donc de notre devoir de les redresser dans l'intérêt de la vérité.

Nous donnons la priorité à l'affaire de Bitolia, mise en scène avec une habileté digne d'émouvoir tout cœur humain. On y voit un certain jeune homme, le nommé Tasko, comme martyr décapité par ordre du Grand Vézir, et un autre jeune homme, le nommé Mina, souffleté et mis en prison par son Altesse pour avoir osé parler au nom de ses compatriotes en faveur du prévenu Tasko.

Voici en peu de mots comment la chose s'est passé. Le Grand Vézir arrivé à Bitolia fut averti par le Gouverneur de cette Province qu'un firman Impérial lui était adressé de la Sublime Porte, confirmant la sentence de mort prononcée contre Tasko par la Cour Criminelle de la localité, composée de Juges Musulmans et Chrétiens, et que quelques gens du pays prétendaient que cette sentence étant entâchée d'irrégularités devait être révisée.

Les informations que son Altesse a recueillies lui ont donné lieu de croire à l'exactitude régulière de la sentence, Tasko ayant été convaincu d'assassinat, non pas comme certains individus le prétendaient en usant du

droit de défense, mais bien au contraire par méditation. Par conséquent son Altesse a ordonné d'appeler les parents du mort par devant le Conseil en présence du Métropolitain Grec, afin de les persuader, suivant la législation Musulmane, à se désister de la peine de talion moyennant une somme d'argent.

Ce ne fut qu'après avoir vainement épuisé tous les efforts de persuasion, que ordre a été donné d'exécuter le firman Impérial, et l'exécution devait avoir lieu après le départ de son Altesse de Bitolia. Vers le soir de la veille un jeune homme inconnu s'approchant de la voiture de son Altesse y jeta un écrit portant le titre de protestation contre l'ordre d'exécution, et rendant son Altesse responsable de cet acte. Comme cette protestation était signée, son Altesse appela les signataires chez lui, qui interrogés ont répondu qu'ils n'entendaient point signer une protestation, mais une supplique, et que ne sachant pas lire ils ont été abusés. Sur cette simple déclaration les signataires ont été renvoyés chez eux. Le nommé Mina se présente sur ces entrefaites devant son Altesse, s'érigeant en député sans commettants, attendu que personne ne l'avait muni d'aucun mandat. Pendant son entretien avec son Altesse ce jeune homme non seulement s'est permis des paroles insolentes, mais il s'est oublié au point d'offenser les droits de souveraineté. De plus ce même Mina fut dénoncé au Gouverneur d'organiser un soulèvement populaire, dans l'intention bien arrêtée d'emporter Tasko de vive force au moment où on allait l'exécuter. Nous demandons maintenant si une pareille conduite de la part d'un sujet Russe avait eu lieu envers une autorité Russe, cette conduite n'occasionnerait-elle pas de l'indignation, et n'entraînerait-elle pas une punition quelconque?

Il en est de même de l'affaire de Vidin, où il est vrai, ainsi que le Mémoire le dit, qu'une pétition fut présentée à son Altesse. Mais cette pétition ne portait que sur la diminution des impôts sur la vin et les bestiaux, et d'après les dispositions prises sur les lieux, les pétitionnaires ont déclaré en avoir été satisfaits. Aussi il est vrai qu'une plainte concernant la pression qui serait exercée sur le membre Chrétien du Conseil, après examen, il fut prouvé qu'elle était mal-fondée.

Quant aux paroles prêtées à son Altesse à propos de différentes demandes des Chrétiens, ainsi que la révélation qui serait faite par un criminel à Roussdjouk à la charge du Gouverneur de Silistrie, nous les déclarons être de pure invention.

N'oublions pas de dire quelques mots à propos "du respectable vieillard Hadji Yordan, qui avait consacré toute sa vie à l'instruction de la jeunesse Chrétienne de son pays, et qui fut saisi et envoyé, chargé de fers, en éxil par ordre de son Altesse." (Ce sont les termes du Mémoire.)

Ce respectable vieillard à peine âgé de 50 ans, dénoncé comme perturbateur de l'ordre public, ainsi que la saisie de ses écrits l'a prouvé, fut tout bonnement éloigné du pays; les fers dont il serait chargé n'ont existé que dans l'imagination de l'informateur.

Ces quelques explications données en réponse aux chefs d'accusation consignés dans le document dont nous parlons, suffiront, nous en avons l'intime conviction, pour éclairer le jugement de l'auteur du Mémoire, et pour donner la mesure de l'inexactitude des différents autres cas y relatés, dont le redressement n'offre plus aucun intérêt. D'ailleurs l'auteur même du Mémoire, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, nous semble ne pas trop garantir l'authenticité des renseignements qu'il possède, et qui pourtant ont servi de matériaux à la confection de son Mémoire.

Nous nous croyons être en droit d'exprimer notre étonnement en voyant l'investigateur minutieux des actes du Grand Vézir, qu'il a suivi étape par étape et pas à pas, garder le silence le plus absolu sur tant d'heureux résultats de la tournée de son Altesse.

Le dit investigation n'a-t-il pas assisté au réglement définitif des différends provenant de la possession territoriale qui donnait lieu, depuis nombre d'années, à des contestations regrettables dans la Province de Nissa, où plus de dix villages Chrétiens détenus par des gens qui n'ont pas pu prouver suffisamment leurs droits de possession, ont été déclarés appartenant aux villageois Chrétiens libres de toute servitude? N'a-t-il

pas un connaissance de la résolution analogue prise à l'égard d'un nombre assez considérable d'autres villages, dont les propriétaires ont été forcés ou de vendre leurs propriétés aux villageois Chrétiens afin de mettre un terme aux plaintes soulevées par ces derniers, ou de modifier considérablement les conditions qui semblaient peser sur les villageois? Ne fut-il pas averti de l'abolition de quelques droits abusivement perçus? N'a-t-il pas aperçus l'empressement de son Altesse à satisfaire partout aux réclamations des Chrétiens, soit pour la diminution de quelques impôts, soit pour tout autre objet légitime qu'elles se proposaient?

Ce qui précède nous autorise à soutenir que ce Mémoire n'est pas rédigé dans des conditions capables de révoquer en doute la fidélité du rapport présenté à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan par son Altesse le Grand Vézir, sur sa tournée d'inspection. Quant aux accusations portées contre la conduite personnelle du Grand Vézir, et à ce que son Altesse aura fait mettre en prison deux Chrétiens et les aura menacé de la peine capitale pour avoir osé tenter des démarches auprès des Ambassades, nous laissons à la conscience de ceux qui ont lu le Mémoire en question de juger le mérite de ces assertions calomnieuses; assertions qui n'ont pu être adoptées par l'auteur que pour rendre son œuvre plus dramatique.

No. 79.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1861.

HER Majesty's Government propose to send two persons to Constantinople from here to look into and examine the state of the Turkish finances.

Would Turkish Government allow these persons to have access to all the documents to enable them to form an opinion as to the evils and remedies? Answer as soon as you can. Let me know your last news from Montenegro.

No. 80.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received March* 26.)

(No. 185.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 12, 1861.

I HAVE several times asked Aali Pasha for an answer to my note of the 29th of January on the Turkish finances, and his Highness has frequently promised me one; but the constant suspense in which the Government has been kept in respect to the Mirès Loan, on the execution of which depended all its arrangements, and the various other important and harassing questions which have occupied his Highness's time, may be pleaded, perhaps, in some degree in excuse for a neglect which otherwise would not be excusable. I, at all events, thought it better to address to him the inclosed note on the subject; after which, in a conversation I had with him, he made me the same apologies that I have made for him, adding I should have the answer in a few days.

He promised me at the same time a sketch of a plan which the Government thought of adopting in face of its present difficulties; and directly I get this I shall forward it to your Lordship.

What I urge the Government to do is, to look the whole of its difficulties fairly in the face, and meet them straightforwardly and manfully.

What I am afraid of its doing, is dealing with those difficulties piecemeal and by small and temporary expedients; a course I have always denounced, but which had some influential supporters.

Aali Pasha seems to have rather come round to my views on this subject.

The project now in view does not contemplate a foreign loan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER

Inclosure in No. 80.

Sir H. Bulwer to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, le 11 *Mars*, 1861.

Le Soussigné a remis une note sur l'état financier de la Turquie à son Altesse Aali Pacha, datée du 29 Janvier dernier. Cette note est restée jusqu'ici sans réponse. Or, l'état financier du Gouvernement Ottoman devient chaque jour plus critique, et la note en question, écrite d'après les ordres du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, indique les moyens par lesquels le crédit Ottoman pourrait renaître.

En outre, il faut se rappeler que les avis ainsi émis viennent du Représentant du pays où seul peut-être, dans un cas extrême, quelques sécours pécuniaires pourront se trouver.

Le Soussigné demande respectueusement si son Altesse Aali Pacha et la Sublime Porte ne prennent pas une sérieuse responsabilité en négligeant et même en laissant sans réponse, dans les circonstances pareilles, des conseils qui peuvent être d'une si haute importance.

En adressant cette question à son Altesse Aali Pacha, le Soussigné ne veut en rien mettre en doute ni le patriotisme, ni l'intelligence, ni l'activité de son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte. Bien au contraire, le Soussigné a la plus haute estime pour les qualités personnelles et intellectuelles et éminentes en tout genre de l'homme d'état à qui il s'adresse dans ce moment, et il connaît aussi les nombreuses et graves occupations de son Altesse. Mais de toutes les questions qui s'agitent dans ce moment, la plus grave est justement la question des finances.

A titre donc d'un ami dont le soin constant a été la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman, le Soussigné appelle encore une fois l'attention de son Altesse sur cette question, sollicitant la réponse qu'il attend depuis si long-temps, et prenant sur lui de conseiller à la Sublime Porte de se mettre d'accord avec les opinions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté sur un point où ces opinions, ainsi que celles des capitalistes et du public en Angleterre, pourraient avoir une si grande valeur pour le bien-être de la Turquie.

(Signé) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 81.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received March .)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 21, 1861.

THE Porte accedes most willingly to your Lordship's proposal to send out two persons to inquire into the state of the Turkish finances. They will have every facility accorded to them, and access to all necessary documents.

No. 82.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1861.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 113 of the 25th ultimo, calling my attention to the information given by Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles respecting a new system for collecting the tithes in Turkey, I have the honour to state that on the receipt of that despatch, Mr. Calvert's observations were at once brought by me to the notice of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 83.

Lord J. Russell to Lord Hobart and Mr. Foster.

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1861.

Sir,

I AM glad to avail myself of your services at Constantinople for inquiring into the condition of the Turkish finances, with a view to the improvement of the system now existing in regard to the collection, appropriation, and account of the revenues of the Porte. You will understand that in the performance of the task assigned to you, you are to act entirely under the direction of Her Majesty's Ambassador, but I should wish you to report to me from time to time the progress that you may be making, and your views as to the course which may be likely to ensure permanent benefit to the Porte as the result of your mission.

The resources of Turkey are abundant if properly turned to account, and it is probable that even under the present system the money levied on the population would, if it were all brought to account, place the Treasury in a much better position than that in which it now stands. But between the tenant or tax-payer and the Treasury, numerous parties intervene who, though it may be in different degrees, all combine to intercept for their own benefit a portion of the revenue which should be paid to the State; while large sums are wrongfully exacted under one denomination or the other, no portion of which is ever brought to account.

It seems to me that the first point to be looked to is, the sum that the several districts are legally bound to pay, and the security which can be devised for the entrance of that sum into the Treasury, and, as regards the tax-payer, for his immunity from further exaction not sanctioned by law.

The next point, with a view to increase the revenue of the State, would be to fix what proportion of this money now illegally exacted by local tax-gatherers might, without pressing injuriously on the population, be fairly added to the taxes which are now legally levied; and it is probable that a very considerable addition might be made to the public revenue not only without any increase of the burthens imposed on the population by the exactions of the tax-gatherer, who levies additional contributions for his own personal enrichment, but with a positive diminution of these burthens.

The next point would be, to provide for the issue of money from the Public Treasury under due control and responsibility; while the last would be the establishment of a proper system of audit, and the regularity and publicity of the accounts of revenue and expenditure. With respect to the head of expenditure, it is essential to ascertain the exact sums issued to each Minister having the control of any branch of the public service, and the mode in which those sums have been appropriated to Civil, Military, and Naval services. These accounts should be given in detail.

I feel persuaded that the knowledge which you possess in regard to matters coming within these several categories will enable you to offer very valuable suggestions to the Turkish Government, and I need not say that if the result of your labours should be to place the Turkish finances on a sound footing, you will have rendered a very essential service, not only to the Porte, but to the general interests of all Powers having relations, whether political or commercial, with Turkey.

The changes which are now in progress in regard to the duties on exports and imports will probably enable you to suggest many improvements in the Turkish Custom-houses, for the benefit of trade.

When you have agreed to a report upon any one branch of the various matters which will form the subject of your inquiry, you will submit the result to Sir H. Bulwer, and you will, after consultation on the different points involved in such report, leave it to him to convey the substance of such report to the Sultan in the manner which he shall deem most conducive to the end in view, and most in conformity with that friendly

interest in the prosperity of the Turkish Empire which has induced Her Majesty to sanction your mission.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 84.

Sir H. Bulwer to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received April* 27.)

(No. 277.)

Constantinople, April 16, 1861.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE to your Lordship a copy of the financial project which the Porte has at last brought out.

I need hardly say that it is very contrary to what I should have advised, but it is so thoroughly impracticable that it can never be carried into execution, and I look upon it merely as an excuse for sanctioning the monthly emission of 30,000,000 piastres in caimés, which the Porte absolutely requires for its urgent wants. In the meantime the scheme is to undergo the revision of the European Mixed Commission, and consequently will, I should trust, die still-born in its hands.

There are various means by which the Porte might provide a remedy for its difficulties, and some of these will no doubt, in the end, be adopted; but the total ignorance of the Government itself in matters of finance, and the readiness with which it listens to speculators and bankers in Galata, who represent all sound views as impracticable, lead the Porte astray.

The errors which it is making are so gross and palpable that they cannot be persevering.

The publication of the Budget, the control of the expenditure, and a new organization of the Financial Department, must precede any solid measure.

With these steps taken the establishment of an equality between the revenue and expenditure is easy, and the local debts might then be without much difficulty provided for.

I shall see with pleasure the two gentlemen whom Her Majesty's Government propose to send out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Financial Project of the Porte.

LES frais occasionnés par les expéditions militaires que le Gouvernement Impérial a dû entreprendre depuis quelques années par suite de diverses circonstances, et l'impossibilité de réduire immédiatement les charges que la dernière guerre avait tout naturellement contribué à augmenter d'une manière sensible, ont eu pour résultat l'insuffisance des ressources du Ministère des Finances, qui a amené à son tour une accumulation des dettes arriérées.

Le déficit annuel a éprouvé, il est vrai, une forte diminution provenant soit des différentes économies réalisées, soit d'un accroissement de revenus; en même temps, des dispositions doivent être prises incessamment pour le faire disparaître complétement et pour arriver, à l'aide des mesures qui s'élaborent en ce moment, à un juste équilibre des dépenses et des recettes de ce Ministère, ainsi qu'on le verra par la publication des budgets. Mais ces dettes ayant été une fois contractées et les diverses classes de la population étant constituées créancières du Trésor à divers titres, le Gouvernement Impérial, dont les intentions toujours bienveillantes ne lui permettent pas de souffrir que les intérêts privés ou publics soient lésés, avait songé à prévenir, au prix de grands sacrifices, la détresse des créanciers de l'état, et à épargner au public toutes les difficultés que cette situation amène

dans les transactions, en concluant au taux de 53 3/40/0 un emprunt en Europe; des garanties suffisantes y avaient été affectées sur les revenus du Trésor. Les circonstances ayant empêché la réussite de cet emprunt, le contrat intervenu a dû être résilié. Vu cet état de choses, qui, dans le cas où les dettes accumulées resteraient impayées, doit augmenter tous les jours la gêne des créanciers de l'état, entraver l'administration du Gouvernement et du pays, et arrêter toutes les affaires, il est devenu indispensable d'y remédier par une mesure intérieure, c'est-à dire, de faire appel à la fidélité et au dévoument éprouvés des habitants de l'Empire Ottoman pour leur Souverain, leur Gouvernement, et leur patrie. Tout le monde connaît les efforts sincères déployés pour le retrait des caïmés, émis precédemment, retrait exigé par les nombreux inconvénients que présente le papier-monnaie dont le chiffre était ignoré par le public, qui ne portait pas de numéros, et dont l'époque et le mode de remboursement n'étaient pas fixés. On n'a pas donc cru devoir suivre les mêmes errements et l'on a pensé à réunir toutes garanties désirables: impossibilité de dépasser un chiffre déterminé; affectation de revenus solides pour le retrait à opérer dans un délai fixé; administration régulière inspirant toute confiance au public; suppression, par la même occasion, des bechliks et autres monnaies altérées qui portent le trouble dans les transactions commerciales; enfin, formation d'un capital destiné à la construction et à la réparation des routes, ports et canaux, propres à faciliter et à développer les opérations du commerce. A cet effet, il a été arrêté ce qui suit:

Article 1. Il sera émis des caïmés pour la somme de 1,250,000,000 de piastres; ces caïmés circuleront comme monnaie dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Ottoman, et seront, sans aucune difficulté, reçus en paiement par toutes les administrations et caisses publiques, à l'exception des douanes.

Art. 2. Sur ce chiffre, 250,000,000 seront destinés à former les deux tiers du capital de 375,000,000 en monnaies de bon aloi, qui sera ainsi qu'il en est fait mention plus bas, affecté au maintien du change sur l'Europe, et le reste, soit un milliard, servira à retirer les caïmés actuellement en circulation, et à solder, d'après un mode économique, les dettes du Trésor provenant des arriérés de l'année 1276 et des années antérieures.

Art. 3. Afin de pouvoir effectuer l'émission à la fin du mois de Mars 1862, il sera procédé dès à présent à la confection des titres des 1,250,000,000 de caïmés dont le papier sera confectionné dans des fabriques spéciales de manière à en rendre la contrefaçon impossible. Ces titres, au fur et à mesure qu'ils auront été imprimés, seront consignés à la Commission de Remboursement dont il est fait mention plus loin, où ils seront numérotés et revêtus d'un timbre spécial. La totalité des caïmés devra être prête au mois de Mars; les opérations du maintien du change commenceront à partir de la fin du même mois.

Art. 4. Le capital de 375,000,000 de piastres en monnaie métallique, destiné au maintien du change, devant être disponible à la fin de Mars 1862, il sera immédiatement tiré, au moyen des planches actuellement existantes, des caïmés pour la somme de 150,000,000 à valoir sur les 500,000,000 affectés à cet objet, en pièces de 100, de 50, et de 20 piastres. Ces caïmés, formant la somme de 150,000,000, porteront au dos une inscription indiquant que leur mise en circulation pourra être effectuée à partir seulement de la fin du mois de Mars 1862, et seront dès à présent distribués aux populations de l'Empire, contre des monnaies d'or ou d'argent de bon aloi, à titre de prêt pour la période d'une année, à l'expiration de laquelle les porteurs auront la faculté de livrer ces titres à la circulation et d'en disposer à leur convenance. Dans le cas néanmoins où le public éprouverait trop de difficultés à se procurer la totalité de leur contre-valeur en monnaie de bon aloi, une partie de cette contre-valeur, égale au quart de chaque versement, pourra être reçue en bechlicks ou en altiliks. Une portion des 225,000,000 qui doit parfaire le capital, sera, jusqu'à concurrence de 100,000,000, convertie par les fonds du Trésor, contre lesquels seront délivrés des caïmés de pareille somme, pris sur ceux qui seront émis pour cette destination. Le solde sera réalisé au moyen des produits des forêts, des mines et des propriétés appartenant à l'Etat; ces produits seront confiés à la Commission de Remboursement

dont il est fait mention ci-après. Le bois de construction provenant des forêts, ainsi que les propriétés de l'Etat, seront vendus conformément aux lois de l'Empire et les mines seront données à ferme à des compagnies particulières.

Art. 5. L'émission des nouveaux caïmés ne devant avoir lieu qu'en Mars 1862, il sera émis à titre provisoire jusqu'à cette époque une somme mensuelle de 30,000,000 de caïmés, destinée a faire face aux besoins les plus pressants du Ministère des Finances. Ces caïmés, tirés au moyen des planches existantes, circuleront comme par le passé exclusivement à Constantinople, et serviront au paiement des dépenses les plus urgentes de l'Etat.

Art. 6. Il sera, dès à présent, institué une Banque de Change, placée sous la direction d'un Gouverneur nommé par le Gouvernement Impérial, et dont les Directeurs et autres fonctionnaires seront choisis parmi les personnes possédant toute la capacité requise. La Banque sera en compte-courant avec le Ministère des Finances, qui fera opérer contre reçus, le versement du capital réalisé au fur et à mesure des rentrées. Le rôle principal de la Banque, pendant toute la durée de la circulation des caïmés, consistera, au moyen de ce capital, à vendre des lettres de change sur l'Europe contre caïmés; à acheter des lettres de change présentant des garanties de solidité. Le détail de ses attributions sera déterminé par un réglement spécial. La moindre somme faisant partie du capital de la Banque ne pourra être détournée de sa destination, et en cas de contravention le Gouverneur et les Directeurs en seront collectivement responsables.

Art. 7. Le maintien du change commencera à la fin de Mars 1862, simultanément avec la mise en circulation des nouveaux caïmés, dont la totalité devra être disponible à cette époque. Une quantité suffisante de nouveaux caïmés sera expédiée dans les provinces à l'effet de retirer, pour les faire venir à Constantinople, les anciens caïmés émis en remboursement de l'emprunt et qui auront déjà été mis en circulation. Ces caïmés, ainsi que ceux existant actuellement dans la capitale ou qui auront été émis pour faire face aux dépenses courantes, seront aussi échangés contre les nouveaux et retirés. Toutes les avances du Ministère des Finances à valoir sur le capital de la Banque seront remboursées en nouveaux caïmés faisant partie de ce capital. Quant à l'émission du solde des nouveaux caïmés, elle aura lieu graduellement au fur et à mesure des besoins véritables. La circulation des nouveaux caïmés s'étendra à toutes les provinces de l'Empire à l'exception du Djiddé et du Yemen. Aucune autre espèce de papier-monnaie ne pourra exister dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire.

Art. 8. Tant qu'on n'aura pas assuré les moyens d'élever le chiffre des exportations pour le moins au niveau des importations, le maintien du change sera insuffisant pour fixer invariablement le cours des pièces d'or au taux normal et pour parvenir ainsi à préserver de toute atteinte la richesse du pays. L'adoption d'une pareille mesure ne pourrait donc avoir lieu qu'à titre provisoire jusqu'à la réalisation de ces moyens dont les principaux consistent à obtenir d'une part un accroissement des produits de l'Empire, et de l'autre, à construire les routes, canaux, &c., qui doivent en faciliter le transport. A cet effet, il sera émis dans une période de cinq ans, à raison de 20,000,000 par année, une somme de caïmés spécialement destinée à être employée aux travaux d'utilité publique.

Art. 9. Une somme de 75,000,000 de piastres, prise sur les garanties de l'emprunt contracté en dernier lieu en Europe, et dont le contrat vient d'être résilié, est affectée au remboursement graduel des nouveaux caïmés. Ces fonds seront consacrés chaque année au retrait de ces caïmés jusqu'à concurrence d'une somme égale. De cette manière, les 1,250,000,000 ci-dessus indiqués, ainsi que les 100,000,000 qui seront pris dans l'espace de cinq ans pour être employés à la construction des voies de communication, auront été complétement retirés et annulés pendant la dix-huitième année. En évaluant à une moyenne annuelle de 10,000,000 de piastres le chiffre des dépenses ordinaires de l'administration du change et les pertes qui en résulteraient pour elle de cette opération, le capital de 375,000,000 destiné

à soutenir le change se trouvera diminué de 150,000,000 à la fin de la quatorzième année. Le capital réduit à 225,000,000 servira à échanger chaque année, à partir de la quinzième, une somme de 100,000,000 de piastres en monnaies altérées, et l'on aura ainsi assuré, à la fin de la dix-huitième année, le retrait complet des caïmés en circulation, en même temps que celui des bechlicks, altiliks, et leurs subdivisions.

Art. 10. Sous la dénomination de "Commission de Remboursement des Caïmés," il sera institué dès à présent un Comité permanent, formé de sujets Ottomans et étrangers. Le président et les membres de cette Commission seront inamovibles, et ne pourront être remplacés qu'en cas de démissions ou délit. Cette Commission sera chargée des attributions suivantes:—1. Elle soumettra à son contrôle les nouveaux caïmés, qu'elle devra numéroter et revêtir d'un cachet spécial, et elle en fera faire l'enregistrement; les caïmés non revêtus du cachet de la Commission ne peuvent pas avoir cours. 2. Tous les caïmés émis en remplacement de ceux usés par la circulation devront, chaque fois que le renouvellement aura été reconnu nécessaire, passer comme la première fois par le contrôle de la Commission, qui sera tenu de les numéroter et cacheter. 3. Il sera mis à sa disposition chaque année jusqu'à la fin de l'opération la somme de 75,000,000 de piastres faisant partie des revenus désignés et affectés au remboursement des caïmés; au moyen de ces fonds, elle retirera annuellement, jusqu'à due concurrence des caïmés qu'elle transmettra au Ministère des Finances après les avoir annulés; elle rédigera chaque année un tableau indiquant les numéros des caïmés annulés, et un exemplaire imprimé de ce tableau sera envoyé par elle à chacun des vérificateurs dont il est fait mention ci-après. 4. Chaque année, à partir de la douzième, elle se fera remettre par la Banque du Change les 50,000,000 qui aux termes de l'Article 9 devront être distraits du capital de celle-ci. Au moyen de ces fonds, elle retirera annuellement des monnaies de mauvais aloi pour une somme égale. 5. Elle conservera en dépôt dans ses caisses les 100,000,000 caïmés destinés aux routes, ports et canaux; sur cette somme elle versera contre reçus 20,000,000 chaque année directement entre les mains de l'administration chargée de ces travaux. Ces reçus seront transmis par elle au Ministère des Finances. 6. Elle sera chargée de vendre, conformément aux lois de l'Empire, les propriétés disponibles appartenant à l'Etat; de donner à terme les mines et les forêts aux compagnies concessionnaires et d'en verser les produits à la banque, qui devra ajouter ces fonds au capital affecté au maintien du change. 7. Enfin elle examinera les dettes susceptibles d'être consolidées, et prendre à cet égard les dispositions nécessaires.

Art. 11. Dans chaque ville principale il sera désigné un vérificateur chargé d'examiner les caïmés faux qui auraient pu se glisser parmi ceux en circulation dans les provinces, et d'éclaircir les doutes des porteurs qui se présenteraient à lui. Ces vérificateurs, choisis parmi les personnes connues par leur capacité et probité, recevront des émoluments suffisants.

No. 85.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 272.)

Foreign Office, April 29, 1861.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 277 of the 16th instant, inclosing a copy of the new financial scheme of the Porte, which is to be referred to the revision of the Mixed European Commission, and I concur in your opinion with regard to it; but as our Agents specially appointed to inquire into the Turkish finances are on their way to Constantinople, it is not necessary for Her Majesty's Government to examine this plan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 86.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 348.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1861.

I HAVE received from Her Majesty's Consul at Monastir, a copy of his despatch to your Excellency No. 19 of the 10th instant, reporting the abuses which have been practised in that province in assessing the agricultural population under the new Turkish Tithes Commutation Tax; and I have to instruct your Excellency to represent this case to Aali Pasha, if you have not already done so.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 87.

Lord J. Russell to Sir H. Bulwer.

(No. 437.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 4, 1861.

THE accession of a new Sultan appears to Her Majesty's Government to furnish a fit occasion for the Turkish Government to make a vigorous effort to relieve the Empire from that financial embarrassment to which all the enemies of the Porte have pointed as the sure and proximate cause of the fall of the Ottoman power.

Yet there are ample means in Turkey for falsifying this prediction. The Empire has provinces of great fertility, and is inhabited by races some of which have industry and a genius for trade, while others furnish hardy and obedient soldiers, the fit materials for a strong and faithful army.

Integrity, order, energy, and impartial justice, would soon redress the most flagrant evils: economy would in a few months furnish a surplus beyond the ordinary expenditure.

Upon these means Her Majesty's Government are convinced Sultan Aziz ought to rely. Her Majesty's Government would consider they were faithless friends to the Porte if they held out any prospect of the guarantee of a loan. It would be pouring water into a cask with a hole in its bottom. But when order and economy with publicity of accounts shall have restored confidence to capitalists, the Sultan will find that the credit of his Government will stand as high as that of any State on the Continent of Europe.

Lord Hobart and Mr. Foster will, I trust, before long be able to furnish you with an authentic report on the state of the Turkish finances.

With that report in your hands your Excellency will be able to give proofs to the Porte of that sincere friendship which animates Her Majesty's Government, and which is as far apart from flattery as it is from hostility or indifference. It is the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government to see the Ottoman race combine with its ancient virtues of courage and fidelity, the improvements and the acts which modern civilization has spread over Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.